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HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS ON CYPRUS

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE PROBLEMS
CONNECTED WITH REFUGEES AND ESCAPEES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 26, 1974

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary



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
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APPROXIMATE AREA OF TURKISH MILITARY OCCUPATION OF CYPRUS as of OCTOBER



HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS ON CYPRUS

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1974

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON REFUGEES AND ESCAPEES,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 4232, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Edward M. Kennedy [chairman] presiding.

Present: Senators Kennedy and Fong.

Also present: Dale S. deHaan, staff director; Jerry M. Tinker, staff consultant; and Joanna Reagan, secretary.

Senator KENNEDY. The subcommittee will come to order.

Today's hearing resumes the subcommittee's public inquiry into the Cyprus refugee problem and United States policy toward recent developments in the eastern Mediterranean.

OPENING STATEMENT

Since the outbreak of violence in mid July, the subcommittee has closely followed developments on the island. An earlier hearing was held on August 20, and shortly thereafter a fact-finding mission traveled to Cyprus on behalf of the subcommittee. Just a few days ago the study mission returned to Washington, and we shall hear their report this morning.

The Turkish invasion and occupation of Cyprus has turned the island into shambles. In political terms, it violated the integrity of an independent state. In economic terms, it shattered the island's flourishing development. And in human terms, it brought personal tragedy to thousands of families—and a nightmare of death and horror and grief.

A drive along the roads of Cyprus quickly tells the tragic tale of the Cypriot people—of the human consequences of an armed invasion, of bombing and napalm, of cease-fire violations, of military occupation, and man's inhumanity to man.

In the occupied territory only a small percentage of the population remains—including some 8,000 Turkish refugees bombed out of their homes. Desolation and destruction mark many areas. Whole villages and towns and cities are empty of people, who fled their homes in fear of advancing Turkish forces. The 15,000 to 20,000 Greeks who remain are being held as virtual hostages—often without adequate food and water and medical care. And some 500 are being cruelly detained in Kyrenia's Dome Hotel.

Government-controlled areas have been inundated with refugees from the north. Over 200,000 men, women, and children—at least a third of the population—have been seeking shelter wherever they can find it—in open fields, under trees, along the roadsides, and in schools, monasteries, and public buildings. Only in the last 2 or 3 weeks have relief supplies begun to arrive in meaningful quantities, and clusters of tents are beginning to sprout around towns and cities in Government-controlled areas of the island. But food, blankets, medicines, and other relief goods are still in short supply. And with the approach of the rainy season and the winter cold, the condition of the people will deteriorate unless adequate relief measures are taken now, or a political settlement is accomplished, which will permit the refugees to return to their homes. The overwhelming majority of needy people in Government-controlled areas are Greek Cypriots. But significant numbers of Turks—including some 10,000 refugees—also command our help and concern.

A great deal has been said over America's role in the crisis, and over the apparent complicity of our Government in the human and political tragedy of Cyprus.

We are told by our Government that we must be practical in our approach to the crisis. We must understand what has happened. And we must accept the new realities on the island.

But what are these new realities? And what are we being asked to understand and accept?

Are we to condone the invasion and occupation of Cyprus? Are we to condone cease-fire violations and the nibbling away of an independent state? Are we to condone the human tragedy brought about with American-supplied weapons, and stand silent in the face of these realities?

I believe the American people expect more of their Government. And I call on the President and members of the administration to give some greater evidence of concern and action over the tragedy of Cyprus, and over the needed diplomacy to restore the island's territorial integrity, and the right of the Cypriot people, working together, to determine their own destiny. We must do all in our power to accomplish this end, including the allocation of foreign military assistance to Turkey. Important first steps must include a strengthened United Nations presence on the island, the orderly withdrawal of Turkish Forces, and the return of refugees to their homes.

With such goals in mind, we should also strengthen our support of relief and rehabilitation efforts by the Cyprus Government, the Turkish Cypriot administration, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Red Cross, and others. We should lend our diplomacy to the reopening of the Nicosia Airport, which would greatly facilitate the work of the international relief agencies.

We should lend our diplomacy to help guarantee the free access of these agencies, for humanitarian purposes, to all parts of the Turkish-occupied area.

And we should increase our contributions to the U.N. High Commissioner and the other programs for the relief and rehabilitation of the refugees and other Cypriots in distress. I have introduced an amendment for this purpose to the pending foreign assistance bill.¹

¹ For the text of the amendment, see app. IV.

And I am extremely hopeful that, given the very urgent human needs in Cyprus and so many other areas of the world, the amendment will be adopted by the Senate, and the foreign assistance legislation will be expedited toward enactment.

STUDY MISSION REPORT

Our first witness this morning, Dr. Dennis Skiotis, is assistant professor of Ottoman and modern Greek and Turkish history at Harvard University. He was a member of the subcommittee's study mission to Cyprus—an invaluable member of the team, speaking fluent Greek and Turkish—and he has had long experience and study in the region, living both in Greece and Turkey.

Professor Skiotis recently served as the director of the Harvard University program under the National Defense Education Act at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies. He has published numerous studies and research papers on Greek and Turkish history.

We welcome him this morning for the very special and knowledgeable perspective he can bring to the current crisis on Cyprus. So we want to welcome you, Professor. We again want to express the great appreciation of the members of this committee for your willingness, on very short notice, to spend the time that you did with our team in this area.

As you are well aware, this committee has been concerned about humanitarian problems in all parts of the world. So often, as we have seen, time and time again—whether we are talking about Vietnam or the Bangladesh problem or the Biafran refugees—it is the people who come last in terms of political decisions. This despite the great protestations by political leaders that it is people who have their first interest. Yet, they are always the ones, as I am sure you will relate to this committee this morning, and as I have seen in my visits to war-torn areas of the world, as well as to areas which have experienced natural disasters, it is always the people, the young and the very old, who suffer the cruelest fate in these situations. And it has always been my belief that concern for refugees and for the weak and the old and the children are very much a part of our heritage in this country and should be one of the strongest interests that we have.

So your willingness to help and assist us in trying to point out ways that we in the Congress and the Senate can respond to these needs, will, I know, be of great value, and I want to indicate at the outset, personally, how much I appreciate your willingness to undertake this responsibility.

Before we start, we want to recognize the Senator from Hawaii, Senator Fong, who is an extremely active member of this subcommittee and who always takes a very keen interest in its workings and has worked very closely with me and other Members of the Senate in trying to make sure that we have a responsible policy toward refugees in all parts of the world.

Senator FONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have nothing to say except that I am glad that you have called this hearing so that we can review the Cyprus question.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much.

Professor Skiotis, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF DENNIS SKIOTIS, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF OTTOMAN AND MODERN GREEK AND TURKISH HISTORY, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, AND MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE'S STUDY MISSION TO CYPRUS

Dr. SKIOTIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Fong.

By way of introduction, I would like to note briefly the activities of the study mission team on Cyprus. We visited the island during the first week of September, traveling extensively in refugee areas on both sides of the ceasefire line. In the government-controlled area in the south, we spent almost 3 full days in the region where the great bulk of the Greek Cypriot refugees are located. We had unrestricted and free access to all areas, and the Government of Cyprus was fully cooperative. We chose where and when we wanted to stop, and we spoke with hundreds of refugees.

ACTIVITIES OF THE STUDY MISSION

We also spent 2 days in the Turkish occupied areas, visiting Turkish Cypriot refugees in Nicosia, and traveling north to Kyrenia and Bellapais, and to the port of Famagusta in the east. We were received cordially by the Turkish Cypriot administration. However, we had only restricted access to military occupied areas, which now comprise some 40 percent of the island—perhaps more. There are frequent checkpoints, and travel arrangements must be cleared with local Turkish commanders. This applied as much to the Turkish Cypriots as it did to us.

During our stay on Cyprus, we met twice with acting President Clerides, and conferred with members of his government, with relief officials, as well as representatives of the Cypriot Red Cross. On the Turkish side, we met with Mr. Rauf Denktash, the constitutional Vice President of Cyprus and the head of the Turkish Cypriot community, with members of his administration and with relief officials of the Red Crescent Society. In addition, we met with the representatives of the international committee of the Red Cross, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and the United Nations Forces in Cyprus—UNFICYP. Traveling to and from Cyprus, we met with foreign ministry officials in Ankara and Athens and London. In Athens, in particular, we met with Mr. Dimitrios Bitsios, who was then acting Foreign Minister; and in Ankara conferred with senior diplomats, including Mr. Sukru Elekdag, soon to be the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry.

In Geneva we met with officials of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. In London we visited with the President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, and held discussions with British Foreign Office and relief officials.

ANTI-AMERICAN FEELINGS ON CYPRUS

The new American Ambassador to Cyprus, William Crawford, and his staff, extended every courtesy to us. In fact, quite by coinci-

dence, we traveled with the Ambassador enroute to Cyprus and appreciated learning his views. I should note at this point, Mr. Chairman, that the Department of State and the Embassy had originally expressed concern over our mission, concern over security and over the dangers arising out of strong anti-American feelings in Cyprus. I think there was some surprise, therefore, when we—as representatives of this subcommittee and carrying your expression of personal concern, Mr. Chairman—received a very warm reception in the refugee areas. We were actually cheered and applauded—all signs of the great appreciation felt by the people of Cyprus at this first public expression of American concern over the tragedy of Cyprus and particularly, of course, the plight of the refugees.

REFUGEES: PAWNS IN A POLITICAL STRUGGLE

Once again, Mr. Chairman, refugees have become pawns in a political struggle between two sides. Once again we are being treated to a heartless numbers game of how many refugees—if any—will be permitted to return to their lands and their homes. New frontiers, new schemes for new constitutional structures are being bruited constantly. In the meantime, the refugees wait, and they suffer. The picture on Cyprus, on the fabled island of Aphrodite, could not be grimmer, and fear and frustration have gripped 90 percent of the population—Greeks and Turks alike.

To explain fully how all of this came to pass, one would have to go back in history for perhaps 1,000 years; for, unfortunately, Greek-Turkish antagonism has lasted that long. In a more extensive report that we will provide to this subcommittee, we will furnish more of this background, but perhaps today in the limited time that I have available, I will begin with what might be called the events of the day before yesterday.

SCENARIO OF THE CRISIS

The whole tragic story began on July 15, when the legitimate government of President Makarios in Cyprus was overthrown in a coup led by Greek officers, mainland Greek officers, on instructions from the military junta ruling in Athens. Nikos Sampson was the puppet installed by the junta in Athens as President and despite a flurry of diplomatic activity, Turkey launched an invasion of the island 5 days later—ostensibly to protect the island's 18 percent Turkish minority; to protect it from the threat of enosis, union of Cyprus with Greece.

The Turkish landings were resisted stubbornly by the Greek Cypriots and in that same week, July 20, the United Nations Security Council adopted the first of a number of strongly worded resolutions calling for an immediate ceasefire; urging an end to foreign intervention and withdrawal of all foreign troops from the island; and requesting the guarantor powers of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and Britain to start negotiations for a settlement.

A shaky cease-fire went into effect shortly thereafter—with the Turkish Army steadily expanding the width of their corridor from Kyrenia to Nicosia. But efforts to work out a settlement in the second

round of the Geneva peace talks collapsed on August 14 after Turkey refused to allow the Greek and Greek Cypriot delegations a 36-hour delay to confer with their respective governments on new Turkish proposals.

TURKISH LINES THE END OF INVASION'S 1st PHASE

(prior to Aug. 13, 1974)



from The Economist

Before dawn, the Turkish Army, heavily reinforced with armor and enjoying total air superiority, slashed across Cyprus toward both east and west. In 3 days, this overwhelming military thrust sliced off at least 40 percent of Cyprus which was slightly more than the Turks had been demanding in the Geneva talks. The rapid and effortless Turkish military advance on Cyprus had both a profound repercussion at the international level and a devastating effect on the population of the island.

EVENTS IN GREECE

At the international level, Greece, headed since July 23 by the civilian government of Constantine Karamanlis—who had been recalled to Greece as a result of the junta's blunder on Cyprus—briefly considered war with Turkey; rejected that option, but withdrew militarily from NATO. This was done in reaction to U.S. policy which was widely reported as having first tilted toward the junta and the Sampson coup and then, after the first invasion, toward Turkey.

Indeed, U.S. policy at every crucial stage of the Cyprus crisis seems to have been one of hasty improvisation, coldly calculated to minimize disturbances within NATO. Not only did it achieve the opposite result in the end, but more importantly, in human terms, it failed the defenseless people of Cyprus.

For whatever the merits or dubious legality of the initial Turkish landings, the second phase of the Turkish Army's so-called "peace operation" on the island—particularly after the Sampson regime had given way to the moderate and constitutional leadership of Glafkos Clerides—was an unjustifiable violation of the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. In fact, Mr. Chairman, in simple language, it was aggression.

WHAT SHOULD U.S. POLICY HAVE BEEN?

Senator KENNEDY. Let me ask you here, Professor, what do you think the United States could have done to have prevented it?

Dr. SKIOTIS. Mr. Chairman, in 1963 and in 1967, when there were two previous crises on the island, the United States was able, through diplomatic means, to defuse the issue and to avoid the consequences we are facing on the island today. It is difficult to begin to enumerate all the kind of activities that the United States might have been able to undertake to insure that this situation did not develop.

We could start, I think, by saying that a high level emissary, on the precedent of the 1963-64 and 1967 crises, could have been sent, before things got out of hand, to Ankara and to Athens, to draw the attention of these governments to the threat to world peace. This was done before but done too late this time.

We know that the Greek Government, the U.S. Government, the Government of Cyprus, and the Government of Turkey were all aware that a coup against Makarios was being planned. And it seems to me that a much stronger American representation could have been made to the Athens junta before it all happened, so that, in fact, these consequences would not have occurred.

Secondly, when the Sampson government came into power, the United States could have repudiated that regime in the strongest terms. I do not think that this was done.

Third, at the Geneva peace talks, the United States could have acted in a much more positive and constructive manner and used its great influence over both countries—both members of NATO at that time—to bring about a negotiated settlement. The Turks at that time had a small but firm beachhead on the island of Cyprus, and they would have been able to see to it that the legitimate grievances of the Turkish Cypriot minority would have been met in any new arrangements, diplomatic arrangements that would be worked out.

I also think, finally, that the second phase of the Turkish military operations on the island was something that could have been avoided with significant and active American diplomatic activity, in the course of the Geneva talks and after.

We are now, as you know, engaged in speculation and discussion about what the United States can do at this point in time to bring about a negotiated, just, and lasting settlement to this problem, but I think that a lot of opportunities were passed up in this regard previously.

CURRENT SITUATION ON CYPRUS

When one goes to Cyprus, one is overwhelmed with impressions. But I think the other members of the study mission would agree with me that there were two stark realities, however, that stand out above

all others. One is the presence of an army of occupation, of 40,000 troops, that command 40 percent, perhaps a little bit more, of the territory of Cyprus. And the second is the tremendous humanitarian crisis confronting something like half of the population of the island, most of whom are refugees. Others are civilian detainees; others are prisoners of war; others are in need of relief assistance. And these people are present on both sides of the uncertain cease-fire line. We saw literally thousands of refugees and spoke to hundreds of them, Greeks and Turks. And in order to facilitate our understanding, the understanding of the subcommittee, regarding the problems they faced, we tended to separate them into categories [see table 1].

TABLE 1.—*Humanitarian problems in Cyprus*¹

I. Refugees:	
1. In Government controlled areas:	
Greek Cypriot refugees	194, 000
Post-cessce-fire refugees (from Athna and other areas along cease-fire line)	20, 000
Turkish Cypriots displaced or cut off	34, 000
2. In Turkish-occupied areas:	
Greek Cypriots displaced or cut off	20, 000
Turkish Cypriot refugees	8, 000
II. Prisoners and detainees, both sides	6, 000
Total	282, 000

¹ Based upon statistics of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross, as of Sept. 15, 1974.

GREEK CYPRIOT REFUGEES

The first, and by far the largest and the most serious category, are the Greek Cypriot refugees in the Government-controlled areas in the south. There are probably close to 200,000 refugees of this sort, who fled prior to the cease-fire, from Turkish-occupied areas; and there are probably another 20,000 post-cessce-fire refugees who fled from Turkish areas due to continued cease-fire violations.

These refugees are everywhere present. Driving along the roads in the southern portion of the island is really to drive through an endless refugee camp. They were under the trees, along the roadsides—under small lean-to huts, awaiting more permanent shelter. Public buildings and accommodations are crammed with refugees; schools, churches, monasteries, civic buildings are also filled with them. District towns have doubled and tripled in size; unemployment rolls are being swelled.

A typical situation was that in the town of Ormidhia, whose population has jumped as a result of the refugee influx by some 300 percent. An empty soccer field was being turned into a refugee city of tents; tents that were originally designed to hold 6 people now hold 2 families with 14 women and children huddled together.

PROBLEMS FACING REFUGEES

The problems facing the refugees of Cyprus are the classic problems which confront refugees everywhere. This includes the need for shelter, for blankets, for food, for the necessities of life. Everywhere we went, everything was in short supply. Many of these items were unavailable. In particular, there was a desperate need for blankets.

There was promise that blankets were on the way, but our own personal observation showed that at the present time this was a crisis of great proportion. The refugees in areas that have a roof over their heads are sleeping on cold concrete, damp floors. Food supplies were rapidly dwindling. And although relief officials were hoping to expand the ration program to include protein foods—milk and other supplies—this would only be possible if—and this is a big “if”—if supplies arrived on schedule from abroad before government stocks became depleted.

POST-CEASEFIRE REFUGEES

While we were on Cyprus and during our tour of these refugees in the Greek-controlled southern zone, the Turks were engaging in what the United Nation's officials described to us as “armed reconnaissance in force” along the ceasefire-line. These land grabs, or “salami tactics,” as they are often referred to in the press, were creating a second type of refugee problem—refugees leaving the areas, leaving their homes and their lands after the initial ceasefire agreements had been signed.

Whether real or imagined—and it is probably real—the fear of the Turkish military on the island is widespread. The Greek Cypriots flee at the moment they hear the slightest rumor that the Turkish Army is on the move, or as soon as they catch a glimpse of the advancing Turkish troops. Stories of rough, sometimes brutal, treatment of civilians by Turkish forces in Kyrenia after the first phase of the invasion had spread over the island like wildfire. Thus, after the second phase began, Greek Cypriots did not wait around to find out whether, in fact, there were Turks advancing on their village or not; they would flee if they thought this was even a possibility.

As I said, we saw direct evidence of this while we were on Cyprus. The area of the Athna Forest, which borders the British Base Area of Dhekelia, was being inundated with a stream of refugees approaching from the village of Athna. Most of them were driving into the base. They had baskets, mattresses, pot and pans—whatever they could fill up their cars with or the buses that were transporting them into the base. And they were settling there in the forest with no tents, no blankets, no water. Just seeking security from the advancing forces. Many of these refugees have moved two or three times.

BRITISH BASES AND THE REFUGEES

The policy of the British, Mr. Chairman, is to do the minimum possible for the refugees who seek refuge on their base. A British colonel, who was in charge of a modest field kitchen which comprised the British relief effort told us quite candidly that the British did not want to accept the refugees and only did so in the beginning because they were seeking sanctuary from actual combat. Now that a ceasefire had been declared, they wanted them off the base.

TURKISH CYPRIOTS IN GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED AREAS

A third category of refugees and persons in duress are the Turkish Cypriots in government controlled areas. All told, there are probably 34,000 Turks in this category, of which, perhaps

10,000—mostly at the Akrotiri British base—can be classified refugees. In almost every way, their plight is the same as that of their Greek Cypriot counterparts.

In addition, there are several thousand Turkish Cypriots cut off or isolated either by choice or circumstance in Turkish villages or in Turkish quarters of the larger towns. These beleaguered villages and quarters in the towns are under the observation and protection of United Nations Forces in Cyprus and are receiving relief assistance from the ICRC or the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.

We also visited one mixed village—a mixed village, that is to say, including both Greeks and Turks—where the Turkish quarter has not been disturbed, having hoisted a white flag above the mosque as a signal it had no hostile intentions. We did not see any harm being done to these Turkish Cypriots. However, there can be no doubt that other villages feel beleaguered and isolated. As one United Nations official put it to us: "Objectively nothing has changed in these Turkish villages, but there is a fear there now that something has changed." And in the context of random violence and mass killings, the apprehension that conditions may change for the worse from minute to minute does not serve to reassure Cypriots in enclaves on whatever side of the cease-fire line they find themselves at their present time.

TURKISH CYPRIOT REFUGEES

The last category of refugees and persons in need are those in the Turkish occupied area, involving some 8,000 Turkish Cypriot refugees and an estimated 20,000 Greek Cypriots cut off by the advancing Turkish forces.

The Turkish Cypriot refugees are those who could have been displaced during the conflict, such as those around the old city of Famagusta, and those who have fled from the south to the north. We visited two schools in the Turkish sector of Nicosia where such refugees were located. The few we saw appeared to be in good condition, with no overcrowding, and adequate relief assistance from the Turkish Red Crescent Society.

However, Mr. Chairman, the refugees the Turks most often mention are not those from the current conflict, but rather from the 1963-64 intercommunal violence, when some 25,000 Turkish Cypriots were displaced. We visited one such area bordering Nicosia called Omorphita, which is a symbol of the neglect the Turks feel the Greek Cypriots and others paid to their needs 11 years ago.

GREEK CYPRIOTS CUT-OFF IN THE NORTH

The second type of refugee problem in the Turkish occupied areas is that of the Greek Cypriots isolated in Kyrenia and Bellapais, and an uncertain number of villagers cut off and isolated in the so-called panhandle, Karpasia, estimated at 15,000 people. We were unable to arrange a visit to this cut-off area, but we are very concerned about what is going on there. Reports from the U.N. indicate that the people there are in increasingly desperate straits—running out of food and other supplies. To date, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees has been unable to freely deliver relief supplies or to have

unrestricted access to refugees in the Turkish occupied areas. Until this is done, the world will not know the full tragedy of Cyprus, nor will we be able to provide all the help we can. And until the Turkish policy of isolating inhabitants of Karpasia ends, the world must assume they have something to hide. This policy, Mr. Chairman, contrasts sharply with the free access enjoyed by the United Nations and the Red Cross throughout the Government-controlled area in the south.

PRISONERS AND DETAINEES

Finally, there is the humanitarian problem of releasing prisoners of war and civilian detainees—some 6,000 on both sides. Considerable and very encouraging progress has been made in this area, resulting from the recent talks, under U.N. auspices, between President Clerides and Vice President Denktash. Two prisoner exchanges have been made, and more are promised next week. But, according to a brief radio announcement that I heard this morning, it seems that these talks are now jeopardized once again, and I think that this underscores the tremendous importance and fragility of these discussions now going on between local Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders on Cyprus.

Senator KENNEDY. Did you visit any detainees?

Dr. SKIOTIS. We visited Turkish detainees, or prisoners of war—the terms are blurred, as you can well imagine in a situation of intra-communal conflict—in Limassol. They were kept in a school. They were under U.N. protection, as well as Greek Cypriot and National Guard protection. And they seemed to have adequate facilities—food, medical attention, and so forth. The ICRC had free access.

In the northern zone—that is under Turkish control—we visited detainees at the areas of Bellapais, where they were mostly women, children, and men, old men over the age of 65 or 70. The men of military age had been taken away by the Turks to unknown destinations, as far as their families knew; perhaps to Turkey, we were told later; perhaps to Turkish confinement areas in Nicosia.

This breaking up of the families by arresting the men of military age was one of the important factors in assuring that Greek families fled united in the second phase of the Turkish operation, because the families that stayed behind in the first phase had this separation of men from the rest of their families. So, in the second phase there was a mass exodus.

We also visited detainees in the Dome Hotel in Kyrenia. There were approximately 450 Greeks there, and they were confined to the hotel and were being guarded by Turkish Cypriot police from the Turkish Cypriot administration, as well as by the Turkish Army. At that time they had not been released, and most of them, of course, wanted to go back to their homes in Kyrenia or areas nearby.

On the question of detainees in Turkey—it is our understanding that there were two prisoner of war camps and that Red Cross officials had visited these areas infrequently.

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE INVASION

The economic consequences of the invasion are, of course, very difficult to quantify. Within so short time after the invasion and the

Turkish Army's control of the northern part of Cyprus, movement is restricted. So, it is very hard to find out what is going on. But for a state as small as Cyprus, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the economic consequences have been catastrophic.

There is relatively minimal structural damage caused by the invasion, except for the areas in the Kyrenia-Nicosia enclave and right around the borders of the enclave, which was the site of the original Turkish landings and the staging ground for their further advance into phase two. But there has been considerable looting in many areas. Kyrenia, for example, has been looted beyond description. And we, in our tours of the Turkish section of Cyprus, saw firsthand two military trucks loaded with miscellaneous pieces of furniture being carted to some unknown destination down the road from Famagusta.

The new city of Famagusta—the “Miami Beach” area known as Varosha—is the major exception to the problem of looting. Care has been taken by the Turkish authorities to seal off this city from all potential looters. But it is totally empty and is a symbol of what has happened to the economy of Cyprus. This once bustling city of 40,000, a key element in the island's tourist industry, is now a ghost town. We walked down the main street, John F. Kennedy Boulevard, amid high rise hotels and apartments and expensive shops, and could see only a few stray dogs and cats and a lonely contingent of Swedish U.N. troops. An entire metropolitan area has become a refugee.

ECONOMIC LOSSES

Since the Turkish invasion, the Government of Cyprus estimates that the country is losing some \$4.5 million in economic production every day. The vast citrus industry in the Morphou area rots on the trees. The fields of wheat, which should now be planted, lie fallow. Unknown numbers of livestock and cattle are dead because of the lack of food and water. The mines and light industry lie idle. And not a single tourist remains on the island. It will not be too many months before the foreign exchange crisis becomes critical—a fact that has only been delayed temporarily by the action of Greece in providing some \$17 million each month in financial support of the Government of Cyprus.

There can be little doubt, Mr. Chairman, that the damage to the economy of Cyprus will only serve to heighten the plight of the people, and make the life of the refugees all the more precarious. With each passing day, the economic situation grows worse, as will the condition of the refugees, if something more is not done very soon.

INTERNATIONAL RELIEF EFFORT

A significant international relief effort is now underway. The International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees have both begun fund drives. They have made appeals for contributions, but they have both only received token amounts to date. The United Nations High Commissioner has said, for example, that his goal is \$22 million, and he has only received \$4.5 million of that. Greece has given considerable bilateral aid to

Cyprus; and the United States has pledged \$3 million to the U.N. High Commissioner's program and has provided approximately \$5 million in cash and kind to date. But there are still massive relief needs to be met.

Blankets and tents are required on an urgent airlift basis. In addition, the medical situation, which is pretty stable now, will surely deteriorate as refugee camps become crowded and as the rains come. A World Health representative told us that medical requirements are needed to head off epidemics.

EFFECTIVE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT RELIEF PROGRAM

We were very impressed, Mr. Chairman, at the capacity of the Government of Cyprus to undertake relief programs and absorb relief assistance under the most difficult of circumstances. They have the talent, the energy, the infrastructure, the education, and most of all, the concern, to carry forth a meaningful and significant relief effort—if they are given the tools and the resources to help them help themselves. This we and the international community cannot fail to do.

POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE INVASION

The political consequences of the invasion can be said to be without a doubt the destruction of the constitutional framework and political structure of the Government of Cyprus as established in 1960.

The future of Cyprus will be a future governed by a new and different governmental and political structure. Most frequently mentioned in this connection is some form of territorial separation of the two communities on the island—of the geographic segregation of Turkish and Greek Cypriots, thus creating a Turkish majority area on Cyprus.

To an outside observer, it may seem possible and even easy to work out some kind of new biregional arrangement on either side of the present cease-fire line. But, Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that any Greek Cypriot Government can be found that would accept a settlement imposed by the force of arms, and predicated on the nonreturn of two out of five of its people. If that solution is, in fact, forced upon the Greek Cypriots, there can be little doubt that they will be left with no alternative but guerrilla war—with all that that implies for the future peace and stability of the eastern Mediterranean. The very likely outcome of a prolonged stalemate would be de facto partition; in effect, double enosis—the political, or at the very minimum, administrative and economic union of the two separate parts of Cyprus with Greece and Turkey. In the process, Cyprus would cease to exist.

IMPACT OF PARTITION

Senator KENNEDY. Are you suggesting that if there is some kind of a partition with a variation of where those lines are now, where the Turkish military forces are now, and requiring a rather significant movement of people, the movement of Turkish Cypriots from the southern part up to the north, and the movement of the Greeks from the north to the south—you think that there would be the kind of result that you have outlined here?

Dr. SKIOTIS. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

I think the figures here are very interesting. We have more Greek refugees displaced from the northern section that is presently controlled by the Turkish Army than there are Turks on the island as a whole. We have more——

Senator KENNEDY. Do they want to leave the north, or would they rather stay? What would be their attitude if they knew that there was going to be Turkish control of that area?

Dr. SKIOTIS. The Greek Cypriots of the northern sector would not return to the Turkish zone if the Turkish Army was there in force. And there is still some doubt in my mind whether they would even return with United Nations protection.

The cost of partition would be massive in human terms—in population terms. In economic terms, it would be disastrous. And the legacy of bitterness—it is hard to conceive of any Greek Cypriot living in peace in the south and not feeling that he had been deprived of his land, his home, his well being, his economic sustenance. I think it would be the ripest kind of ground for tension and terrorism.

TURKISH GOVERNMENT'S GOALS ON CYPRUS

Senator KENNEDY. It seems that that is really what the Turkish Government is holding out for, though, is it not—partition? As far as their opening position in Geneva.

Dr. SKIOTIS. There is no question in my mind that that is what the Turkish Government wants.

Senator KENNEDY. And you think that barring a military force there, of Turkish occupation, that it could not probably hold together if you had the partition? And even with a military occupation, you will also run into the kind of guerrilla activity and violence you have described?

Dr. SKIOTIS. That is correct.

The Greeks form 80 percent of the population of Cyprus, and it is hard to conceive of a situation where they will be deprived of 40 percent of the land on Cyprus and about 70 percent of the economic resources and not wish to do something about that injustice. Without the presence of the Turkish Army in the northern sector, I do not think that this would be a feasible arrangement.

Senator KENNEDY. I understand.

Dr. SKIOTIS. On this question of the consequences of partition, the Turks have proposed the so-called Attila line. This line was first proposed by the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber in 1964, and was raised again this past July by Turkey during the Geneva talks.

ORIGIN OF THE ATTILA LINE

Senator KENNEDY. Can you tell me, as a matter of history, where the name came from, Attila line? Does it have any——

Dr. SKIOTIS. It refers to the famous Hun conqueror, and the Turks have a racial and linguistic affinity with the Huns. To the Turkish people Attila is a national hero.

Senator KENNEDY. What was the line? Is that the extent of his conquests, or was it just named after him?

Dr. SKIOTIS. No, it was not the extent of his——

Senator KENNEDY. It has no military significance, I guess, in terms of the mountains and geographic area; it had no past historical reference? Just a name?


Dr. SKIOTIS. That is correct; yes.

Senator KENNEDY. All right, please continue.

IMPACT ON POPULATION PATTERNS OF ATILA LINE

Dr. SKIOTIS. This line, which runs from the northwest of Cyprus through Nicosia to Famagusta, is considerably less than the area presently held by the Turkish Army. The point is, no matter where the line is finally drawn, any artificial division of the island will bring immense economic problems as well as massive population dislocation.

THE 'ATTILIA LINE' PROPOSED BY TURKEY



--- -- --- APPROXIMATE DEMARCATION OF THE LINE

The population dislocation that would come with partition is every bit as serious and disruptive as those which have already come about with the Turkish military invasion, which has, in effect, turned the island upside down. Most severely affected is the Greek Cypriot community, which comprises 80 percent of the population. Drawing a line somewhere will mean moving nearly one-half of the total population of the island and resettling them elsewhere on a permanent basis. Based on the 1972 population estimates, this would amount to moving about 50,000 Turks—44.6 percent of the total Turkish Cypriot population—from the southern part to the northern part. In turn, this would require moving out of that northern area at least 150,000 Greek Cypriots, who, until the invasion, lived there.

Government of Cyprus estimates indicate that this would reduce the density of the population in the northern zone from 185 to only 76.9 persons per square mile. Yet, at the same time, it would force the population density in the Greek area to jump from 181 to 202.6 persons per square mile. In short, drawing a line will require a drastic rearrangement of existing population patterns, rearrangements that cannot help but be painful and probably inequitable to the Greek Cypriots.

PARTITION AND LAND OWNERSHIP

The impact upon land ownership would be no less severe, and will obviously be a major stumbling block in any partition plan. The question is compounded with the different statistics that are being advanced by both sides as to how much land each owns on the island—and even assuming that that could somehow be resolved, you have a problem with the kind of land, where it is located, its level of development, its crop, land distribution patterns, and so forth. How does one exchange land in the north, of a different kind, for land in the south. The problem of the actual technical agreement on land exchanges would be enormously difficult to work out.

FUTURE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF PARTITION

As for the future impact of partition on the economy, Cyprus, being a relatively small island, of necessity has an integrated, homogeneous economy. It is a fragile and developing economic system. And it has worked and prospered and grown because it has been able to do so as a whole. If the Attila line forms the basis of partition, it will include many of the principal foreign exchange earning portions of the economy on the Turkish side. It will include the cooper mining region in the Morphou Bay area, the whole of the highly developed agricultural Morphou Plain—including the mostly Greek citrus industry—all of the perennial springs in the Kyrenia Mountain Range, most of the irrigated plain of the eastern Mesaoria—commonly referred to as the breadbasket of Cyprus—large areas of citrus groves in the Serrakhis River Valley, large forest areas in the Kyrenia region—although two-thirds of these forests were burned during the invasion—many of the best tourist resorts, and portions of Famagusta, including the largest port facilities on the island.

In comparison, the Greek-controlled area, although retaining a sizable portion of the fertile Mesaorian Plain, would contain a high

proportion of uncultivable mountainous and forested terrain—the Troodos Mountain area—and undeveloped land.

The effects on agriculture, on tourism, on forestry, on mining, on industry—all significant and productive areas of the Cypriot economy—would be grievous. Over the past decade, the economy of Cyprus has grown at a remarkable rate, and it has become one of the most dependable members of the International Monetary Fund, and one of the highest rated recipients of United Nations Development Program funds. Indeed, Cyprus has prospered and developed economically at a far better rate than its neighbors, including Turkey and even Greece. It has one of the highest per capita incomes in the area—its economy is often compared to that of Israel—and the per capita income of the Cypriots is three times that of Turkey.

PARTITION OF AN INTEGRATED ECONOMY

However, this prosperity and this economic performance has been based upon the integrated economy of the whole island. What political partition will do to Cyprus will be compounded by what economic partition would do, even if the intention is not, as Turkey now says, it is not, to divide the island's economy. But how a political partition line can be drawn without also dividing or disrupting the economy of the island is clearly one of the most troubling questions confronting negotiations over the fate of Cyprus.

The results of the Turkish invasion have already, in less than 3 months, wreaked havoc with the economy of Cyprus. As I have already noted, the losses from physical damage and dislocation, caused by the military activity since July, have already run into the millions of dollars. But as serious as the economic effects of Turkish occupation have been to date, consequences of partition may be even more damaging. Every indicator suggests that Cyprus could not easily recover economically from a permanent political partition—certainly not in the near future, and perhaps not for many years to come.

I would like, Mr. Chairman, to make a few concluding notes at this point.

CYPRUS: FOCUS OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS

Ethnic conflict between Greeks and Turks on Cyprus has led, and will lead inexorably in the future, to confrontation between Greece and Turkey. Britain, as a guarantor power, is also immediately involved. All this in turn, gives rise to problems within the Western Alliance—NATO—and automatically draws the United States into the picture. Intense United States and NATO activity in the eastern Mediterranean tends to bring about the reaction of the Soviet Union and the issue thus reaches the level of world politics involving the stakes of global war and peace. Finally, Cyprus membership in the United Nations and her ties with the nonaligned nations bring an additional factor to bear on the power equation around this small island. This, in fact, has been the general pattern and complexity of international crises surrounding the Cyprus question since 1963–64, in 1967, and now again, in 1974.

Considering this extremely complex network of conflicting interests involving Greece, Turkey, Britain, the United States, NATO, the

Soviet Union, the United Nations, and most important of all, the divided people of Cyprus, the only way of reconciling most of these interests is to maintain and preserve a truly independent, democratic Cyprus. Viewed in this perspective, the Greek junta's engineered coup on Cyprus in July was a clear attempt to impose an unacceptable solution. So, too, however, was the military intervention of Turkey which now threatens partition.

CYPRUS AND DÉTENTE

Surely, Mr. Chairman, one of the most important lessons of this latest Cyprus crisis is that the much-touted concept of détente has degenerated to a mechanical nonaggression agreement among the great powers, while any smaller power which feels strong and determined enough to strike can defy both Washington and Moscow, as well as the United Nations. Nobody can claim that the people of Cyprus have benefited from détente. Their suffering is ignored, and their legitimate interests are forgotten.

It is to the end of restoring the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus that the United States should now turn its full energies. The Cyprus crisis will not go away as we "tilt"—or perhaps more accurately, as we "slide"—from one side to the other in an unsuccessful policy of drift that is called being neutral. Active, imaginative diplomatic approaches are needed urgently.

CONCESSIONS TO THE TURKISH COMMUNITY ON CYPRUS

Needless to say, any negotiated settlement will have to provide the Turkish Cypriot community on Cyprus, which has legitimate and serious grievances, with an enhanced degree of security, autonomy, and participation in the economic life of the country. How this is achieved, and within what constitutional framework, is, of course, a matter for creative diplomacy and negotiations to define.

In this connection, the talks now taking place between President Clerides and Vice President Denktash are crucial and must be actively supported.

RETURN OF REFUGEES

However, we can foresee no viable solution to the crisis on Cyprus unless a substantial number of refugees are permitted to return to their lands and their homes. Some movement and transfer of population may be necessary and, indeed, desirable. But no plan that perpetuates what military conquest has brought about can long survive.

ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

U.S. diplomacy should be carefully orchestrated with peace initiatives advanced by the United Nations. Only within the context of a U.N. solution will the Soviet Union, which has legitimate security interests in the eastern Mediterranean, accept the final disposition of the Cyprus issue.

The United Nations has a long and constructive record of involvement in Cyprus. But its presence and its peacekeeping capability on the island were severely tested in this latest crisis. In fact, the credi-

bility of its peacekeeping functions has been gravely impaired. The United States should support a new and strengthened mandate for UNFICYP to enable it to perform its peacekeeping mission satisfactorily.

The longer the time needed to achieve a resolution of the crisis, the greater will be the suffering and tragedy of the people of Cyprus. Political postures cannot be allowed to freeze into inflexibility, as they have been in a number of similarly related crises in the Middle East. The need of the people of Cyprus is urgent and it must be a priority before the international community.

Thank you.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much. That is a very comprehensive statement, Professor, and I know we have a much more detailed report before the Subcommittee which goes into great detail on many of the different parts which you have outlined here.

I just have a few questions for you.

CANTONAL SOLUTION POSSIBLE?

You spelled out a very grim picture, as I see it; but I think that is a very accurate and realistic one. I am interested in a few points. One is what you think the political realities are of some kind of cantonal arrangement. This has been talked about in previous testimony. First, whether you think it is politically realistic to expect that the military forces of Turkey, which have 35 to 40 percent of the land, will give that up—whether you can expect this as a possible alternative. Is it an alternative to partition, and is it realistic to expect that there could be any hope for that kind of an arrangement under the present circumstances?

Dr. SKIOTIS. The canton arrangement is something that the Greek Cypriot side and the Greek Government would now probably accept. I do not think that the Turkish Government will at this point accept a canton arrangement as a disposition of the Cyprus question.

There may be some ground for compromise there, but my best judgment at this point is that the Turkish Government is interested solely in a biregional, bicomunal Cyprus, that has an almost exclusive Turkish majority in the northern section, wherever the line is ultimately drawn, and an almost exclusively Greek majority in the southern sector.

But the idea of the so-called zonal system, of cantons or any other kind of similar arrangement, would not be acceptable to the Turks now. They have gone too far to turn back. So I do not think that this is a realistic diplomatic option unless the Turkish position is changed.

POSSIBLE PHASE 3 OF TURKISH INVASION

Senator KENNEDY. Do you, as a student of history, and as an observer of recent events, think that there is any possibility that there may be phase 3 if Turkey is unable to work out these arrangements in terms of the control of the north? What would be the restraining force to Turkey saying, "all right, we will take 3 or 4 more days and take over the whole island, and then we will work out a canton arrangement for the Greek Cypriots," turning it the other way around. Is this a real possibility?

Dr. SKIOTIS. I think it is a real possibility. I think the danger of yet another Turkish operation is very real. I think the information we received from the field bears this out without the slightest doubt. Certainly, Mr. Chairman, it is real to the Greek Cypriot refugees who have already fled, some of them, as I have stated, once or twice before from advancing Turkish forces. To say that they are terrified of yet further Turkish military operations would be an understatement.

There is also a good deal of public opinion pressure in Turkey regarding the plight of the Turkish Cypriot minority in the south which could give rise in Turkey to a policy of undertaking yet another offensive, either to move militarily into areas that contain substantial Turkish minorities and thus bring them under the umbrella of the Turkish Army, or to conduct hit-and-run type rescue missions in further removed parts of Cyprus which, again, have Turkish Cypriots there.

There is, as you know, a good deal of pressure now being put on the British Government regarding the 10,000 or so Turkish Cypriot refugees in the Akrotiri-Episkopi Sovereign Base Area. The British Government is being asked to return these refugees to mainland Turkey, from which point, presumably, they would be sent back to the northern part of Cyprus, which has been denuded, at this point, of population. It has only approximately 15 percent of the total population of Cyprus occupying 45 percent of the territory.

It is an interesting statistic, perhaps, that there is one Turkish soldier in the northern sector for every one and a half Turkish Cypriot inhabitants.

TURKISH DENIALS OF A PHASE THREE?

Senator KENNEDY. Have you noticed or seen any statements by Turkish leaders that could give us any sense of hope that this phase three is not in their bag of alternatives? Have they made any strong representations in the United Nations or in Geneva or Ankara that, as far as they are concerned, the military aspect has been ended?

Are there any statements we can look to, that we can get any hope that this might not be a realistic alternative?

Dr. SKIOTIS. I can think of no statements that one could look to to get reassurance in this regard. Indeed, the record, I think is very disturbing; because there have been numerous very strongly worded United Nations Security Council resolutions calling for cease-fires. But, the Turks, in this particular crisis, have a record of deliberately violating cease-fire agreement after cease-fire agreement, whether it was agreed to by the United Nations or some other form of talks—in Geneva, for example.

So, the mere fact that there is now one further cease-fire in effect at this point in Cyprus is not, I would think very reassuring if the Turkish Government felt that it was in its interests to engage in further military operations. I would like to think that this would not be the case, but I cannot say that I am sanguine on the point.

U.N. ACCESS IN TURKISH SECTOR

Senator KENNEDY. Has the United Nations had free access to the northern sector?

Dr. SKIOTIS. The United Nations, as I stated in my report, has total and free access in the Government-controlled southern part of the island. They are, therefore, very effectively protecting the Turkish community, and seeing to it that relief, food, medicines, and so forth, get to the isolated Turkish Cypriot pockets on that part of the island. Their freedom of movement in the north, however, is severely hampered and limited by the Turkish military. The same holds true for the freedom of movement of other relief agencies, such as the International Red Cross.

I think the members of the study mission feel very strongly that one of the beneficial areas where the United States could apply its diplomatic muscle would be to insure that the humanitarian and relief agencies are given free access to the northern zone, to look into this question of what is happening to the people there.

OPENING NICOSIA AIRPORT

May I also add, in this connection, a related point, and that is that the airport of Nicosia, the international airport, which is the only civilian airport of any size on the island, has been closed since the fighting, and it is not available for the landing of relief planes from the outside world. Whatever airborne relief is provided is provided now through the use of the British RAF base at Akrotiri. It goes without saying that another airport would greatly facilitate the flow of relief on an urgent basis to the people of Cyprus.

There also seemed, in this connection, to be problems with the use of the sea lanes to the island of Cyprus. Much of the Greek relief, which, as I stated, has been substantial, has been provided by ship to the port of Limassol. Because the area—that is to say the sea around Cyprus—has been unilaterally declared a war zone by the Turkish Government. Thus, the risk that ships take when they provide relief to Cyprus, and the question of insurance which has to be paid, is a very serious one; so that, again, efforts to change this designation as war zone would greatly facilitate the flow of relief.

Senator KENNEDY. I think that is a worthwhile point to consider, to insure that both the sea lanes and the air lanes are open. And I'm sure there are a number of other steps that could be taken almost immediately that would have a really important impact in terms of relief to refugees on the basis of humanitarianism, without even getting to the question of political negotiations.

Dr. SKIOTIS. I agree.

Senator KENNEDY. We will be interested in finding out what the administration is doing about these problems.

I hope you will stay for the rest of our hearing this morning, as we hear from the Department of State.

Dr. SKIOTIS. I will. Thank you.

Senator KENNEDY. Very good. Thank you very much.

Our next witness is the Honorable Arthur Hartman, who is Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and Chairman of the Department's Task Force on Cyprus. We appreciated his testimony before the subcommittee on August 20, and we welcome his appearance here today.

I also want to indicate how much we appreciate all the help and assistance given to our study mission. I hope you will tell the Department, and I will write to the Secretary myself. They said all the way through the trip, the Department extended every courtesy, and gave every degree of cooperation and assistance. This has become something that we, both in the trips of our subcommittee to Southeast Asia, and in other parts of the world, which has become very characteristic, and I just wanted to indicate to the Department how much we appreciate the enormous help. And we are glad you are here.

The full committee has just called me, and I have to go downstairs for one minute to make a quorum, and then we will start with you.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Hartman, we welcome you. I apologize for the brief recess. Perhaps you would make some opening comments, and then I could ask some questions.

STATEMENT OF HON. ARTHUR HARTMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; ACCOMPANIED BY RUSSELL S. McCLURE, FOREIGN DISASTER RELIEF COORDINATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. HARTMAN. I have no formal statement to the committee. I would like to express my appreciation for meeting with you, and also hearing the report of Professor Skiotis. I do not think that we would differ with his description of the serious difficulties that are faced in finding a solution to the Cyprus problem. I think we may have some minor differences of assessment in terms of the actual numbers of refugees and the requirements in the future. But it is clear to us that the general description that he gives of the refugee situation is an accurate one.

We would perhaps have a lower figure for the number of Greek Cypriots in need of assistance in the southern area, but it is still a very sizable figure. Our figure is something like 163,000, and he used the figure of 194,000. It is difficult to arrive at an accurate estimate, mainly because many of the people who have come south have either gone in with families or relatives, or perhaps into some of the cities of the south, and not necessarily into the camps that have been set up. But some of those may still require assistance. So that you cannot even take the numbers that are actually physically in camps as being the total numbers of refugees in need of assistance.

U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO UNHCR

Mr. McClure has just come back from Nicosia, where he has talked to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and to the Cypriot Government authorities and also to the Turkish Cypriot authorities in the northern part of Cyprus. We also received a visit recently from the Deputy U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Mr. Mace. I believe he also talked with the subcommittee staff. Their estimate, through the end of the year, for the requirements from September 1 until the end of the year, is \$22 million. We have already made a pledge of \$3 million. This is in addition to \$3.2 million we made available during the summer.

But that is still not up to one-third of the requirement which would normally be expected of us, and we are examining now the resources we would have available, to come closer to the share that would be expected of the United States. I am disappointed myself in the response from other donor countries. During these U.N. sessions, when we are meeting with foreign ministers, particularly from the European countries, we are making the point to them that there is a large requirement here. We believe that greater efforts will have to be made by them in order to meet this very serious situation. We have urged the U.N. High Commissioner to take steps to bring this to the attention of the European governments—the need for an additional contribution.

USES OF CONTINGENCY FUND

We are now in the process of examining our resource situation. The contingency fund, as I understand it, will permit us to fund part of that \$3 million pledge, and we are now looking at the question of whether or not we should now transfer, under the transfer authority in the Foreign Assistance Act, amounts of money from the \$10 million that we have the possibility of transferring for refugee matters to the pledge that we would make for assistance to the U.N. High Commissioner for use in Cyprus. I think that with that amount of money, we could probably get close to the total of \$7.3 million, which would be our one-third share of this \$22 million requirement.

This, of course, only takes us to the end of the year. My understanding is that by the end of the year, the contingency fund itself will be exhausted. And therefore, we have to all think seriously about a replenishment of that fund, or some special provision that would have to be made in order to meet requirements that might extend beyond January 1.

Senator KENNEDY. How do we get that now? Are you going to get that money from some existing account, or do we need it in the foreign aid bill?

Mr. HARTMAN. I would like to come back to you on that. My understanding is we are all right through the end of the year, and the U.N. has not yet made any estimates beyond the first of the year. When I saw the Deputy High Commissioner, I said to him, I do not think it is realistic at all for you to be talking only about this period from September 1 through December 31, because you cannot expect to talk to these governments now and come around to them again sometime in December and say, look, we have a new requirement now for 1975. While none of us want to give the impression that we think this is a problem that is not going to be solved by negotiation, I think it is only wise and prudent to project further ahead.

Senator KENNEDY. What will not be solved by negotiation?

Mr. HARTMAN. We do not wish to give the impression that we think the refugee problem on Cyprus will not be significantly changed or altered during the course of negotiations between the two communities. But I think it is only realistic to see that this problem is certainly going to extend into 1975, and that we ought to be thinking now about the contingency funding of requirements in 1975.

PLANNING FOR THE WORST ON CYPRUS

Senator KENNEDY. How can you make a plan if you do not know what the political situation will be, or have we got some idea of when a political settlement is going to be achieved? I suppose if there is some hope that we are going to soon resolve the Cyprus crisis through political negotiations, then humanitarian needs would be a good deal different than if there is going to be a complete lack of negotiations and the refugees remain where they are. I suppose if I were the High Commissioner, I would be probably looking at it the same way. I do not know how you make such long-term projections unless the administration feels that there is very little hope that you are going to reach any negotiations over the period of this year.

Mr. HARTMAN. As Mr. McClure suggested, the best thing to do is hope for the best and plan for the worst. My own feeling is that under the best circumstances, the situation will not be significantly different by the first of the year, in terms of the refugee problem; because I would think that even if negotiations proceed with good will on all sides toward a solution, one of the last matters to be dealt with will be the very serious and difficult political problem of the movement of populations.

As Professor Skiotis said, if the final arrangement involves some kind of zonal system, he is quite right in saying that the current Turkish position is that there should be a large movement of population. The Turkish authorities see separation of the two communities as the only way to assure stability on the island, whereas the position of the Greek Cypriot authorities is that that will just prolong the problem into the future, cause difficulties into the future; and it would be very unfair in terms of what the equities of the situation are, where the people have lived in the past and made their livelihood.

If the Greek Cypriots were to accept a zonal system, they would hope that the final solution would provide for perhaps some voluntary movement of populations, but not a massive required movement of populations. That will probably be one of the most difficult issues to settle in the negotiation. I do not see that kind of negotiation ending successfully in a short time.

Therefore, I think we have to plan for further requirements on the refugee side, extending into next year.

U.S. ONE-THIRD COMMITMENT TO UNHCR

Senator KENNEDY. But at least, with regard to this year, could you give us an assurance that the United States is prepared to meet its one-third obligation?

Mr. HARTMAN. I think we could come very close. I think we were saying this morning that there might be a gap of \$800,000 or \$900,000. But what really worries me is the lack of response from others. We still have that other two-thirds to be met.

Now, the Greek Government has made some provision. It is uncertain whether they have agreed to the amount that Professor Skiotis mentioned.

OTHER DONORS BEING ENCOURAGED?

Senator KENNEDY. What efforts have been made in the Department to get other countries to contribute?

Mr. HARTMAN. We have sent an instruction to our missions in Europe, particularly, to make approaches at a high level in each government, saying what we are doing, what we understand the requirements to be, and urging them to make their contributions to the funds that have been established by the U.N. High Commissioner.

As the Secretary of State meets with the foreign ministers during this U.N. session, he, too, is mentioning this to them as a serious problem, which in terms of all of our interests in seeing the political negotiation process underway, is really an essential underpinning for the success of those talks. If the situation deteriorates among the refugees, it will certainly make it much more difficult for the communal talks to proceed.

OPENING NICOSIA AIRPORT

Senator KENNEDY. One of the relief bottlenecks, of course, has been the thing which Professor Skiotis mentioned this morning that should be done immediately and which would have little relationship to the immediate military situation—is the opening of the Nicosia airport and the sea lanes around the island, permitting greater humanitarian assistance to come to Cyprus. What direct diplomatic efforts are being made in these areas to provide some immediate action, and what kind of reaction are you getting from the Turks?

Mr. HARTMAN. In terms of the Nicosia airport, when I was in Nicosia, and later in a series of approaches that we have made, both to the Turkish authorities and to the Cypriot Government, we have urged that the airport be opened for this very purpose. It is quite difficult now. There is tremendous traffic that has to go through the sovereign base area. We also felt that the opening of the airport would begin to show that a more normal existence was returning, as well as being much more economical in terms of getting assistance into the area.

We understand that this has figured in the communal talks, and are urging, we have told both Denktash and Clerides that we thought this ought to be one of the first things that they could agree to. The difficulty seems to be centered on what kind of assurances could be given, that the airport, once reopened, will not be used for the purposes of resupplying forces on either side. The Turks believe that, since they do not control the airport, perhaps it could be used for resupply of Greek forces on the island. We think that some arrangements could be worked out with U.N. control continuing on the airport itself to prevent that sort of thing from happening.

My understanding of the present state of those discussions is that both sides have expressed some concern about the opening of the airport, and have put forward some conditions for the opening of the airport. But we are going to continue to press to have that one of the first items of business that they try to reach agreement on.

PURPOSE OF CONTINUED MILITARY AID TO TURKEY

Senator KENNEDY. What can you say, Mr. Secretary, we have really gained by the continuation of military assistance to Turkey?

I asked you about this some month or so ago, when you were here, about reconsidering the decision not to cut off military aid. You said then we have rejected it for the moment, because our feeling is to get these parties back to the negotiating table, you have to have the greatest influence on all parties concerned.

Can you tell us, over the period of the last month or so, what we have been able to achieve by maintaining that position, in opposition to both the rule of the law, and the obvious will of Congress, that military aid to Turkey be terminated?

MR. HARTMAN. Our feeling has been that the only solution to this problem will come through negotiation by the parties. We have seen in our talks with both the Turkish and Greek Governments that we can, by making suggestions, by trying to show them areas where we think agreement is possible, have some influence on the movement toward negotiations, both between the communities on the island and, eventually, in creating a framework within which a broader negotiation is possible.

Now, I think where we have differed with those who felt that assistance should be cut off immediately to Turkey is that we feel that is an ultimate step when you have really given up trying to exercise influence on one of the parties. We recognize that the legal requirements may force us to this. That situation is being discussed with the President. We have noted the action taken yesterday in which a vote on the continuing resolution required the administration not to use any of that assistance, until such time that the President could certify that progress is being made in the negotiations.

As I say, we have opposed that action. We may, of course, be forced to accept it, if that is the will of the Congress.

RULE OF LAW AND CONTINUED TURKISH MILITARY AID

Senator KENNEDY. Are you not forced—is it not the rule of the law itself—that will force you to terminate it now, under the specific language of the law?

MR. HARTMAN. That situation is being examined by the Secretary and the President to see what the exact status of that is, and the requirement that it puts on the administration.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, I do not see how, myself, how there could be much question in the minds of, I would think, the legal counsel of the Department. The provision says explicitly: any country which uses defense articles furnished under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, in violation of the provisions of this chapter, shall be immediately ineligible for further assistance.

Certainly, the Library of Congress legal opinion¹ says that U.S. military aid is intended for the sole purpose of permitting beneficiaries to defend themselves from aggression, whether from internal or external origin. Use of articles and services for other than defensive purposes, for aggressive purposes, is barred by law. So I am just wondering what possible legal rationale is being advanced within the Department to suggest that these provisions, which are a part of the law, should not be complied with immediately?

¹ For full text, see app. I.

Mr. HARTMAN. Well, I think the question is—the intent of those provisions was presumably to get the individual recipients, if they violated those understandings, to come back into compliance with the law.

Senator KENNEDY. It does not say that. It does not say you get one crack at it and then if you rescind your aggressive acts you are OK; it does not say that at all.

Mr. HARTMAN. I do not have that provision in front of me, but self defense is not the only provision of that paragraph. It talks about international agreements, I believe, and there are some other words used. I am not saying that this is justified or that our conclusions do not agree with the conclusion reached in the study you refer to from the Library of Congress. But I say it is a matter of study, and the President is going to be discussing this; and in fact, I think he is this morning discussing this with congressional leadership.

HOW TO CHARACTERIZE TURKISH ACTION IN CYPRUS?

Senator KENNEDY. Well, how would you characterize the Turkish action in Cyprus, if it is not aggression? Would you call it aggression or what?

Mr. HARTMAN. You are speaking of their action as of today?

Senator KENNEDY. Phase one, phase two; take your pick.

Mr. HARTMAN. As I said, I think, in my statement when I was here before, the action that they took immediately after the coup in Cyprus was justified by the Turkish authorities under the Guarantee Treaty of 1960.¹

I would not personally want to justify any further actions that they took after that—or even attempt to do so—under those agreements or, indeed, the resolutions that were voted by the Security Council—in fact, the United States voted for all of those resolutions in the Security Council, and the last resolution was a condemnation of the Turkish action. And the difference that we have now is what are the chances of moving the parties toward a negotiated solution, and what is our assessment.

At the moment, we are still hopeful; and on the basis of the conversations we have had this week in New York—and we will continue to have next week, with both the Turkish and Greek foreign ministers—we have hope that our influence will help to move them toward a negotiated solution to this problem.

But, as I say, the administration will be talking with the Congress about the specifics of the aid situation, both with respect to the provision in the continuing resolution, and also the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, I was not really asking so much about how Turkey justified its action, but how we viewed it. And, of course part of that Guarantee Treaty which they have relied upon calls for consultations with the other guarantors.

Mr. HARTMAN. That is correct; and, indeed, beyond consultation. In 1960, when the original agreements were signed, we gave permission to the Turkish authorities to bring certain of the weapons onto

¹ For the full text of the Treaty, see app. II.

the island, which is permitted to the President to do. We certainly did not do that this time. Therefore, there is a recognition in the background of this problem that some kind of permission, at least, was required in 1960. And it was not sought this time.

CURRENT REVIEW OF LEGALITY OF MILITARY AID TO TURKEY

Senator KENNEDY. Well, is there any question in your mind that given the action that Turkey has taken, that U.S. military aid has to be terminated according to the law?

Mr. HARTMAN. The specific response to that question, Mr. Chairman, I would much prefer to come from the consultations taking place and the Secretary's decision—how he is going to approach this with Congress—because he has not made a determination so far as I know; but he has discussed it with the President and they are deciding now, and in consultation with the Congress, what the next step should be.

Senator KENNEDY. I am glad he is talking with the Congress. However, I do not understand what you mean "in consultation with Congress." I do not know of any Member of Congress who will be able to say very much other than what the law states on this question, and that, without the immediate termination of Turkish military aid, there is a violation of it. I am just trying to find in my own mind what possible basis there could be for the Secretary of State not obeying it.

Mr. HARTMAN. I will agree to give you further information. I am a little hindered now because I know it is being discussed this morning and I do not know myself.

Senator KENNEDY. Between whom and whom?

Mr. HARTMAN. I am not even sure with whom. There is a meeting this morning with congressional leaders.

Senator KENNEDY. Somewhere there is a meeting and someone is talking about it.

Mr. HARTMAN. No; between the President, the Secretary, and congressional leaders, but I do not know who is involved.

Senator KENNEDY. You can provide more on this later.

We will recess for 5 or 10 minutes. A matter has come up. Excuse me. [Discussion off the record.]

RATIONALE FOR CONTINUING MILITARY AID IF LEGAL

Senator KENNEDY. Let me just ask a few more questions because the hour is getting late.

If there is a determination that continued military aid to Turkey is not a violation of the law in the technical sense—how one could reach that opinion is beyond me—but if there is such a determination, what is the attitude within the Department about the efficacy for continuing military assistance?

Mr. HARTMAN. Well, as I tried to say, Mr. Chairman, what we want to do now is to try to get this negotiating process started and started as quickly as possible.

To do this requires that if we are going to have influence on the situation, we maintain that influence. Whatever influence we have with the Turkish government, I do not believe that a delay in the

negotiations, a hardening of the position any further than it has already been hardened on one side or the other is going to help us get an early negotiation started. Our entire efforts now are to get that process started as soon as possible because the longer the status quo remains the more difficult it will be to reach a settlement. The real question is: Does that action by us hasten the process of negotiation?

Now you can say that in the end cutting off aid will have its effects and eventually you will have a better negotiation. That is not our assessment. Unless this negotiating process gets started now and gets to the real issues, the very difficult issues—the longer it drags on—the more difficult it is going to be to solve.

As I say, the legal question is being studied and discussed, and I am not saying to you that there is a justification for its continuance.

STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS

Senator KENNEDY. Could you tell us what the status is of the negotiations now?

Mr. HARTMAN. At the moment the two communities have some discussions underway. They mainly relate to the humanitarian situation, the exchange of prisoners and the refugees. But my understanding is that there is also some discussion of the political issues.

The important thing now is to get support for a greater discussion in those talks of the political issues. That is dependent upon the attitudes both in Ankara and in Athens. We are attempting to use our influence with both parties to give the support necessary so that these discussions can proceed. And we are continuing. The Secretary met with both the Turkish Foreign Minister and the Greek Foreign Minister in New York, and he intends to meet with them again Sunday and Monday to see if there is any help we can give to this process. And we also talked to the British Foreign Minister, the third of the guarantor powers.

Then, of course, there is the political situation on both sides that needs some clarification. There will be elections in Greece, which also further complicate the general situation as it exists today.

There is a political complication in Turkey in that they are now in the process of forming a new government. All of that does not make the negotiating process any easier.

WITHDRAWAL OF TURKISH TROOPS

Senator KENNEDY. Is it our position that there is going to have to be a withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cyprus?

Mr. HARTMAN. Well, let me state what the last agreed position of the parties was.

On July 30 they agreed to a declaration in Geneva calling for the phased withdrawal of forces. The 1960 agreement did provide, as part of the guarantee mechanism, that there would be certain forces on the island.

Now, when you say total withdrawal, it seems to me that is linked with the negotiations in the sense that the final outcome of these negotiations will have to include some kind of guarantee.

Now, whether that guarantee will again call for forces from Greece and Turkey on the island, whether it would be in the form of an international agreement with no foreign forces on the island, it seems to me that is something that will have to come out of the negotiations.

So I would say we do not have a position on whether a total withdrawal of all forces should be the final outcome.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, should not—

Mr. HARTMAN. They both agree there should be a phased withdrawal of forces. Clearly, 40,000 Turkish troops on the island is not—

A GESTURE FROM TURKEY?

Senator KENNEDY. Should there not at least be some gesture on the part of the Turks?

Mr. HARTMAN. As an aid to the negotiating process?

Senator KENNEDY. That is right.

Mr. HARTMAN. Yes, and I think, as a matter of fact, that gesture might be more difficult if they thought they were being called upon to do that under pressure. I think their reaction would be to decline to make a gesture of reduction, to perhaps reconsider that now so that it does not look as if they are doing it under pressure.

Senator KENNEDY. Are not the Greeks under a lot of pressure, too? What about the pressure of all those refugees? People cannot go home. That is pressure on them.

Mr. HARTMAN. That is right.

Senator KENNEDY. They are being pressured, too, every day they are denied the right to go home or see their friends. That is why I do not understand. Pressure is a one-way street, evidently.

We are reluctant to say very much about the Turkish action. We have refused to call it aggression, as it really is—clearly and blatantly it is.

Mr. HARTMAN. Well, it may not have been called aggression, but we voted for the Security Council resolution which condemned the Turkish action.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, what would you call it? Do we just vote it or do we call it something?

Mr. HARTMAN. I do not have the resolution before me. I do not believe it used the word "aggression," but it condemned their military action.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, are we calling on the Turks to make a gesture? What are we calling on them to do? You say on the one hand that it may very well be advantageous for us to continue our military assistance to them because then we have some degree of influence. What are we trying to influence?

Rather than the general kind of vague hopefulness for fruitful negotiations that you say will help resolve the conflict. Other than those generalities, what do you expect? What can we look forward to? What have we asked them to do?

TURKEY AND GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS

Mr. HARTMAN. It seems to me that we must start with what the parties themselves are now prepared to discuss, and that is changing as time goes on.

I can remember when I was in Geneva at the second phase of the Geneva Conference. There was a reluctance to even discuss the possibility of a federal solution. Now, just a few weeks later, public statements have been made by all of the parties that they are prepared at least to examine a federal solution as the possible outcome of these negotiations. I consider that some progress toward reaching common ground.

The real questions that must be decided in the negotiations, and we are discussing these with all parties, are the question of the degree of separation of the communities with the Turkish Government taking the position that it should be almost a complete separation.

I do not like to call it partition because they also say that they believe that there should be a federal arrangement within a sovereign independent state. I think there is a distinction to be made between having two separate zones, if that is the final agreement, and partition, which implies that part of the island goes to Turkey and a part of the island goes to Greece, which both parties, again, have agreed is not what they desire.

SENATOR KENNEDY. What is the difference between the separation they seek and partition? If all of the parties agree on that, what is really the—

MR. HARTMAN. The distinction is that you have an independent administration in the areas controlled by the Turkish Cypriot community and the Greek Cypriot community, but you have a federal structure over those two independent administrations.

And another significant issue in the negotiations will be: what are the powers of the federal authority if they move toward a federal solution?

REFUGEES AN IMPORTANT ISSUE

The refugee question will be one of the most important issues, and here again you have a difference of view as to whether or not there should be a major movement of population to accomplish this virtual separation of the populations of the communities or whether it should be voluntary with some people going north or some people coming south, but not a completely exclusive two zonal concept with no Greek Cypriots in the north and no Turkish Cypriots in the south.

So the issues in the negotiation are the form of government, and territorial agreements, the withdrawal of foreign forces, and the guarantee for the eventual outcome.

Those are really the four major issues and what we are talking to the parties about is trying to find out what their positions are and whether we can see any common ground that can be suggested. That has been the purpose of our talks with all of the parties.

SENATOR KENNEDY. I understand that the talks have broken down today.

MR. HARTMAN. They have had their difficulties in the past. I certainly hope they have not broken down completely. I do not have information on exactly what was discussed today.

FURTHER TURKISH MILITARY ACTION?

Senator KENNEDY. What possibilities do you see of further Turkish military action—a phase 3? Is that a possibility? Is it a remote possibility?

Mr. HARTMAN. Well, it is a danger. We have made our view very, very clear, indeed, that this is something which will not only set back the efforts to reach a settlement, but something that we would have to totally oppose.

Senator KENNEDY. In what way?

Mr. HARTMAN. Well——

Senator KENNEDY. Would you cut off military aid then?

Mr. HARTMAN. The Turkish Government is going to have to make its decision on whether or not it seeks a negotiated solution. We have tried to paint the picture of what we think the future will look like if they do not seek a negotiated solution, and it is a rather bleak picture, we think.

We believe that up until now the Turkish authorities have said that they are interested in negotiations. They are talking about these issues. We think the positions of the two parties are still very far apart.

Our efforts have been to try to see whether there is any common ground at all to be found.

“LEVERAGE” WITH TURKEY

Senator KENNEDY. What is our real leverage with Turkey if they decide on phase 3?

Mr. HARTMAN. Well, in the end I think that you have to, at least we have been going on the assumption that there is a rational view and we have been painting what we think is an accurate picture of what the future would hold if they decide that the only solution is one which is going to be by force of arms. We have seen enough situations like this around the world where people might think that for awhile at least arms can produce a solution, but it is a very temporary phenomenon and in a few years' time people who think that usually find they have brought themselves a much bigger problem.

Senator KENNEDY. Do you think the fact that we have continued military aid to Turkey increases or decreases the possibility of a military phase 3?

Mr. HARTMAN. I do not think that that would be the significant factor in their minds in deciding whether or not to continue. I think they realize that—we hope that they realize on the basis of all of the talks—that this would have a very detrimental effect in their relationship not only with us but with a lot of other people.

Senator KENNEDY. So it really does not make very much difference?

Mr. HARTMAN. Well, our conclusion in July was that the choice for us, if we wished to stop this action, was the use of force by the United States. We rejected that. We had had an earlier experience with the Turkish Government of threats to cut off assistance because of their decision on opium growing and they were not deterred from making the decision to grow opium again because of that threat.

Their action was something that was taken for internal political reasons. We have, however, in talking to the Turkish authorities, succeeded in getting them to make a decision on this issue of opium, which we think will lead to a control of this production. But that was done through negotiation and talk and through the use of U.N. pressures, which we think have now been successful. They have agreed to use a new process which the U.N. authorities believe will enable them to have the best chance at any rate of controlling the traffic in opium.

But the threat of cutting off military assistance did not deter them.

U.S. RELATIONS WITH GREECE

Senator KENNEDY. What efforts are we making towards the Greek Government, if any, to try to restore some relationship with them?

Mr. HARTMAN. We have instructed our Ambassador to have talks with the Greek Government. He has just arrived there. The Secretary met with Foreign Minister Mavros in New York 2 days ago and will be meeting with him again Sunday evening. We are asking them what their views are on some of the other problems they face because, after all, Cyprus is not the only issue the new Government faces. We assured them of our support for the democratic regime which has been established in Athens, and we will be discussing with them any needs and concerns that they have, not only on the Cyprus situation but in other areas as well.

ROLE OF THE CIA IN SAMPSON COUP

Senator KENNEDY. Can you tell us what, if any, is the role of the CIA in the Athens-inspired coup in Cyprus, and the emergence of Mr. Sampson and the disposition of President Makarios?

Mr. HARTMAN. I can tell you that there was no role of the CIA in the coup against Archbishop Makarios. We have said that to Archbishop Makarios. Archbishop Makarios himself has recognized that at least on two other occasions, on one occasion with which I am familiar, we had warned him of coup plotting against him by Greek Army people on the island.

We heard coup rumors ourselves and, in fact, Ambassador Davies discussed this situation with Archbishop Makarios the Friday before the coup. Archbishop Makarios gave us the impression that while he, too, had heard of these rumors, he was not as concerned as we thought perhaps he should be. And perhaps we were all lulled by that.

But in any case he did not feel in that conversation with Ambassador Davies that there was an immediate threat. But Ambassador Davies deliberately did raise this.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Senator KENNEDY. Well, we thank you for your testimony and we would like to stay in close touch with you about this whole problem. As we see time and again before this subcommittee—as in the situation with Biafra, Bangladesh, and Vietnam—ultimately, in all of

these problems of hundreds of thousands, even millions of refugees that you have, the most effective way to do something about them is to resolve the political problems that created them.

And I hope that in the meantime we can work closely with the Department of State and AID in the development of your programs to deal with the special needs of the refugees on all sides, the Turkish refugees in the south as well as the Greek Cypriot refugees in the north and in other areas. But also that we can recognize that until we get a political solution to this, it is going to be extremely difficult over the long term to meet those needs of the refugees.

But I would hope, as you can well understand, that our government will consider the pressure on these refugees when the Administration is considering what our public posture is going to be—that their interests and their well-being will be put high on the roster of priorities in terms of any of these negotiations.

I can think of no more important item on any agenda than the well-being of the people of Cyprus who have been absolutely devastated and, in many respects, decimated, on that island.

So we appreciate your appearance this morning and apologize for the interruptions earlier today.

Thank you very much.

Mr. HARTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KENNEDY. The subcommittee stands in recess.

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX I

Military Aid Cutoff to Aggressor Recipients of Foreign Military Assistance

(A Study by the Library of Congress)

MILITARY AID CUTOFF TO AGGRESSOR-RECIPIENTS

Reference is made to your inquiry requesting information on the above matter. Specifically, you ask whether statutes limit extending U.S. military aid to nations which employ same for aggressive purposes inimical to world peace and domestic interests.

That U.S. military aid is intended for the sole and exclusive purpose of permitting recipients to defend themselves against aggression, whether from internal or external sources, seems to permeate the laws governing this matter. Title II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, relating to the extension of military assistance, rests on the congressional finding that "the efforts of the United States and other friendly countries to promote peace and security continue to require measures of support based upon the principle of effective self-help and mutual aid." Accordingly, it is the purpose of this title "to authorize measures in the common defense against internal and external aggression, including the furnishing of military assistance, upon request, to friendly countries and international organizations." Taking note of the dangers to world peace and national security posed by international communism, and so-called wars of liberation, Congress declares that "in the administration [of title II] priority shall be given to the needs of those countries in danger of becoming victims of active Communist or Communist-supported aggression or those countries in which the internal security is threatened by Communist-inspired or Communist-supported internal subversion."

That the principal purpose of U.S. military aid was intended for defensive rather than aggressive purposes is clearly implied by various other statements contained in Title II's statement of policy. Thus, Congress states that the furnishing of military assistance notwithstanding, "it remains the policy of the United States to continue to exert maximum efforts to . . . control weapons of mass destruction and universal regulation and reduction of armaments, including armed forces, under adequate safeguards to protect complying countries against violation and evasion." Elsewhere, Congress declares that "[i]n enacting this legislation, it is" its "intention . . . to promote the peace of the world and the foreign policy, security, and general welfare of the United States by fostering an improved climate of political independence and individual liberty, improving the ability of friendly countries and international organizations to deter or, if necessary, defeat Communist or Communist-supported aggression, facilitating arrangements for individual and collective security, assisting friendly countries to maintain internal security, and creating an environment of security and stability in the developing friendly countries essential to their more rapid social, economic, and political progress." § 501; 22 U.S.C. 2301.

The operative provision of the Act are if anything more explicit regarding the exclusively defensive purposes of the military aid authorized title II. Thus, section 502 provides, in relevant part, that—"Defense articles and defense services to any country shall be furnished *solely for internal security, for legitimate self-defense*, to permit the recipient country to participate in regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, or otherwise to permit the recipient country to participate in collective measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security, or for the purpose of assisting foreign military forces in less developed friendly countries (or the voluntary efforts of personnel of the Armed Forces of the United States in such countries) to construct public

works and to engage in other activities helpful to the economic and social development of such friendly countries. . . .” § 503, 22 U.S.C. § 2302.

In authorizing military assistance to friendly foreign countries and international organizations, Congress wrote into the Act the express requirement that the President has to find that the extension of such assistance will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace. § 503; 22 U.S.C. § 2311.

In order to be eligible for defense articles on a grant basis, an applicant country, *inter alia*, must agree, “that . . . it will not, without the consent of the President . . . use or permit the use of such articles for purposes other than those for which furnished” § 505(a)(1)(c); 22 U.S.C. § 2314(a)(1)(c). Similarly, Congress enjoined the President from furnishing defense articles on a grant basis to any country at a cost in excess of \$3,000,000 unless he determines “that such country conforms to the purposes and principles of the United Nations; that such defense articles will be utilized by such country for the maintenance of its own defensive strength, and the defensive strength of the free world; . . .” § 505(b) (1), (2); 22 U.S.C. 2314(b) (1), (2).

Any doubt regarding the mandatory (as distinguished from directory) nature of the aforementioned restrictions on foreign military assistance authorized by the 1961 Act should have been dispelled by a significant amendment which was added one year later. Public Law 87-565, Pt. II, § 201(a), 76 Stat. 259 (1962) 22 U.S.C. 2314(d). That amendment which added section 505(d) provides that use by any recipient nation of materials in violation of the terms and conditions contained in this and related laws, past and present, “shall [render it] . . . immediately ineligible for further assistance.” Section 505(d) reads as follows:

“Any country which hereafter uses defense articles or defense services furnished such country under this chapter, the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, or any predecessor foreign assistance Act, in substantial violation of the provisions of this chapter [§§ 2311-2320] of this title or any agreements entered into pursuant to any of such acts shall be immediately ineligible for further assistance.”

The substance of section 505(d) was proposed in the House version of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, H.R. 11921, § 201. The House Report that accompanied the bill (H. Rept. No. 1788, 8th Cong., 2d Sess. pp. 26-27) states, in relevant part, that—

“Section 201(a) amends Section 506 [subsequently renumbered section 505], relating to conditions of eligibility, by adding a new subsection (c) [subsequently redesignated (d)] providing that any country which hereafter uses defense articles or defense services furnished such country under this act, the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, or any predecessor foreign assistance act in violation of any of the provisions of this chapter or any agreements entered into pursuant to any of these acts shall be immediately ineligible for further assistance under this chapter.

“The present act requires that military assistance furnished either through grants or sales shall be solely for the purposes of internal security, legitimate self-defense or the participation in collective arrangements or measures consistent with the United Nations Charter or as requested by the United Nations for maintaining or restoring international peace and security. It also provides for certain conditions of eligibility which include the reaching of agreements as to the use, observation, protection, and disposition of the assistance furnished.

“This amendment will provide the positive penalty not now contained in the law for the future violation of the requirements of this chapter or agreements under which the equipment or services are furnished.

“The committee believes that such a penalty is necessary and will serve notice or agreements as having little or no effect. It is not intended that every small disagreement between the United States and recipient countries on the deployment of units or uses of equipment would serve to make such country ineligible for further assistance. However, where a country actually undertakes an act of aggression or refuses to allow continuous observation of the equipment, diverts substantial quantities of the items furnished, or otherwise violates the terms of its agreements, further assistance under this chapter would be prohibited by this Amendment.”

The conference appointed to iron out differences in the measure as passed by the Senate and the House, accepted the latter’s recommendation relative to conditions of eligibility with the addition of the qualification that the violation must be substantial in order for the prohibition to apply. The conference report (H. Rept. No. 2008, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 17-18) states, in relevant part, that—

"Section 201(a) of the House Amendment provided that any country which hereinafter used defense articles or defense services furnished such country under this act, the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, or any predecessor foreign assistance act, where such use was in violation of the provision of the military assistance chapter or any agreements entered into pursuant to any of such acts, should be immediately ineligible for further assistance.

"The Senate bill contained no comparable provision.

"The committee of conference accepted the House provision with an amendment which provided that in order for the section to become operative there must be a 'substantial' violation of the provisions of the military assistance chapter or applicable agreements. The purpose of this amendment is to make clear that minor instances of diversion or improper uses would not work to make countries ineligible for further military assistance."

In keeping with traditional practice, the apparent absolute prohibition contained in section 505(d) is subject to the President's special waiver authority in section 614(a), 22 U.S.C. 2364(a), which reads, in relevant part, that—

"The President may authorize . . . the use of funds made available for use under this chapter and the furnishing of assistance . . . without regard to the requirements of this chapter or any other law, any relating to receipts and credits accruing to the United States, any Act appropriating funds for use under this chapter, or the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, in furtherance of any of the purposes of such Acts, when the President determines that such authorization is important to the security of the United States . . ."

See H. Rept. No. 1788, *supra*, at p. 18.

That military aid under title II is intended for defensive purposes exclusively seems beyond debate. As noted, such assistance was conceived as operating hand in glove with economic aid by enabling recipients to defend themselves sufficiently to allow improvement in economic circumstances which in turn would make communism a less appealing alternative. Use of articles and services for other than defensive purposes, i.e., for aggressive purposes, is barred by law. However, neither the Act nor its legislative history make clear what kinds of activities separate defensive from aggressive purposes. Similarly, aside from the noted statement that a substantial violation which makes section 505(d)'s prohibition applicable is not intended to apply to minor violations, Congress provided little or no guidance for clearly distinguishing between the two. It is not unlikely that Congress had common sense standards in mind, i.e., general notions of the differences between offense and defense.

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WAIVER AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION 614(a), FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED, 2 U.S.C. 2364(a) (1974).

(By Raymond Celada, Senior Specialist in American Public Law,
September 20, 1974)

A recent report prepared by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress states: "That U.S. military aid is intended for the sole and exclusive purpose of permitting the recipients to defend themselves against aggression, . . . seems to permeate the laws governing the matter." Accordingly, the report concludes that U.S. military aid under the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended, "is intended for defensive purposes exclusively seems beyond debate." Further, that use of U.S. military supplies and services "for other than defensive purposes . . . is barred by law." See 22 U.S.C. 2314(d).

At the same time the report cautions that "neither the Act nor its legislative history makes clear what kinds of activities separate defensive from aggressive purposes." It further notes that Congress provided no clear cut guidelines for ascertaining a "substantial violation" of the prohibition against use of U.S. military aid for other than defensive purposes which makes the violator "immediately ineligible for further assistance." That these terms raise important threshold questions which must be resolved before the letter and spirit of the 1961 Act, as amended, can be applied in a given context is dramatically brought home by a preemptive strike, such as that undertaken by Israel against Egypt which resulted

in destruction of the latter's air arm. Other illustrations depicting the frequently murky area between offensive and defensive operations can be conjured up. Indeed, it is a virtual axiom that in many, if not most, cases, the best defense is a good offense. In brief, save in clear-cut situation of overt aggression or static defense, a decision to terminate military aid to any country for violating the prohibition against use of such aid for aggressive purposes may involve the exercise of a substantial judgment.

As noted in the earlier report, the prohibition in section 505(d) against using military assistance for aggressive purposes just referred to was added by a 1962 amendment to the 1961 law. Section 505(d) was part of the House Foreign Affairs Committee 1962 Foreign Assistance proposal. The report on the bill (H.R. 11921, 87th Congress, 2d Session) states, in part, that—

This amendment will provide the positive penalty not now contained in the law for the future violation of the requirements of this chapter [Act] or agreements under which the equipment or services are furnished.

This committee believes that such a penalty is necessary and will serve notice on recipient countries who may view these conditions or agreements as having little or no effect. It is not intended that every small disagreement between the United States and recipient countries on the deployment of units or uses of equipment would serve to make such country ineligible for further assistance. However, where a country actually undertakes an act of aggression or refuses to allow continuous observation of the equipment, diverts substantial quantities of the items furnished, or otherwise violates the terms of its agreements, further assistance under this chapter would be prohibited by this amendment. House Report No. 1788, 87th Congress, 2d Session.

The report concludes in this regard with the observation that the "President's waiver authority contained in section 614(a) of this act may be used to waive the requirements of this subsection. *Ibid.* Section 614(a) which formed part of the original 1961 enactment then read as follows:

The President may authorize in each fiscal year the use of funds made available for use under this chapter and the furnishing of assistance under section 2318 of this title in a total amount not to exceed \$250,000,000 and the use of not to exceed \$100,000,000 of foreign currencies accruing under this chapter or any other law, without regard to the requirements of this chapter, any law relating to receipts and credits accruing to the United States, an Act appropriating funds for use under this chapter, or the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, in furtherance of any of the purposes of such Acts, when the President determines that such authorization is important to the security of the United States. Not more than \$50,000,000 of the funds available under this subsection may be allocated to any one country in any fiscal year.

Since 1961, section 614(a) has been substantively amended once. In 1966, the Congress added a new sentence at the end of the section providing that the \$50,000,000 limitation on the allocations of funds to any country in any one fiscal year shall not apply to any country which is a victim of active Communist or Communist-supported aggression. Section 301(f), 80 Stat. 805(1966). The specific language of the new matter added to section 614(a) is—"The limitation contained in the preceding sentence shall not apply to any country which is a victim of active Communist or Communist-supported aggression."

Notwithstanding the clear statement in the Committee report noted above which seemingly disposes of the matter, a question has arisen as to whether the authority contained in section 614(a) permits the President to waive the prohibition in section 505(d). As noted, the former generally authorizes the President to waive with respect to \$250 million and \$100 million of local currency otherwise applicable restrictions in a variety of laws, including "the requirements of this Act." (Note that the phrase "this Act" was changed to "this chapter" when the provision was written into the Foreign Relations Code.) The waiver authority delegated by the section is tied to a presidential determination "that such authorization is important to the security of the United States." However, it is asserted that this "is not the only decision the President must make. He must also determine that the furnishing of such assistance must be in furtherance of any of the purposes of such Acts." 120 *Congressional Record*, S16366 (daily edition, September 11, 1974). The "acts" in question, in addition to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, include (1) any acts appropriating funds for the purposes of this act, including interim or temporary appropriations as well as regular appropriation acts and amendments thereto; (2) any law relating to receipts and credits

accruing to the United States and amendments thereto: (3) Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, and amendments thereto. See House Report No. 851, 87th Congress, 1st Session, on H.R. 8400, Mutual Security Act of 1961. Accordingly, it is said that "the President of the United States can waive the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act which require him to cut off aid to a violating nation, but that waiver must also further the purposes for which the United States provides military assistance [viz: self defense and collective security arrangements]." 120 Congressional Record, S. 16366 (daily edition, September 11, 1974).

Although a quick reading of the section in question seems to offer plausible support for such an interpretation, a more deliberate reading thereof suggests otherwise. As will be observed, the wording of section 614(a) effectively provides that the waiver thereby conferred may be exercised, "in furtherance of *any* of the purposes of such Acts, when the President determines that such authorization is important to the security of the United States." That the prepositional phrase comprising the first part of the quoted material constitutes a limitation on the exercise of presidential authority seems clear. However, the limitation is not so broad as to unavoidably compel the exercise of the waiver authority in a manner consistent with the restriction in section 505(d). If the underlined words in the quote were not a part of the phrase, the latter view might be the only one literally allowed by section 614(a). In other words, if the phrase instead of its present language read "in furtherance [] of *the* purposes of such Acts", the President would appear to be foreclosed from waiving the restriction on future aid to recipient aggressors notwithstanding that such waiver is supported by a presidential determination that it is important to the national interest. However, as written, the requirement reads so as to permit literal compliance therewith if waiver furthers "any" (cf. "all") the purposes of the specified acts. Briefly, while waiver invariably requires the President to determine that the authorization of aid be important to the national security, it may be exercised notwithstanding it serves some, though not all purposes of the aforementioned laws.

Although the legislative history of section 614(a) leaves much to be desired insofar as definitively resolving the present issue, events surrounding attempts to amend that and a related section strongly suggest that the general understanding of the waiver authority contained in the former supports the broader view that the President can disregard some or all of the fundamental purposes of specified *individual* enactments. In the House an unsuccessful effort was made to amend present section 614(a) in order to eliminate the President's authority to disregard the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, more familiarly referred to as the Battle Act. As is generally known, it was part of the general policy of that Act that "no military, economic or financial assistance shall be supplied to any nation unless it applies an embargo on such shipments to any nation or combination of nations threatening the security of the United States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all countries under its domination." 107 Congressional Record 16287 (1961).

Rep. Adair who moved in the House to eliminate the Battle Act from that section assumed that exercise of the waiver with respects thereto included total waiver thereof. Relevant portions of his remarks follow:

Mr. Chairman, this proposed amendment is the one which relates to the Battle Act. If my amendment is adopted, the President, under the special authority given him by section 612, would not have the authority to waive the Battle Act. It would remove from him that power.

Here was a law passed to insure the security of the United States. If we leave in this legislation the words which I have asked to be stricken, the President of the United States may waive with respect to \$250 million and \$100 million of local currency those salutary restrictions which are there for the protection and preservation of the United States of America.

Mr. Chairman, we still give to the President under this section considerable authority to waive other provisions of law. He can waive the provisions of this bill and the amendments thereto; he can waive any act appropriating funds for the purposes of this act, including interim or temporary appropriations as well as regular appropriation acts and amendments thereto; and he can waive any law relating to receipts and credits accruing to the United States and amendments thereto.

Therefore, I point out to the Members of this House that we would leave ample authority in the hands of the President to waive restrictions with respect to this title—involving possibly \$350 million. We owe it to our Nation and we owe it to the citizens of this country to retain the provisions of this act which

was passed in 1951, the so-called Battle Act. It is designed to prevent the strengthening of the Communist countries, to prevent the strengthening of those countries which would do us injury and which are the potential enemies of our country.

In opposition to the Adair amendment, Rep. Zablocki argued that notwithstanding his general agreement with the purposes of the Battle Act, circumstances might arise which required obviating or circumventing its prohibitions. Further, in allowing presidential waiver of that act Congress would be following precedents whereby earlier Presidents were allowed to disregard it whenever the national interests so required. His comments in point follow:

Mr. Chairman, the authority given the President to use \$250 million within his discretion, notwithstanding the Battle Act, is not new legislation. President Eisenhower had that authority and, in my opinion, used it effectively. At this time, when we are in a crisis in Berlin, when we are hoping to effectively fight communism, it is in our national interest to give the President the authority and the flexibility to meet developments.

In the past it appeared that we reacted only when the Communists would take a step. The critics charged that in effect, the Communists were dictating our foreign policy. Under this authority the President can, when he deems it advisable to, take positive action and move in. We know that the Soviets move in to overthrow governments. The Communists never hesitate to infiltrate, subvert, and overthrow governments. For example, they moved into Cuba and we became very much alarmed when they succeeded.

I like to compare the fight against communism to putting out a fire. Naturally fire can be extinguished by pouring gallons of water on it, and if enough water is poured long enough the fire may be put out. But the most effective way to put out a fire is to try to get at the cause of the fire. It is common practice to break into the roof, enter through the side, front door, or back door in order to get inside and put out the fire. In effect this is just what we are authorizing the President to do, permitting him to do what the Soviets are doing.

The Communists are most adept at infiltration. Their successes to a great degree are due to their use of this method. It would be most unfortunate at this time, in my opinion, if the special authority granted to past President Eisenhower should now be denied to President Kennedy.

Subsection 612 provides:

The President may authorize in each fiscal year the use of funds made available under this bill and the furnishing of assistance under section 510 of this bill both in an amount not to exceed \$250 million.

The amount of money which may be allocated to any one country under this authority is limited to \$50 million. This requirement prohibits the use of funds to furnish assistance, pursuant to Presidential waiver, directly to any country of a value exceeding \$50 million in any fiscal year.

If there was a sudden development in an African country or in East Germany or in East Berlin, the President could not react if this authority will be denied. 112 Congressional Record 16287-16290 (1961)

During Senate consideration of the proposed Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Senator Dodd introduced an amendment banning aid to the USSR and named Communist-controlled nations "notwithstanding the provisions of section 614 or any section of an Act appropriating funds for use under this Act. . . ." In response to a question whether he would modify his amendment to omit the specific reference to section 614, Senator Dodd made clear that such a step was contrary to his proposal since it was his purpose not to allow waiver of the restrictions on assisting Communist nations. His remarks in this regard—which follow hereafter—like those of House members in connection with the Adair amendment, assume that the President, pursuant to section 614, could waive the Battle Act as such irrespective of its purposes.

The heart of our difference is I fear that under section 614 the President could waive every other provision of the bill and take the \$250 million and do what he pleased with it.

That is precisely why I wrote that language into my amendment. I am sure the Senator from Arkansas, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, will not mind my saying this. He wrote to me and offered to accept my amendment if I would delete reference to section 614. I said in essence, "That I cannot do, because it is the heart and soul of this amendment."

That is the difference. That is why I cannot accept the substitute of my colleague.

I do not want to repose in any President any such authority. I am very devoted to our President, and I do not want my words to be in any way construed as

my not having the greatest of trust and faith in him. That is not the point. We are always talking about this country being a nation of laws. Indeed it is. This is the Congress which makes those laws. I do not want any President, any frail human being, to have the power to take our money and give it away to a Communist country. 112 Congressional Record 16150 (1961)

The language of section 614(a) allows the President to waive relative to \$250 million and \$100 million of local currency restrictions otherwise applicable thereto whenever it is important to the security of the United States. In addition, the act of waiver and the consequent extension of aid is to be in furtherance "of any" of the purposes of the laws specified in that section. The literal wording of the section does not condition waiver on satisfying all of the purposes of such laws. Such a conclusion seems to be borne out by statements in support of amendments designed to insure that none of the purposes of one of the specified acts could be ignored, viz: the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951. Additional support for this view also may be adduced from the provisions in section 617 of the 1961 Act whereby the Congress, *inter alia*, provided that "[a]ssistance under any provision of this chapter may, unless sooner terminated by the President, be terminated by concurrent resolution." 22 U.S.C. § 2367(1974).

The annexed appendix contains other passages from the legislative materials on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 relative to section 614(a).

ANNEX

WAIVER AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION 614(a), FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED, 22 U.S.C. 2364(a).

Section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 U.S.C. 2364(a), reads as follows:

(a) The President may authorize in each fiscal year the use of funds made available for use under this chapter and the furnishing of assistance under section 2318 of this title in a total amount not to exceed \$250,000,000 and the use of not to exceed \$100,000,000 of foreign currencies accruing under this chapter or any other law, without regard to the requirements of this chapter, any law relating to receipts and credits accruing to the United States, any Act appropriating funds for use under this chapter, or the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, in furtherance of any of the purposes of such Acts, when the President determines that such authorization is important to the security of the United States. Not more than \$50,000,000 of the funds available under this subsection may be allocated to any one country in any fiscal year. The limitation contained in the preceding sentence shall not apply to any country which is a victim of active Communist or Communist-supported aggression.

Since its adoption in 1961, section 614(a) has been substantively amended on one occasion. On that occasion, the Congress added the concluding sentence providing that the \$50,000,000 limitation on the allocations of funds to any country in any one fiscal year shall not apply to any country which is a victim of active Communist or Communist-supported aggression. Section 301(f), 80 Stat. 805 (1966). Therefore, as adopted and written into the Foreign Relations Code, section 614(a) provided that—

(a) The President may authorize in each fiscal year the use of funds made available for use under this chapter and the furnishing of assistance under section 2318 of this title in a total amount not to exceed \$250,000,000 and the use of not to exceed \$100,000,000 of foreign currencies accruing under this chapter or any other law, without regard to the requirements of this chapter, any law relating to receipts and credits accruing to the United States, any Act appropriating funds for use under this chapter, or the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, in furtherance of any of the purposes of such Acts, when the President determines that such authorization is important to the security of the United States. Not more than \$50,000,000 of the funds available under this subsection may be allocated to any one country in any fiscal year.

As such, the language of the section follows closely that of the bill reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Designated section 612(a) at that time, it read in relevant part as follows:

SEC. 612 SPECIAL AUTHORITIES.—(a) The President may authorize in each fiscal year the use of funds made available for use under this Act and the

furnishing of assistance under section 510 in a total amount not to exceed \$250,000,000 and the use of not to exceed \$100,000,000 of foreign currencies accruing under this Act or any other law, without regard to the requirements of this Act, any law relating to receipts and credits accruing to the United States, any Act appropriating funds for use under this Act, or the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (22 U.S.C. 1611 et seq.), in furtherance of any of the purposes of such Acts, when the President determines that such authorization is important to the security of the United States. Not more than \$50,000,000 of the funds available under this subsection may be allocated to any one country in any fiscal year.

In its report on the bill, the Committee described that section as follows:

Section 612. Special authorities

Subsection (a) provides that the President may authorize in each fiscal year the use of funds made available under this bill and the furnishing of assistance under section 510 of this bill both in an amount not to exceed \$250 million, and the use of not to exceed \$100 million of foreign currencies accruing under this act or any other law, without regard to the requirements of the following laws, when such authorization is in furtherance of any of the purposes of such laws, including Public Law 480 and the President determines that it is important to the security of the United States:

1. This bill and amendments thereto.
2. Any acts appropriating funds for the purposes of this act, including interim or temporary appropriations as well as regular appropriation acts and amendments thereto.
3. Any law relating to receipts and credits accruing to the United States and amendments thereto.
4. Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, and amendments thereto.

The amount of money which may be allocated to any one country under this authority is limited to \$50 million. This requirement prohibits the use of funds to furnish assistance, pursuant to Presidential waiver, directly to any country of a value exceeding \$50 million in any fiscal year. The committee also believes this limit should apply to international organizations.

The authorization to use foreign currencies accruing under this act or any other law, not to exceed the equivalent of \$100 million, is not only intended to permit drawing on foreign currencies to that amount to meet emergencies as they may arise. The purpose is, primarily, to make possible the use of such currencies for humanitarian purposes in countries where substantial amounts of foreign currencies have been or are being deposited for U.S. use. The object is to permit the initiation of projects which will contribute directly and immediately to alleviating the living and working conditions of the people.

It is anticipated that this authority will not be used to finance grandiose or long-term projects.

It is hoped that utilizing foreign currencies not required for the more usual development programs carried out under the Act for International Development would encourage people opposed to communism to continue their struggle and would give to the discontented in less-developed countries an alternative to the promises of Communist propaganda.

Assistance under section 510, referred to above, is the new authority given to the President in this bill to order defense articles from Department of Defense stocks and defense services for military assistance purposes, in the maximum amount of \$400 million in any fiscal year, if he determines that it is vital to the security of the United States, subject to subsequent reimbursement from subsequent appropriations for military assistance.

In section 451 of the existing law the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, and amendments thereto, is not included by name but is covered by the following language: "or any other Act for which funds are authorized by this Act." Section 613, therefore, is more specific as to the laws whose requirements may be waived.

Section 201(b) of this act prohibits the use of the authority of section 612 to waive the requirements of title I (development loans).

This bill makes available for use under the provisions of section 612 \$250 million of the funds authorized for use under this act. The present law (sec. 451) provides for such use \$150 million of any funds authorized under the Mutual Security Act and, in addition, \$100 million of the \$150 million authorized to be

appropriated for the contingency fund. In this bill there is a separate provision for the contingency fund (sec. 451).

In addition, the former Mutual Security Act (sec. 451) provides for certain types of assistance to escapees or selected persons from Communist-dominated or occupied areas and proclaims the hope that such captive peoples shall again enjoy freedom. The provisions concerning escapees and captive peoples are not retained in this bill because they are covered in H.R. 8291 pending before the House Judiciary Committee. House Report No. 851, 87th Congress, 1st Session, on H.R. 8400, Mutual Security Act of 1961, at pages 71-72.

The comparable provision in the Senate bill was designated section 614(a) and provides as follows:

SEC. 614. SPECIAL AUTHORITIES.—(a) The President may authorize in each fiscal year the use of funds made available for use under this Act and the furnishing of assistance under section 510 in a total amount not to exceed \$250,000,000 without regard to the requirements of this Act, any Act appropriating funds for use under this Act, or the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (22 U.S.C. 1611 et seq.), in furtherance of any of the purposes of such Acts, when the President determines that such authorization is required by the national interest.

As will be observed, the above section which appeared in the original, reported and Senate-passed versions differs from the House measure in three particulars: First, there is no express reference to or authority for expending "foreign currencies accruing under this Act or any other law" for military assistance; second, there is no express provision permitting the exercise of the authority delegated by the section without regard to "any law relating to receipts and credits accruing to the United States"; third, there is no provision comparable to that placing a \$50,000,000 limitation on the allocation of funds to any country in any one fiscal year.

EFFECT OF ROSENTHAL AMENDMENT ON SECTION 505(d), FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED

The following is submitted in response to a variety of inquiries dated October 1, 1974, requesting information on the above.

As you know, section 505(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 U.S.C. 2314(d) effectively provides that use by any recipient nation of defense articles or services in violation of the terms and conditions contained in this and related laws, past and present, "shall [render such nation] . . . immediately ineligible for further assistance." Among the various terms and conditions imposed by the law is the requirement that defense articles and services authorized in other provisions "shall be furnished solely for internal security, for legitimate self-defense" and for similar nonaggressive purposes. 22 U.S.C. 2302 (Supp.). That the disqualification imposed by section 505(d) was intended to enforce compliance with the requirement of purely defensive use of U.S. military assistance mandated by section 503, 22 U.S.C. 2320 (Supp.) is clearly supported by the House Committee Report (No. 1788, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.) that accompanied the bill which, *inter alia*, added section 505(d) to the Foreign Assistance Act adopted the previous year. The report states, in relevant part, that "where a country actually undertakes an act of aggression or refuses to allow continuous observation of the equipment, diverts substantial quantities of the items furnished, or otherwise violates the terms of its agreement, further assistance under this chapter would be prohibited by this Amendment."

On Tuesday, September 24, 1974, the House adopted an amendment to H. J. Res. 1131, making further continuing appropriations until sine die adjournment of the 93d Congress, which amendment provides that—

"None of the funds herein made available shall be obligated or expended for military assistance, or for sales of defense articles and services (whether for cash or by credit, guaranty, or other means) to the Government of Turkey until the President certifies to the Congress that substantial progress toward agreement has been made regarding military forces in Cyprus."

It is clear from remarks made by the principal spokesman for what is generally described as the Rosenthal Amendment that one of its chief purposes is to send a "signal to the Government of Turkey that they cannot have military equipment to continue and maintain this kind of aggressive action [in Cyprus]." 120 *Congressional Record* H. J. 482 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1974). It is equally clear from the

debate on the Amendment that its proponents feel that Turkey has used U.S. military assistance to commit aggression on Cyprus in violation of the law; they have despaired of Administration taking effective steps to enforce such laws either by cutting off assistance to Turkey or by waiving the requirements of section 505(d) as seems possible under section 614(a), 27 U.S.C. 2364(a); and that legislation in the form of the Rosenthal Amendment is needed to fill the void.

The operation of the amendment was described as follows: "It is not irrevocable. It suspends military aid until such time as the President certifies to the Congress that substantial progress is being made." *Id.*, at J. 9483. Elsewhere in the debate, the Amendment was explained as "represent[ing] a useful statement of congressional concern over the continued substantial presence of Turkish troops on Cyprus without impeding the ability of the President to influence a settlement. . . . It sends a signal but does not tie the President's hands." *Id.*, at H. 9490.

From these and other statements, one receives the impression that the Rosenthal Amendment is "carefully" drawn to permit sending the requisite signal to Turkey while simultaneously allowing the President discretion to continue or to resume aid to that country by certifying to Congress that "substantial progress toward agreement has been made regarding military forces in Cyprus." Accordingly, the question arises as to the effect of the enactment of the Amendment on section 505(d).

As noted, the Rosenthal Amendment does not address itself to section 505(d). As such, it does not expressly amend that provision of existing law. Nor, in our judgment, does the Amendment effect an implied repeal of the existing law. As the Supreme Court recently observed: there exists "the 'cardinal rule . . . that repeals by implication are not favored'." *Morton v. Mancari*, Nos. 73-362 and 73-364 (June 17, 1974), 42 LW4933 (June 18, 1974). *Additionally, as you know, the provision of House Rule XXI forbidding in any general appropriation bill a "provision changing existing law" is construed to mean the enactment of a proposition for repeal of existing law. VII Cannon's Precedents of the House of Representatives §1403. Accordingly, it may be assumed that had opponents of the Rosenthal Amendment viewed it as something other than an admissible limitation on an appropriation bill, they would have raised at point of order against it.

The amendment appears to conform to the requisites of a limitation which provides that no part of an appropriation under consideration shall be used for a certain designated purpose. *Id.*, at § 1581 et seq. As such, and because of the nature of the legislation in which it appears, the Amendment seems to supersede section 505(d) *for purposes of the moneys appropriated thereby*.

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APPENDIX II

Documents Relating to Cyprus, Including Treaty of Guarantee

(From Documents on International Affairs, 1959, Edited by Gillian King, Oxford University Press, London, 1963)

1. DOCUMENTS REGARDING CYPRUS SIGNED AND INITIALLED AT LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, 19 FEBRUARY 1959¹

(a) Basic structure of the Republic of Cyprus

1. The State of Cyprus shall be a Republic with a presidential regime, the President being Greek and the Vice-President Turkish elected by universal suffrage by the Greek and Turkish communities of the Island respectively.

2. The official languages of the Republic of Cyprus shall be Greek and Turkish. Legislative and administrative instruments and documents shall be drawn up and promulgated in the two official languages.

3. The Republic of Cyprus shall have its own flag of neutral design and colour chosen jointly by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic.

Authorities and communities shall have the right to fly the Greek and Turkish flags on holidays at the same time as the flag of Cyprus.

The Greek and Turkish communities shall have the right to celebrate Greek and Turkish national holidays.

4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected for a period of five years.

In the event of absence, impediment or vacancy of their posts, the President and the Vice-President shall be replaced by the President and the Vice-President of the House of Representatives respectively.

In the event of a vacancy in either post, the election of new incumbents shall take place within a period of not more than 45 days.

The President and the Vice-President shall be invested by the House of Representatives, before which they shall take an oath of loyalty and respect for the Constitution. For this purpose, the House of Representatives shall meet within 24 hours after its constitution.

5. Executive authority shall be vested in the President and the Vice-President. For this purpose they shall have a Council of Ministers composed of seven Greek Ministers and three Turkish Ministers. The Ministers shall be designated respectively by the President and the Vice-President who shall appoint them by an instrument signed by them both.

The Ministers may be chosen from outside the House of Representatives.

Decisions of the Council of Ministers shall be taken by an absolute majority.

Decisions so taken shall be promulgated immediately by the President and the Vice-President by publication in the official gazette.

However, the President and the Vice-President shall have the right of final veto and the right to return the decisions of the Council of Ministers under the same conditions as those laid down for laws and decisions of the House of Representatives.

6. Legislative authority shall be vested in a House of Representatives elected for a period of five years by universal suffrage of each community separately in the proportion of 70 per cent. for the Greek community and 30 per cent. for the Turkish community, this proportion being fixed independently of statistical data. (*N.B.*—The number of Representatives shall be fixed by mutual agreement between the communities.)

¹ The agreement on Cyprus was approved by the Greek Parliament on 28 February, by 170 votes to 118, by the Turkish Parliament on 4 March, by 347 votes to 138 with 2 abstentions, and by the House of Commons on 19 March, with no division, after an opposition amendment criticizing the Government's policy since 1954, had been defeated by 239 votes to 246. On 10 November 1959 agreement was reached on the question of executive authority in the new constitution. On 13 December Archbishop Makarios was elected first President of the future Republic of Cyprus; he received 70 per cent of the votes. The state of emergency on the island ended on 4 December 1959.

The House of Representatives shall exercise authority in all matters other than those expressly reserved to the Communal Chambers. In the event of a conflict of authority, such conflict shall be decided by the Supreme Constitutional Court which shall be composed of one Greek, one Turk and one neutral, appointed jointly by the President and the Vice-President. The neutral judge shall be president of the Court.

7. Laws and decisions of the House of Representatives shall be adopted by a simple majority of the members present. They shall be promulgated within 15 days if neither the President nor the Vice-President returns them for reconsideration as provided in Point 9 below.

The Constitutional Law, with the exception of its basic articles, may be modified by a majority comprising two-thirds of the Greek members and two-thirds of the Turkish members of the House of Representatives.

Any modification of the electoral law and the adoption of any law relating to the municipalities and of any law imposing duties or taxes shall require a simple majority of the Greek and Turkish members of the House of Representatives taking part in the vote and considered separately.

On the adoption of the budget, the President and the Vice-President may exercise their right to return it to the House of Representatives, if in their judgment any question of discrimination arises. If the House maintains its decisions, the President and the Vice-President shall have the right of appeal to the Supreme Constitutional Court.

8. The President and the Vice-President, separately and conjointly, shall have the right of final veto on any law or decision concerning foreign affairs, except the participation of the Republic of Cyprus in international organisations and pacts of alliance in which Greece and Turkey both participate, or concerning defence and security as defined in Annex I.

9. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall have, separately and conjointly, the right to return all laws and decisions, which may be returned to the House of Representatives within a period of not more than 15 days for reconsideration.

The House of Representatives shall pronounce within 15 days on any matter so returned. If the House of Representatives maintains its decisions, the President and the Vice-President shall promulgate the law or decision in question within the time-limits fixed for the promulgation of laws and decisions.

Laws and decisions, which are considered by the President or the Vice-President to discriminate against either of the two communities, shall be submitted to the Supreme Constitutional Court which may annul or confirm the law or decision, or return it to the House of Representatives for reconsideration, in whole or in part. The law or decision shall not become effective until the Supreme Constitutional Court or, where it has been returned, the House of Representatives has taken a decision on it.

10. Each community shall have its Communal Chamber composed of a number of representatives which it shall itself determine.

The Communal Chambers shall have the right to impose taxes and levies on members of their community to provide for their needs and for the needs of bodies and institutions under their supervision.

The Communal Chambers shall exercise authority in all religious, educational, cultural and teaching questions and questions of personal status. They shall exercise authority in questions where the interests and institutions are of a purely communal nature, such as sporting and charitable foundations, bodies and associations, producers' and consumers' co-operatives and credit establishments, created for the purpose of promoting the welfare of one of the communities. (*N.B.*—It is understood that the provisions of the present paragraph cannot be interpreted in such a way as to prevent the creation of mixed and communal institutions where the inhabitants desire them.)

These producers' and consumers' co-operatives and credit establishments, which shall be administered under the laws of the Republic, shall be subject to the supervision of the Communal Chambers. The Communal Chambers shall also exercise authority in matters initiated by municipalities which are composed of one community only. These municipalities, to which the laws of the Republic shall apply, shall be supervised in their functions by the Communal Chambers.

Where the central administration is obliged to take over the supervision of the institutions, establishments, or municipalities mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs by virtue of legislation in force, this supervision shall be exercised by officials belonging to the same community as the institution, establishment or municipality in question.

11. The Civil Service shall be composed as to 70 per cent. of Greeks and as to 30 per cent. of Turks.

It is understood that this quantitative division will be applied as far as practicable in all grades of the Civil Service.

In regions or localities where one of the two communities is in a majority approaching 100 per cent., the organs of the local administration responsible to the central administration shall be composed solely of officials belonging to that community.

12. The deputies of the Attorney-General of the Republic, the Inspector-General, the Treasurer and the Governor of the Issuing Bank may not belong to the same community as their principals. The holders of these posts shall be appointed by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic acting in agreement.

13. The heads and deputy heads of the Armed Forces, the Gendarmerie and the Police shall be appointed by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic acting in agreement. One of these heads shall be Turkish and where the head belongs to one of the communities, the deputy head shall belong to the other.

14. Compulsory military service may only be instituted with the agreement of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus.

Cyprus shall have an army of 2,000 men, of whom 60 percent shall be Greek and 40 percent Turkish.

The security forces (gendarmerie and police) shall have a complement of 2,000 men, which may be reduced or increased with the agreement of both the President and the Vice-President. The security forces shall be composed as to 70 percent of Greeks and as to 30 percent of Turks. However, for an initial period this percentage may be raised to a maximum of 40 percent of Turks (and consequently reduced to 60 percent of Greeks) in order not to discharge those Turks now serving in the police, apart from the auxiliary police.

15. Forces, which are stationed in parts of the territory of the Republic inhabited, in a proportion approaching 100 percent, by members of a single community, shall belong to that community.

16. A High Court of Justice shall be established, which shall consist of two Greeks, one Turk and one neutral, nominated jointly by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic.

The President of the Court shall be the neutral judge, who shall have two votes.

This Court shall constitute the highest organ of the judicature (appointments, promotions of judges, etc.).

17. Civil disputes, where the plaintiff and the defendant belong to the same community, shall be tried by a tribunal composed of judges belonging to that community. If the plaintiff and defendant belong to different communities, the composition of the tribunal shall be mixed and shall be determined by the High Court of Justice.

Tribunals dealing with civil disputes relating to questions of personal status and to religious matters, which are reserved to the competence of the Communal Chambers under Point 10, shall be composed solely of judges belonging to the community concerned. The composition and status of these tribunals shall be determined according to the law drawn up by the Communal Chamber and they shall apply the law drawn up by the Communal Chamber.

In criminal cases, the tribunal shall consist of judges belonging to the same community as the accused. If the injured party belongs to another community, the composition of the tribunal shall be mixed and shall be determined by the High Court of Justice.

18. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall each have the right to exercise the prerogative of mercy to persons from their respective communities who are condemned to death. In cases where the plaintiffs and the convicted persons are members of different communities the prerogative of mercy shall be exercised by agreement between the President and the Vice-President. In the event of disagreement the vote for clemency shall prevail. When mercy is accorded the death penalty shall be commuted to life imprisonment.

19. In the event of agricultural reform, lands shall be redistributed only to persons who are members of the same community as the expropriated owners.

Expropriations by the State or the Municipalities shall only be carried out on payment of a just and equitable indemnity fixed, in disputed cases, by the tribunals. An appeal to the tribunals shall have the effect of suspending action.

Expropriated property shall only be used for the purpose for which the expropriation was made. Otherwise the property shall be restored to the owners.

20. Separate municipalities shall be created in the five largest towns of Cyprus by the Turkish inhabitants of these towns. However:—

(a) In each of the towns a co-ordinating body shall be set up which shall supervise work which needs to be carried out jointly and shall concern itself with matters which require a degree of co-operation. These bodies shall each be composed of two members chosen by the Greek municipalities, two members chosen by the Turkish municipalities and a President chosen by agreement between the two municipalities.

(b) The President and the Vice-President shall examine within four years the question whether or not this separation of municipalities in the five largest towns shall continue.

With regard to other localities, special arrangements shall be made for the constitution of municipal bodies, following, as far as possible, the rule of proportional representation for the two communities.

21. A Treaty guaranteeing the independence, territorial integrity and constitution of the new State of Cyprus shall be concluded between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey. A Treaty of military alliance shall also be concluded between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey.

These two instruments shall have constitutional force. (This last paragraph shall be inserted in the Constitution as a basic article.)

22. It shall be recognised that the total or partial union of Cyprus with any other State, or a separatist independence for Cyprus (*i.e.*, the partition of Cyprus into two independent States), shall be excluded.

23. The Republic of Cyprus shall accord most-favoured-nation treatment to Great Britain, Greece and Turkey for all agreements whatever their nature.

This provision shall not apply to the Treaties between the Republic of Cyprus and the United Kingdom concerning the bases and military facilities accorded to the United Kingdom.

24. The Greek and Turkish Governments shall have the right to subsidise institutions for education, culture, athletics and charity belonging to their respective communities.

Equally, where either community considers that it has not the necessary number of schoolmasters, professors or priests for the working of its institutions, the Greek and Turkish Governments may provide them to the extent strictly necessary to meet their needs.

25. One of the following Ministries—the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Finance—shall be entrusted to a Turk. If the President and the Vice-President agree they may replace this system by a system of rotation.

26. The new State which is to come into being with the signature of the Treaties shall be established as quickly as possible and within a period of not more than three months from the signature of the Treaties.

27. All the above Points shall be considered to be basic articles of the Constitution of Cyprus.

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† A. M.

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ANNEX I

A

The defense questions subject to veto under Point 8 of the Basic Structure are as follows:—

- (a) Composition and size of the armed forces and credits for them.
- (b) Appointments and promotions.
- (c) Imports of warlike stores and of all kinds of explosives.
- (d) Granting of bases and other facilities to allied countries.

The Security questions subject to veto are as follows:—

- (a) Appointments and promotions.
- (b) Allocation and stationing of forces.
- (c) Emergency measures and martial law.
- (d) Police laws.

(It is provided that the right of veto shall cover all emergency measures or decisions, but not those which concern the normal functioning of the police and gendarmerie.)

(b) *Treaty of Guarantee between the Republic of Cyprus and Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey*

The Republic of Cyprus of the one part, and Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey of the other part:—

I. Considering that the recognition and maintenance of the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, as established and regulated by the basic articles of its Constitution, are in their common interest;

II. Desiring to co-operate to ensure that the provisions of the aforesaid Constitution shall be respected;

Have Agreed as Follows:

ARTICLE 1

The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution.

It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. With this intent it prohibits all activity tending to promote directly or indirectly either union or partition of the Island.

ARTICLE 2

Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey, taking note of the undertakings by the Republic of Cyprus embodied in Article 1, recognize and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the provisions of the basic articles of its Constitution.

They likewise undertake to prohibit, as far as lies within their power, all activity having the object of promoting directly or indirectly either the union of the Republic of Cyprus with any other State, or the partition of the Island.

ARTICLE 3

In the event of any breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, the United Kingdom, and Turkey undertake to consult together, with a view to making representations, or taking the necessary steps to ensure observance of those provisions.

In so far as common or concerted action may prove impossible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs established by the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 4

The present Treaty shall enter into force on signature.

The High Contracting Parties undertake to register the present Treaty at the earliest possible date with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter.

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(c) *Treaty of Alliance between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey*

1. The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey shall co-operate for their common defense and undertake by this Treaty to consult together on the problems raised by this defence.

2. The High Contracting Parties undertake to resist any attack or aggression, direct or indirect, directed against the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

3. In the spirit of this alliance and in order to fulfil the above purpose a tripartite Headquarters shall be established on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus.

4. Greece shall take part in the Headquarters mentioned in the preceding article with a contingent of 950 officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers and Turkey with a contingent of 650 officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus, acting in agreement, may ask the Greek and Turkish Governments to increase or reduce the Greek and Turkish contingents.

5. The Greek and Turkish officers mentioned above shall be responsible for the training of the Army of the Republic of Cyprus.

6. The command of the tripartite Headquarters shall be assumed in rotation and for a period of one year each by a Cypriot, Greek and Turkish General Officer, who shall be nominated by the Governments of Greece and Turkey and by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus.

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¶ (d) *Declaration by the Government of the United Kingdom, 17 February 1959*

DECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, having examined the documents concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, comprising the Basic Structure for the Republic of Cyprus, the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance, drawn up and approved by the Heads of the Governments of Greece and Turkey in Zürich on February 11, 1959, and taking into account the consultations in London, from February 11 to 16, 1959, between the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom

Declare:

A. That, subject to the acceptance of their requirements as set out in Section B below, they accept the documents approved by the Heads of the Governments of Greece and Turkey as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus.

B. That, with the exception of two areas at

(a) Akrotiri—Episkopi—Paramali, and

(b) Dhekelia—Pergamos—Ayios Nikolaos—Xylophagou, which will be retained under full British sovereignty, they are willing to transfer sovereignty over the Island of Cyprus to the Republic of Cyprus subject to the following conditions:—

(1) that such rights are secured to the United Kingdom Government as are necessary to enable the two areas as aforesaid to be used effectively as military bases, included among others those rights indicated in the Annex attached, and that satisfactory guarantees are given by Greece, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus for the integrity of the areas retained under British sovereignty and the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights referred to above;

(2) that provision shall be made by agreement for:—

(i) the protection of the fundamental human rights of the various communities in Cyprus;

(ii) the protection of the interests of the members of the public services in Cyprus;

(iii) determining the nationality of persons affected by the settlement;

(iv) the assumption by the Republic of Cyprus of the appropriate obligations of the present Government of Cyprus, including the settlement of claims.

C. That the Government of the United Kingdom welcome the draft Treaty of Alliance between the Republic of Cyprus, the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey and will co-operate with the Parties thereto in the common defence of Cyprus.

D. That the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus shall come into force and the formal signature of the necessary instruments by the parties concerned shall take place at the earliest practicable date and on that date sovereignty will be transferred to the Republic of Cyprus.

SELWYN LLOYD.

ALAN LENNOX-BOYD.

E. A.-T.

† A. M.

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ANNEX

The following rights will be necessary in connexion with the areas to be retained under British sovereignty:—

(a) to continue to use, without restriction or interference, the existing small sites containing military and other installations and to exercise complete control within these sites, including the right to guard and defend them and

to exclude from them all persons not authorised by the United Kingdom Government;

(b) to use roads, ports and other facilities freely for the movement of personnel and stores of all kinds to and from and between the above-mentioned areas and sites;

(c) to continue to have the use of specified port facilities at Famagusta;

(d) to use public services (such as water, telephone, telegraph, electric power, &c.);

(e) to use from time to time certain localities, which would be specified for, troop training;

(f) to use the airfield at Nicosia, together with any necessary buildings and facilities on or connected with the airfield to whatever extent is considered necessary by the British authorities for the operation of British military aircraft in peace and war, including the exercise of any necessary operational control of air traffic;

(g) to overfly the territory of the Republic of Cyprus without restriction;

(h) to exercise jurisdiction over British forces to an extent comparable with that provided in Article VII of the Agreement regarding the Status of Forces of Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, in respect of certain offences committed within the territory of the Republic of Cyprus;

(i) to employ freely in the areas and sites labour from other parts of Cyprus;

(j) to obtain, after consultation with the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, the use of such additional small sites and such additional rights as the United Kingdom may, from time to time, consider technically necessary for the efficient use of its base areas and installations in Cyprus.

(c) *Additional article to be inserted in the Treaty of Guarantee*

The Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus undertake to respect the integrity of the areas to be retained under the sovereignty of the United Kingdom upon the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment of the United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to the United Kingdom by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the declaration by the Government of the United Kingdom.

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APPENDIX III

Statement of Senator Kennedy on Humanitarian Problems on Cyprus, and Introduction of Joint Resolution Calling for Withdrawal of Foreign Troops

(From the Congressional Record, Senate, August 8 and 13, 1974)

SENATE

HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS ON CYPRUS

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, events on Cyprus have been a source of deep concern for many Americans and people around the world. But after days of intense violence and political turmoil, reports now suggest some hopeful signs that at least the violence is subsiding—and that additional efforts will now be made by all parties concerned to effect a meaningful separation of forces under United Nations auspices. Hopefully, as well, new efforts to resume negotiations on a political settlement of the conflict will be diligently pursued—and will not only restore the security of civilians and constitutional rule of all of Cyprus, but also the island's territorial integrity and full independence.

In pursuing these objectives, however, the parties concerned—and all men of good will—should not lose sight of the human tragedies which have hit the people of Cyprus. Regrettably, their situation has taken second place to the military and political issues at stake—and to the special interests of those who have much to lose, or to gain, by the outcome of the conflict. But the civilians of Cyprus—both Greeks and Turks—also have interests. And for many thousands, apparently especially among the Greek population in the Turkish salients—recent weeks have been a nightmare of death and horror and grief.

Reports from the area—including official reports to our own Government and elsewhere—fully confirm the human tragedy of Cyprus. Tens of thousands of women and children have been forcibly expelled from their villages—especially in Turkish occupied areas—or have fled their homes as refugees. Thousands of able-bodied men have disappeared—and some apparently have been deported to camps or prisons in southern Turkey. Refugees tell of “much suffering” and “systematic” arson, looting, murder, and rape. And civilian casualties—both wounded and dead—number in the hundreds, if not the thousands.

Mr. President, I do not rise to offer any magic solution for meeting the immediate political and humanitarian problems of Cyprus. But I do rise to express a deep personal concern over the plight of Cypriot civilians—and especially over the continuing violations of human rights and the rules of common human decency which are evidenced in Turkish occupied areas. A spokesman for our own Government suggests that “some very rough stuff” continues. This is a deplorable situation, and I appeal to the Turkish Government and all parties involved to make every effort in behalf of bringing peace and relief to Cyprus.

Apart from securing a meaningful separation of forces and a political settlement at the conference table in Geneva, there are three items of immediate concern to me as chairman of the Subcommittee on Refugees:

First, the emergency relief needs of refugees and others in distress—including food, water, shelter, medicine, and protection;

Second, the condition, treatment, and release of civilian detainees—including those who may have been deported to Turkey or other areas; and

Third, the free movement of international relief convoys and humanitarian personnel from the United Nations or the International Committee for the Red Cross—ICRC—including the free access of Red Cross personnel to detention centers on both sides.

The United Nations and the ICRC are the primary international agencies charged with the care and protection of Cypriot civilians. Reports from the U.N.

and elsewhere suggest, however, that difficulties continue in all three areas of my immediate concern—especially in the Turkish salients of the country.

The humanitarian services of the U.N. and the ICRC have been indispensable in helping to bring peace and relief in many areas of the world. And today in Cyprus the services of these organizations deserve the full support of the parties to the conflict, our own Government, and others as well.

In conclusion, let me express some concern over the course of U.S. policy toward Cyprus. We have heard a great deal about the travels of our diplomats to the area, but we have heard very little about the substance and objectives of American policy toward developments on Cyprus and related issues.

I fully appreciate the immense difficulties in the Cyprus issue. It is a complex matter for diplomats and humanitarians alike. But should not our Government give more evidence of concern? What are American policy objectives? What is the substance of our activities? What have we done to help restrain Turkish forces? And how are we responding to help meet humanitarian needs among the Cypriot civilians who are refugees or detainees on either side?

The American people and their representatives in Congress deserve some answers, and should not be in the dark over United States policy toward Cyprus. I am extremely hopeful, Mr. President, that the administration will finally give some additional evidence of a very active concern over the needed efforts to bring peace and relief to the people of Cyprus.

[From the Congressional Record—Tuesday, August 13, 1974]

SENATE

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 110—SUBMISSION OF A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION RELATING TO THE SITUATION IN CYPRUS

(Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.)

Mr. KENNEDY submitted the following concurrent resolution:

S. Con. Res. 110

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring),

Whereas a settlement of the present conflict in the Republic of Cyprus is vital to peace and security of the eastern Mediterranean and is in the best interests of world peace and stability; and

Whereas a settlement depends upon the right of the Cypriot people to determine their own destiny and the efforts of the United Nations to act as a negotiating body; and

Whereas Resolution 2077(xx) adopted by the General Assembly on December 8, 1965, "calls upon all states . . . to respect the sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and to refrain from any intervention directed against it"; and

Whereas the continued presence of foreign troops in Cyprus undermines the ability of the Cypriot people to resolve their own crisis and the efforts of the United Nations to restore peace; and

Whereas Resolution 353 adopted by the Security Council on July 20, 1974, "demands an immediate end to foreign military intervention in the Republic of Cyprus" and requests the withdrawal without delay from the Republic of Cyprus of foreign military personnel present otherwise than under the authority of international agreements . . ."; and

Whereas the declaration on Cyprus signed by the foreign ministers of Britain, Turkey, and Greece, in Geneva on July 30, 1974, calls for a "timely and phased reduction of the number of armed forces" from Cypriot soil; and

Whereas the continued presence of foreign troops in Cyprus violates international agreements and United Nations resolutions, threatens the independence and territorial integrity of the island, jeopardizes peace and stability in the eastern Mediterranean, and imperils the very existence of NATO; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring),

That all foreign troops currently involved in Cyprus be withdrawn immediately so that the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross may be permitted to restore peace to the island, and to guarantee the protection and civil rights of all persons and communities and the right of the Cypriot people working together to determine their own destiny.

APPENDIX IV

Amendment of Senator Kennedy Providing Relief Assistance to Cyprus (and Africa and Bangladesh)

(Adopted in the Senate, October 2, 1974; introduced on September 17, 1974)

[From the Congressional Record—Tuesday, September 17, 1974]

SENATE

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1974—AMENDMENT

Amendment No. 1878

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. KENNEDY (for himself and Mr. McGEE) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by them jointly to the bill (S. 3394), *supra*.

Relief and Rehabilitation Funds for Africa, Bangladesh, and Cyprus

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I am submitting today an amendment to S. 3394, the pending Foreign Assistance authorization bill. The amendment provides special funds for disaster relief and rehabilitation programs in the drought-stricken areas of Africa, for flood relief in Bangladesh, and for refugee assistance in Cyprus.

The amendment authorizes the use of existing funds—an estimated \$119,000,000 available under scheduled loan repayments administered by AID—to permit our Government to respond to the massive human tragedies in these areas, and to possible disasters in other parts of the world.

The current crisis in Cyprus, the massive flooding in Bangladesh, and the spreading drought and famine in Africa, are only the latest links in the chain of ravaged populations which have circled the globe in recent years. Such humanitarian crises have always brought forth an immediate response from the American people—in fulfillment of our Nation's longstanding leadership in helping, to the extent we can, all people in need. Just last spring the Congress responded to the famine needs of Africa, and the disaster relief requirements of Pakistan and Nicaragua, by enacting the Foreign Disaster Assistance Act. And, during consideration of the foreign assistance bill last year, the Congress enacted section 639B, which provided substantial famine and disaster relief to the African Sahel for the first time.

The amendment I am introducing today continues our country's record of concern for our fellow man, and the longstanding support of Congress for disaster relief overseas. The amendment was prepared in very close cooperation with AID, and carries with it the support of the Ford administration.

For the people of Cyprus, Mr. President, this is especially a perilous time—as it is also for the renewal of democracy and freedom in Greece, and for the future of peaceful relations in the Eastern Mediterranean. Regrettably, the plight of Cypriot civilians has taken second place to the military and political dimensions of the Cyprus problem—and to the special interests of those who have much to lose or to gain by the outcome of the conflict on the island. But the civilians of Cyprus—both Greeks and Turks—also have interests. And for tens of thousands, the past weeks have been a nightmare of death and tragedy and grief.

1. CYPRUS

This week I received a preliminary report from a special study mission to Cyprus, which visited the area on behalf of the Subcommittee on Refugees, which I serve as chairman. The study mission visited refugees in all parts of the island, including the Turkish occupied areas. The study mission met with both Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders and United Nations relief officials, and also held

extensive conversations on humanitarian and related problems with officials in Ankara and Athens.

The study mission reports that nearly 300,000 Cypriots—mostly Greeks—are now refugees. They fled the advancing Turkish Army, leaving their homes and nearly all of their belongings behind. This is close to half the island's population—without sufficient food and medicine, with little shelter, with few clothes and blankets, and with increasingly little hope for an early return to their villages and homes.

A drive along the highways of Cyprus, especially in the southern zone, quickly tells the tragic tale of the events of July and August—of the human consequences of an armed invasion, of constant cease-fire violations, of military occupation, and of man's inhumanity to man.

Refugees are still fleeing down the roads of Cyprus. During the team's recent visit some 20,000 people fled the town of Athna, in advance of what the Turkish Army calls "armed reconnaissance in force"—or what simple language would label a cease fire violation. These thousands of refugees, like the tens of thousands before them, are today seeking protection and safety in the towns of southern Cyprus, swelling the local population in some areas by at least 500 percent. They are seeking shelter wherever they can find it—in open fields, under trees, along the roadsides, and in schools, churches, and civic buildings. In the first days they had no shelter, and few blankets. And only in the past 2 weeks have relief supplies begun to arrive in meaningful quantities, and clusters of tents are beginning to sprout around towns and cities in the government controlled areas of the island. The overwhelming majority of those in need are Greek Cypriots, but significant members of Turks also command our help and concern.

The economy and life of Cyprus has been shattered by the Turkish invasion, with some 80 percent of the economic base located in the occupied areas which now have less than 10 percent of the population. The vast citrus industry rots on the trees. Farms on the plain lie idle, as cattle and other livestock die from lack of food and water. The tourist center of Kyrenia has been looted beyond recognition, and the city of Famagusta—a city of over 40,000 people—is now a ghost town, with empty streets, houses, and hotels. The population of whole cities have become refugees.

For many refugee families, the tragedy is still too fresh, their flight to safety too recent, for them to realize fully what has happened. And few in the international community have recognized the full tragedy of Cyprus, Our Government's role during the crisis—our early silence and later vacillation toward the political and military problems of the island—must not characterize our Nation's attitude or response to the escalating human crisis which has gripped all of Cyprus.

The study mission reports that important relief efforts have now been undertaken, in cooperation with Cypriot authorities, by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross, among others. But these initiatives, and programs for humanitarian relief in Cyprus, are just getting off the ground and need the immediate support of the United States—support which this amendment will provide. It is estimated that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees will alone need some \$22 million for emergency relief through the end of this year, and that an additional sum will be required for returning the refugees home or resettling them elsewhere on the island. Our Government must be in a position to actively encourage and generously support this important humanitarian work of the United Nations and the Cypriot authorities. Peace and relief for all Cypriots in need must be our goal on Cyprus.

2. BANGLADESH

In Bangladesh, there can be no doubt today that great tragedy has once again hit the Bengali people. A recent hearing before the Subcommittee on Refugees indicated that flood refugees number in the millions, as the worst floods in over 20 years have inundated the land and people of Bangladesh. Crops have been destroyed, and food reserves have been lost. Housing, schools, health clinics and other facilities have been swept away. And all reports confirm that this latest disaster seriously compounds existing economic and social problems brought about by the dislocations of the 1971 war for independence.

In testimony before the Refugee Subcommittee recent travelers to the area report that there is more human suffering than ever before, that the country stands on the brink of starvation, and that epidemic and disease threaten the well-being and lives of millions, and, perhaps, the nation as a whole. In purely

human terms, there is great suffering today in Bangladesh which must call forth a greater response from the United States—out of humanitarian concern, as well as concern for the stability and peace of South Asia. The United States cannot assume the full responsibility for meeting the massive human needs in Bangladesh. The United Nations and other governments must help. But we, too, must do what we can with what we have.

3. AFRICA

And in the Sahel and other parts of Africa, the food situation continues to deteriorate as famine conditions spread across the continent. Contrary to our Government's general optimism over the past year, recent reports, even within the government, tell of catastrophic consequences from the Sahelian drought, and that the situation among the people is precarious in some areas. The number of famine refugees is growing. Relief camps are over-burdened. Last year's logistical bottlenecks and administrative delays in the movement of food and relief supplies continues. Malnutrition and disease still threaten the lives of many thousands, and unless something more is done the death rate will continue to climb.

Mr. President, it is the purpose of this amendment to make available already appropriated funds to support international relief and rehabilitation programs in Cyprus, Bangladesh, Africa, and other areas of possible need over the coming year. This amendment authorizes the Agency for International Development—AID—to use 50 percent of the fiscal year 1975 scheduled loan repayments, which now revert to the Treasury, to be used for the relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction purposes mandated in the amendment—especially in Cyprus, Bangladesh, and Africa. Current estimates by AID suggest that some \$119 million is immediately available. And by using the loan repayments, under specific Congressional authorization, it will not be necessary to appropriate a new obligational authority this fiscal year.

The humanitarian concerns today—in Cyprus, Bangladesh, and Africa—illustrate once again that those foreign policy variables involving people are crucial elements in our foreign policy. Little will be achieved in building a structure of peace unless governments place a higher priority on the welfare and real-life problems of people—whose neglect fosters instability and spawns conflict around the globe.

Political wisdom and simple humanity demands of our country that we do more to help the critical humanitarian needs in today's world. The extraordinary needs in Cyprus and elsewhere demand that we take extraordinary steps to utilize all readily available sources of funds—including those scheduled loan repayments which will revert to the Treasury, unless Congress and the administration act to use them for humanitarian purposes in the interest of world stability and peace. The amendment I introduce today will help accomplish this end.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the amendment, as well as a section-by-section analysis of its provisions, be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the amendment and analysis were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

AMENDMENT No. 1878

At the end of the bill, add the following new section:

RECONSTRUCTION, RELIEF, AND REHABILITATION

SEC. 33. (a) Section 203 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by inserting immediately after "of this part." the following: "The balance of such receipts for fiscal year 1975 is authorized to be made available for the purposes of sections 639B, 639C, and 639D of this Act."

(b) Section 639B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following: "Notwithstanding any prohibitions or restrictions contained in this or any other Act, the President is authorized to furnish assistance, on such terms and conditions as he may determine, for reconstruction and economic development programs in the drought-stricken nations of Africa. Such assistance shall be furnished solely out of funds made available under section 203 of this Act to carry out this section."

(c) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by adding after section 639B a new section 639C as follows:

"SEC. 639C. RELIEF AND REHABILITATION IN BANGLADESH AND CYPRUS.—(a) The Congress finds that the recent flooding in the People's Republic of Bangladesh, and the civil and international strife in the Republic of Cyprus, have caused great suffering and hardship for the peoples of the two Republics which cannot be alleviated with their internal resources. The President shall make every effort to develop and implement programs of relief and rehabilitation, in conjunction with other nations providing assistance, the United Nations, and other concerned international and regional organizations and voluntary agencies, to alleviate the hardships caused in these two nations.

"(b) Notwithstanding any prohibitions or restrictions contained in this or any other Act, the President is authorized to furnish assistance, on such terms and conditions as he may determine, for disaster relief, rehabilitation, and related programs in the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the Republic of Cyprus. Such assistance shall be furnished solely out of funds made available under section 203 of this Act to carry out this section."

(d) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by striking after section 639C, as added by subsection (c) of this section, the following new section:

"SEC. 639D. DISASTER RELIEF AND REHABILITATION.—Notwithstanding any prohibitions or restrictions contained in this or any other Act, the President is authorized to furnish assistance, on such terms and conditions as he may determine, for disaster relief, rehabilitation and related programs in the case of disasters that require large scale relief and rehabilitation efforts which cannot be met adequately with the funds available for obligation under section 451 of this Act. Such assistance shall be furnished solely out of funds made available under section 203 of this Act to carry out this section."

(e) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by adding after section 639D, as added by subsection (d) of this section, the following new section:

"SEC. 639E. INTERNATIONALIZATION OF ASSISTANCE.—Assistance for the purposes set forth in Sections 639A, 639B, 639C, and 639D shall be distributed wherever practicable under the auspices of and by the United Nations and its specialized agencies, other international organizations or arrangements, multilateral institutions, and private voluntary agencies."

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE AMENDMENT

The purpose of this amendment is to permit the President to respond to the disasters in Cyprus and Bangladesh, to have the authority to respond to future disasters of a like nature, and to permit him to complement disaster relief for the drought-stricken nations of Africa with long-term development and reconstruction assistance which will facilitate a reorientation of the Sahelian and Ethiopian economies and will halt the advance of the desert. Absent such efforts, the African nations are likely to endure a perpetual and ever-growing disaster.

This amendment also directs that both reconstruction and relief assistance be undertaken with other donors, international organizations, and voluntary agencies.

Subsection (a): This subsection provides a funding source for the Sahelian and Ethiopian development authority, the Bangladesh and Cyprus relief authorizations, and future large scale disasters which other portions of this amendment create. Presently, A.I.D. may use 50% of the scheduled loan repayments for new loans under its regular development accounts. The balance reverts to the Treasury. This subsection makes the 1975 balance available for loans or grants for the purposes set forth below. A.I.D. estimates that this balance will total 119 million. Although only 1975 receipts will be used, the funds need not be used during this fiscal year but will remain available for use as multilateral programs for the Sahel, Bangladesh and Cyprus develop. By using the loan repayments, it will not be necessary to appropriate new obligatory authority.

Subsection (b): Last year the Congress enacted Section 639B which urged the Executive to develop, in conjunction with other donors and international organizations, long-range development plans in the drought-stricken African nations. Congress indicated its belief that the short-range reaction to the disaster (authorized by Section 639A) must be followed by reconstruction and development that will halt or reverse the advance of the desert, if the inhabitants of the area are ever to overcome their misfortune and participate in a self-sustaining economy. This subsection complements that directive by authorizing the President to furnish such assistance. There are some restrictions in the Act that will work

against this effort, however. One example is the 25% local participation requirement of Section 110(a). The drought-stricken regions of Africa are confronted with such enormous problems that their scant resources cannot provide even 25% of the cost of reconstruction. For this reason, the language "notwithstanding any prohibitions or restrictions. . ." is included. The amendment's sponsors believe that this authorization will greatly facilitate the executive Branch's attempts to involve other nations and organizations in development plans by showing the seriousness of our commitment.

Subsection (c): This subsection responds to the misfortunes of the people of Cyprus and Bangladesh. In both cases, events beyond the control of the local populace—armed conflict in one case and devastating flooding in the other—have caused great suffering and hardship to the respective populations. Emergency relief and rehabilitation in large but still undetermined amounts is needed in both situations. The Congress recognizes this need and authorizes and encourages the President to make every effort to work in concert with other concerned nations and organizations to provide assistance to these two areas. As in subsection (b), a waiver of the restrictions of the Act is necessary. Such restrictions as sections 620(a)(3) and (n), which prohibit assistance to countries whose ships carry cargoes to Cuba and North Vietnam respectively, must be overcome. Other disaster relief provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act contain similar language which permit the Act's prohibitions to be overridden.

Subsection (d): Rather than reacting to disasters some time after they occur, this subsection will give the President the authority to respond quickly to large-scale disasters the nature and consequence of which cannot yet be foreseen. Drawing on the same funding source as the other portions of this disaster oriented provision, this subsection will be available for efforts beyond those possible under the Contingency Fund of Sec. 451. This section will allow response when disasters are so serious and on such a large scale that an extensive effort will be needed. The funds allocated under Sec. 451 are authorized primarily for disaster relief purposes, but are limited to \$30 million under current authorizations. This subsection makes it possible for the U.S. to respond promptly to the Sahels, Cyprus and Bangladeshes of the future without obtaining new authorizing and appropriating legislation. Since this subsection does focus on a need that will transcend normal policy restrictions, this provision includes a waiver of the restrictions of this and other laws. Such a waiver is consistent with the other disaster relief provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act.

Subsection (e): Stipulates that the assistance provided under all the above sections "shall be distributed wherever practicable under the auspices of and by the United Nations and its specialized agencies, other international organizations or arrangements, multilateral institutions, and private voluntary agencies."

APPENDIX V

A Series of Reports on the Crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean

(By Stanley Karnow, from The New Republic magazine)

[The New Republic, Sept. 7, 1974.]

FOUL-UP IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

In *A World Restored*, a book that contains many clues to his diplomatic conduct, Henry Kissinger described the challenge that confronted Metternich and Castlereagh in 1821, when the Greeks suffered atrocious reprisals after revolting against their Turkish overlords. European liberals of the period were appalled and Tsar Alexander of Russia, defender of the Greek Orthodox faith, planned action against Turkey. But Metternich and Castlereagh exerted all their influence to prevent intervention on the grounds that it would jeopardize European stability. As Kissinger put it, they insisted that "humanitarian considerations were subordinate to maintaining 'the consecrated structure' of Europe," and therefore, while they criticized the Turkish repression, they worked to preserve the social order at the expense of Greek lives. Not long afterward, however, their policy crumbled, and Greece, with British and Russian support, gained its independence.

Although history doesn't repeat itself precisely, Kissinger's handling of the present crisis in the eastern Mediterranean bears a striking resemblance to the way Metternich and Castlereagh behaved more than a century ago. His main objective has been to protect the power balance in the region, and, as a consequence, he has tilted toward strength. He tolerated the ouster of President Makarios of Cyprus by the Greek military junta then in control in Athens because he sought to avoid a threat to the US bases in Greece. Later, after failing to dissuade the Turks from invading Cyprus, he did little to prevent them from taking over the most important sectors of the island. But, in contrast to Metternich and Castlereagh, whose strategy endured for at least a few years, Kissinger has met with immediate setbacks that are likely to unsettle the Mediterranean for many years.

By leaning toward the Turks he has alienated the new civilian government in Athens, and Premier Constantine Karamanlis, responding to a wave of anti-American sentiment, has withdrawn Greece from military participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This has not only shattered the southern flank of the NATO alliance but the current prospect is that the Greeks will close down US military facilities in their country. The most important of these are the Athenia Air Field, vital for resupplying Israel, and a missile-firing range on the island of Crete. By permitting the crisis to deteriorate, Kissinger also has brought the Greeks and Turks into conflict for the first time in years, and even though their dispute may not erupt into war, it will destabilize the area. This offers a distinct advantage to the Russians, who have long been seeking to reinforce their sway in the Mediterranean and are already advancing themselves by backing the Greeks diplomatically. Kissinger's unwillingness to step into the situation at an early stage contributed as well to the devastation of Cyprus, where hostilities have left some 200,000 people homeless and where political tensions between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots are bound to continue. The new President of Cyprus, Glafkos Clerides, warned recently that the Greek Cypriots might trigger a guerrilla war against the Turkish forces occupying the northern tier of the island. Such a war, if it erupts, would probably lead to a conflict between Greeks and Turks on the mainland and, in the process, ignite the Baikan powder keg.

Replying to criticism, Kissinger said the other day that the US cannot stop "every local war between smaller nations," and his aides argue that the Turks could not have been restrained except by the intrusion of American forces. It seems to me, however, that the US had several opportunities to influence events without running the risk of direct involvement. For example Kissinger could have sent a special emissary to Athens in late June to advise the Greek military junta

against overthrowing Makarios. After the fall of Makarios, he could have issued a statement denouncing the appointment as President of Cyprus of Nicos Sampson, the thug whose elevation to power by the Athens junta convinced the Turks that invasion was their only option to head off Greek domination of the island. Kissinger could later have threatened to curb US aid to Turkey in order to compel the Turks to reach a compromise at the short-lived Geneva conference, and he could have wielded the same weapon to bar them from launching an offensive on Cyprus in the middle of August. It is possible that none of these efforts would have worked, yet they were worth trying if only to demonstrate to the world that the US is as concerned with the well-being of smaller nations as it is with peace among the big powers. In this respect the contention that America is not a global policeman lacks credibility. To treat an aggressor and a victim impartially is to side with the aggressor—which is what Kissinger did when he leaned first toward the Greek junta and later toward the Turks.

On the Washington scene, meanwhile, the fallout from the crisis may be serious. In the first place it could aggravate the differences that were already developing over other issues between Kissinger and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, whose preoccupation with the future of NATO has led him to voice misgivings about the State Department's approach to the Mediterranean problem. At the same time numbers of Greek Americans are currently mobilizing to protest against US policy, and if they turn into a lobby as strong as that organized by the Jewish community on behalf of Israel, they will give the Ford administration a political headache. With all this, though, it appears that Kissinger has yet to learn that the world has changed since the days of Metternich and Castlereagh.

[The New Republic, Sept. 14, 1974.]

THE INDISPENSABLE MAN?

AN INTERVIEW WITH MAKARIOS

(By Stanley Karnow)

London

I anticipated as I went over to see Archbishop Makarios at his hotel here the other day that I would encounter a bitter, dispirited exile. For although several foreign governments still officially recognize him to be president of Cyprus despite his ouster from the island in July in a coup d'état engineered by the Greek military junta then in charge in Athens, nobody at the moment is really doing much to return him to his former position of authority. The new Greek civilian regime, which expressed its support for him soon after coming into office six weeks ago, is too weak to translate whatever hopes it may have into reality. The Turks, who initially backed him when he was a victim of the Greek generals, have apparently estimated that his presence on Cyprus now would undermine the strong position they have built up there following their offensive last month. His British hosts, who continue to regard him formally as the chief of state of Cyprus, are too preoccupied with their domestic troubles to do more than pay lip service to his status. The Russians, who recently called for an international conference on Cyprus as a way of restoring his power, are at the same time pursuing a policy carefully contrived to avoid alienating the Turks. And the US, which has long favored the partition of Cyprus into Greek and Turkish Cypriot zones and currently perceives such a pattern to be emerging, plainly prefers the present evolution of events to having Makarios in control of an independent island.

Yet with all these cards stacked against him Makarios seemed to me to be surprisingly cheerful and occasionally even casual. Moreover he struck me as being unusually confident, at least for the long-term future. I should insert here, however, that he is not an easy man to interview, for he is a truly Byzantine figure whose manner is often elliptical. But if I interpreted him correctly, his essential strategy is to wait and watch in the expectation that the Cyprus situation will sooner or later become so desperately hopeless that everyone concerned, both on the island and elsewhere around the world, will finally acknowledge that he is the only person capable of straightening out the muddle. In other words, it appears to me, he has calculated that time is on his side and that there is no reason for him to rush back to a mess in Cyprus that, at this stage, is probably beyond any immediate solution.

"I have greater support from the people of Cyprus than I have ever had," he asserted to me, contending that even the Greek Cypriot "extremists" who formerly opposed him now admit that they were wrong to have done so. That assessment of his popularity is echoed, incidentally, by his sympathizers on Cyprus who claim, as one of them put it last week, that half of the island's population would show up on the beach to welcome him. Makarios insisted during our talk, therefore, that he could return whenever he wished. He explained, though, that he has not done so because his appearance there now would "aggravate" tensions between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, whose efforts to reach some kind of accommodation have been going badly. So Makarios made it clear to me certain conditions must be fulfilled before he would consider going back. In other words, I inferred from his remarks, he wants to return to Cyprus with something concrete rather than jeopardize his reputation in the tangled discussions currently being held between Glafkos Clerides, the acting president of the island, and Rauf Denktaş, the spokesman for the Turkish Cypriot community.

In the first place, Makarios said, he would not involve himself in any serious negotiations until the Turkish forces that invaded the island in July are withdrawn to the positions they held on August 9, when representatives of Greece and Turkey agreed on a cease-fire that soon afterward collapsed. At that time the Turks occupied about five percent of Cyprus while now, in contrast, they control roughly 30 percent of the island's territory and 80 percent of its resources. "The Turks would be talking from a position of strength if we negotiated before a withdrawal of their forces," Makarios said, "and I have no intention of going to a conference to sign a meaningless piece of paper."

Secondly, he went on to say, he wants the Turks to permit the Greek Cypriot refugees to return to areas occupied by Turkish troops. Estimates of the number of refugees run as high as 200,000, and little is being done to alleviate their suffering.

Makarios' third condition for returning is that the Greek officers appointed by the Athens junta to command the Cyprus national guard be pulled out of the island. These officers, acting on instructions from the Greek junta, tried to assassinate Makarios in July. Many are still on Cyprus, and they are believed to be cooperating with the Greek Cypriot terrorists whose organization, known as EOKA-B, opposed Makarios' policy of stalling on union between the island and Greece. The new civilian government in Athens is no longer encouraging the terrorists, but they are heavily armed and are likely to constitute a chronic problem, as their apparent attempt to murder one of Makarios' close friends the other day demonstrated.

But if Makarios is not about to return to Cyprus until his conditions are fulfilled, he claims to be playing an important role in the situation there. He told me, for example, that Clerides could not survive without "my support." Makarios also said that he is in "constant contact" with Clerides, thereby indicating that he is managing the situation on a daily basis. As far as I know, Clerides has not claimed to be in constant contact with Makarios. He has said that he has not placed "any restrictions" on Makarios' return, and that statement, issued a couple of weeks ago, was thought to denote a distinct lack of enthusiasm for the Archbishop's comeback at this time. I cannot judge the validity of that analysis until I get to Cyprus, which I plan to do within the next two weeks.

Looking back on the events that led up to the coup against him, Makarios conceded that he may have been mistaken in not having worked more effectively over the years for an agreement between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. But had he done so, he says, the Greek junta in Athens would have moved against him sooner than it did, and so he figured that like Penelope, who defended herself until the return of Ulysses by weaving an endless fabric, he could stave off the inevitable attack by prolonging the talks between the island's two ethnic communities. By early summer, however, he expected that the junta would try to assassinate him, as it had on two earlier occasions, but he was not sure of its precise plans. It was for that reason, he said, that he did not sound alarmed when he saw Roger Davies, the American ambassador who was killed in Cyprus last month. Davies reported to Washington at the time that Makarios was in no imminent danger, and the State Department has referred to the dispatch to bolster its argument that it was as surprised as Makarios by the crisis.

As I listened to Makarios, it seemed to me that his subdued, prudent remarks were deliberately tailored to fit his wait-and-see strategy. For he needs to make friends rather than to create enemies, and thus he is taking a charitable approach to almost everyone. He had words of praise, for instance, for the civilian Greek

government headed by Constantine Karamanlis, and he voiced the doubtful view that the Turks might tolerate his return to Cyprus.

He absolved the United States of any responsibility for his difficulties, saying that "I do not think the American government or any American agent was involved in the coup against me." And I found him to be relatively kind toward Secretary of State Kissinger. Makarios saw Kissinger in Washington shortly after the Cyprus crisis erupted. They met for more than an hour and, according to Makarios' account, Kissinger said that the United States continued to recognize him as president of Cyprus. Kissinger never said that publicly, however, and his failure to do so left the impression in many quarters that the United States recognized the regime of Nicos Sampson, the thug who succeeded Makarios for a brief period. That position by Washington is said to have prompted the Turks to invade Cyprus. Makarios was reportedly upset by the American position at the time, but now, speaking to me, he dismissed it as unimportant because, I think, he wants to leave the door open to future dealings with the United States and does not want to say anything that might annoy Kissinger. He did tell me, though, that during a later meeting with Kissinger he complained that the United States was not doing enough to restrain the Turks. As Makarios relates it, Kissinger replied that he was working behind the scenes to mediate the crisis. To which Makarios answered, according to his version, "I don't know what you're doing behind the scenes, but whatever you're doing I don't like the results." Makarios added that the Russians have been "more constructive from my viewpoint," indicating that he approves of their proposal for an international conference on Cyprus. There is some suspicion here that Makarios himself put the Kremlin up to making that proposal.

Makarios' hope that a deteriorating situation in Cyprus will make him indispensable has obvious limitations. A guerrilla war waged by the Greek Cypriots against the Turks, for example, would throw the island in turmoil and make his return precarious. For that reason, as he told me, the idea of guerrilla activity is "premature" and should not be initiated except in desperation. He is still counting on diplomatic possibilities, therefore. But for all his confidence it still remains to be seen whether he is another Prince Sihanouk, doomed to permanent exile, or another Charles de Gaulle, on the brink of a triumphant comeback.

[The New Republic, Sept. 21, 1974]

GREECE IN TRANSITION

A PASSEL OF PROBLEMS TO BE SOLVED

(By Stanley Karnow)

Athens

The many officials, politicians, businessmen, lawyers, journalists, students and diplomats I have seen in this talkative capital within the past week have, almost without exception, reacted with either scorn or skepticism to Secretary of State Kissinger's recent pledge that, despite "some misunderstandings and disagreements," the United States intends "to restore and to deepen" its friendship with Greece and do its "utmost" to support the new civilian government headed by Premier Constantine Karamanlis. One member of the Karamanlis cabinet, a studious gentleman educated in the United States, described Kissinger to me as "a cynic whose so-called *realpolitik* shows immoral disregard for people," and other comments I have heard have been similarly passionate. This rage against Kissinger not only reflects Greek displeasure with his handling of the Cyprus crisis, which has propelled the Turks into a dominant position on the island but it also represents an outburst of hostility against the United States for having propped up the cruel and inept military regime that governed Greece for seven years until its collapse during the summer. In my opinion these complaints are largely justified. For the Cyprus issue, which arouses the kind of emotions among Greeks that the question of Alsace-Lorraine once evoked in the French, could probably have been capped had the United States and the other Western powers intervened in the first instance to stand by Archbishop Makarios, the Cypriot president ousted by the Greek junta, or failing that, exerted pressure on Turkey not to extend its presence over the island.

To a large degree, however, these diatribes against Kissinger and the United States underline a significant trait in the Greeks. Inhabitants of a small, poor geographically vulnerable land, they have developed a sense of reliance on outside

assistance even though to bolster their self-esteem, they constantly proclaim their sovereignty. The British, who helped them to gain freedom from the decrepit Ottoman Empire in the 19th century, remained an influence here until after World War II, and Lord Byron, who championed their cause, is still a national hero. The United States moved in during the civil war against the Communists, establishing a modern-day protectorate in which American diplomats, military officers and Central Intelligence Agency operatives, many of them of Greek origin, functioned inside the Greek administration and army almost as colonial advisers. The Greeks for the most part welcomed this dependent arrangement, so much so that an Athens landmark is a statue of President Truman, whose celebrated doctrine turned them into US clients. The link has been reinforced over the years, moreover, by the fact that some three million Greek-Americans in the United States have retained close ties with the "old country." Thus, it seems to me, the Greeks are currently denouncing the US with extraordinary stridency because they feel disappointed, even betrayed, that their principal defender should have let them down in the midst of a bitter dispute with their traditional enemy, the Turks.

One of the interesting aspects of US policy here is that different branches of the American government often squabbled over how to deal with Greece, and those squabbles still persist. Back in the spring of 1967, for example, when the US mission in Athens learned that two separate Greek military groups were preparing a coup d'état to head off a likely election victory by George Papandreu's left-of-center party, the CIA recommended that the election be rigged in favor of the conservatives in order to deprive the army of a pretext for a takeover. According to my source, who was involved in planning the maneuver, the idea was rejected by the American ambassador, then Phillips Talbot, on the grounds that the US should not interfere in Greece's domestic affairs, and it was spurned by American military commanders in the region who preferred a junta with which they could do business. As a result, Col. George Papadopoulos seized power, and until his upset last November by Brig. Gen. Demetrios Ioannides, he was pampered by Ambassador Henry J. Tasca, whose loyalty to the regime was such that he barred his staff from criticizing it in cables to Washington.

As myopic as Tasca was to the realities of Greece, the present effort to blame him for failing to avert the Cyprus crisis seems to me to be misplaced. From what I gather, he did advise Ioannides through CIA channels before the coup that the US disapproved of any designs against Makarios. Afterward, when he learned that Kissinger was not going to take decisive action to prevent the Turkish invasion of the island, Tasca resorted to a desperate measure. He sent a message to the Pentagon urging that the Sixth Fleet be deployed in the Aegean Sea to discourage the Turks. A copy of the message of course reached Kissinger, who fired back a cable to Athens accusing Tasca of having become "hysterical" and warning him against attempting another end run. Tasca, whose career is shattered, is due for recall soon. Despite their lack of respect for him, many diplomats here believe that his suggested naval tactic might have worked.

In any case nearly everyone I have talked with here agrees that the client relationship that tied Greece to the United States is now finished, or at least will never be the same again. And except for a few diehard Americans, everyone regards this change as healthy. But it clearly occurred at the worst possible moment and in the worst possible manner for the Greeks. For the Karamanlis government, which is dedicated to a policy independent of American tutelage, has come into office confronted by enormous problems. Karamanlis has taken it upon himself to set up an effective democracy, and he must also win an acceptable settlement of the Cyprus mess, and these two tasks are related. The Cyprus tangle, which the Greeks essentially perceive to be a new chapter in a millennium of conflicts with Turkey, impinges on the domestic political situation to the extent that Karamanlis cannot concede to a solution that dissatisfies Greek national pride without courting the risk of unleashing attacks from the left wing or prompting the army to try to resurrect a military regime or perhaps driving both these factions into an unholy alliance against him. Hence his internal challenge is aggravated by an external challenge.

If any Greek is qualified to grapple with this dilemma it is Karamanlis. He is a tough, honest conservative in his late 60s who, after serving as premier for eight years, chose exile in Paris in 1963 rather than compromise with his adversaries. He returned here at the end of July under circumstances that, for the present, give him considerable strength.

The situation during the last week of July was chaotic. The Turks had landed in Cyprus and were threatening to invade Greece, and the Ioannides regime had simply evaporated. The country's military leaders, virtually on the verge of panic, appealed to Gen. Phaedon Gizikis, the figurehead president, to create a civilian government that could extricate them from the predicament. On the afternoon of July 23 Gizikis brought the army, air force and navy commanders together with nine or 10 prominent politicians from rival parties, and by evening they had decided on a government under Panayotis Canellopoulos, a conservative ex-premier, with George Mavros, a liberal, as his deputy. Following further bargaining, however, the politicians and generals changed their minds and reached the conclusion that Karamanlis was more popular with the public and had greater prestige with the armed forces. They then telephoned him and invited him to come back from Paris. The point of this story is that Karamanlis did not make a bid for power but returned here in response to a plea. Accordingly he made no deals with the military leaders but accepted, as one of his associates put it, their "unconditional surrender."

Many of his critics argue that Karamanlis is being too soft on the old regime, and by way of evidence they point out that Papadopoulos is still living comfortably in a seaside villa belonging to Aristotle Onassis and that Ioannides was gently retired last week with the rank of major general. The premier's spokesmen acknowledged the truth of this evidence, but, they reply, Karamanlis must proceed slowly at a time when the danger of war with Turkey still exists and he cannot afford a wholesale purge of the Greek military establishment. His caution is plainly motivated as well by his fear that the armed forces may attempt to stage a comeback if their officers are harassed, and another coup d'état is more than Greece could stand. Nevertheless he has reshuffled the country's top military command, elevating to the senior post Gen. Ioanis Davos, who played an important part in the overthrow of the junta in July. Karamanlis has also begun to clean up the security apparatus through which the junta controlled the population. But, his aides explain, the big job lies ahead. There are 40,000 Greek officials spread throughout the provinces, and screening them all will be a vast operation. Besides it will require immense labor to separate those who were guilty of criminal conduct from those who collaborated with the junta out of passivity. Except for a few extremists, one of whom just returned here from the US, I found surprisingly little clamor for revenge.

Karamanlis considers his government to be merely temporary, and his first objective is to hold elections as soon as possible, probably within the next six months. His primary purpose is to win himself legitimacy, and with that, to establish a new political system, since the present structure is a mishmash. The junta deposed King Constantine and proclaimed a republic, but Karamanlis regards that move as having been illegal. Unless he intends to restore the monarchy, which is unlikely, he must somehow contrive to retire the king formally. Although nobody has said so bluntly, I suspect that he hopes to set up a sort of Gaullist presidency, partly because he knew and admired de Gaulle and partly because he believes that Greece needs a strong executive. This was signaled to me the other day when one of his close colleagues noted that the only slogan that was popular during the period of junta rule was the one that condemned the old parliamentary system, which in many respects resembled the French Fourth Republic.

Another page that Karamanlis took out of the French book was his decision to pull Greece out of military participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This was an extremely shrewd move from a domestic political viewpoint, since it deflated opponents, particularly on the left, who thought that they could tarnish him as a lackey of the US. The move was also justifiable since the alliance, despite its official claim to safeguard democratic traditions, did nothing to curb the dictatorship here. Nor was NATO of much help to Greece during the Cyprus crisis, when it was either unable or unwilling to mediate a fight between two of its members. So, the Greeks say, they quit NATO because NATO abandoned them. It strikes me, though, that Karamanlis might have been wiser in tactical terms had he threatened to withdraw from NATO in order to impel the United States and the Europeans to exert pressure on Turkey to show restraint in Cyprus. That is obviously what he is doing now in respect to the US military installations here, and the Greeks stress it is precisely because Karamanlis dropped out of NATO that his threat to close down the American facilities is credible.

The extent of the American involvement in Greece—and a key reason successive administrations in Washington have paid so much attention to the country—is

mirrored in the number of US military operations going on here. The naval bases are the most apparent fixtures, but they are the least important parts of the machinery. Far more vital to the United States are the Iraklion air stations on the island of Crete, a secret installation that monitors Soviet movements in the Mediterranean, the US air force facility near the capital, a key link to the Middle East, and a number of places throughout Greece at which tactical nuclear weapons are deployed. To shift these activities would not only entail huge costs, but it is not entirely certain where they could be relocated. Turkey is considered out of range for certain intelligence surveillance of the Balkans, and Italy is regarded as too unstable politically for a massive investment in military real estate. Against this background the Greeks know that they are in an enviable bargaining posture, and their negotiations on the US presence here may explain Kissinger's softer tone toward them. The Greeks are aware, however, that they cannot jettison the Americans without weakening their own security.

Politically, meanwhile, the new Greek government is striving to return to the European fold, and George Mavros, the foreign minister, went to Paris, Bonn and Brussels last week with that in mind. The French, who are seeking to displace US influence here, have been especially cordial to the Greeks and are promoting their efforts to join the European Common Market, which would have nothing to do with the junta. Besides perking up Greek morale, membership in the Common Market would help the country's sagging economy, which has been suffering from the highest inflation rate on the continent.

With all this, though, the crucial ingredient in the future stability of the Karamanlis government or any other civilian regime here is going to be the Cyprus issue. His aides admit that Greece was originally responsible for the crisis because of the junta's action against Makarios, and they express the wish that the Turks would cease exploiting their blunder. At the same time, however, they know that they cannot expect much generosity from Turkey as long as Turkish Premier Ecevit needs to appease his military supporters. The best they can hope for is a loose federation of ethnic cantons under a central Cypriot authority. Getting that kind of settlement is bound to be snagged by Turkish insistence on keeping troops on the island. What worries the Greeks more is that the Turks will press for a partition of Cyprus in which they consolidate their control of the richest part of the island they now hold. Such an accommodation would, by putting numbers of Greek Cypriots either under Turkish authority or leaving them to rot in refugee camps, mean another Palestinian problem in the Mediterranean.

Plagued as it is by both domestic and foreign problems, Greece is searching for a role in an area that has lost its equilibrium. Much of its trouble can be attributed to the fact that, partly because of its own inadequacies and partly as a result of its strategic location, it became a virtual pawn of the US, which has sacrificed Greek interests for the sake of its own aims. The lesson to be drawn from this episode, then, may be that it is tragic to be a small nation in a Kissinger world—or in any world.

[The New Republic, Sept. 23, 1974]

SHAMBLES

REPORT FROM CYPRUS

(By Stanley Karnow)

Nicosia

One afternoon last week a pair of Turkish jet fighter planes appeared over this city, darting across the azure sky like silver birds, and although they flew off within a matter of minutes, their impact was electric. Offices emptied, merchants quickly shuttered up their shops, and those who could motored into the nearby hills amid rumors that the aircraft were reconnoitering for a fresh offensive by the Turkish forces, which already occupy the northern tier of the island. Nothing of course occurred, and a day later all was again calm. Yet the moment of panic dramatized the extreme nervousness of the Greek Cypriots, who vastly outnumber the local Turkish minority. Their apprehension is understandable for the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey that followed the ouster of President Makarios 10 weeks ago has been devastating. Hundreds of Greek and Turkish Cypriots have been killed, often in atrocious circumstances, and new tales of slaughter, rape and pillage are detailed nearly every day by one ethnic group in an effort to impugn the other. More than one third of the island's population has been driven into refugee camps in the southern sector, and the touristy northern coast, now controlled by the

Turkish army, is a scene of desolation. Glafkos Clerides, the Greek Cypriot leader, and Rauf Denktash, his Turkish counterpart, are meanwhile trying under United Nations auspices to negotiate an accommodation. They showed a bit of progress a few days ago when, with much fanfare, some sick and disabled civilian prisoners were exchanged. But even though the two men are old friends, their attempts to reach a substantive settlement have been fruitless. Denktash cannot accede to a compromise that is unacceptable to Turkey, and Clerides is operating under the shadow of Greece as well as under pressure from Makarios, who has been sitting in London since July. Both Cypriot leaders are therefore pawns in a conflict between Greece and Turkey that dates back a thousand years, and thus their task is being complicated by outside factors. The prevailing view here, consequently, is that the horrors of the past two months may be repeated.

People who know Cyprus well suggest that its portrayal by Lawrence Durrell, while marvelous prose, is somewhat romantic. Durrell's picture of the island is largely one of ethnic harmony shattered in the late 1950s by the struggle against British colonial rule waged mainly by the Greek Cypriots. In fact, I am told, the two principal ethnic groups more or less coexisted until then only because the Greek majority, which makes up more than 80 percent of the population and has commanded the island's resources, was able to keep the less dynamic Turks down. In other words the situation resembled that of our own South, where peace reigned as long as whites dominated blacks. So potential tensions have for years simmered below the surface of this pluralistic society, and they began to emerge during the fight for independence, when the British, distrustful of Greek Cypriots, recruited Turks as policemen and administrative officials. After independence, the Greeks led by Makarios took revenge against the Turks by excluding them from economic development projects and generally treating them as second-class citizens. The friction created by this behavior eventually sparked an outbreak of clashes in 1964 that, in reverse, seemed to be a rehearsal for the present ruction. In that uprising, the Greek Cypriot movement known as EOKA-B ruthlessly persecuted Turks, dislocating them in much the same way that the Turkish army has, on a broader scale, now displaced Greeks. The fallout from that period also plunged Cyprus into political confusion. On the one hand Makarios came under assault from the Greek Cypriot extremists and their military supporters in Athens, who favored *enosis*, or union, between Cyprus and Greece. At the same time, both he and his Greek adversaries were opposed by the Turks, who sought a stronger voice in running the island. The overthrow of Makarios by agents of the Athens junta raised the specter of immediate *enosis*, and Turkey, either genuinely scared by that prospect or merely seeking a pretext to intervene, invaded Cyprus. Since then the Turks have extended their hold over nearly half of the island, and their bargaining position is very solid indeed. They have territory, and they have turned some Greeks into refugees.

It was obvious to me as I went into the northern zone the other day that, depending on the settlement they can impose, the Turks intend to transform this region into a separate Turkish state, an autonomous Turkish area within a Cyprus federation, or an appendage of Turkey. The natural beauty of the coast is extraordinary. Rugged mountains form a backdrop to hills sloping down to the sea, and villages nestled in the landscape afford spectacular perspectives of the scene. But this canvas is currently suffused with death and destruction. Wrecked tanks and armored cars litter roads, and tourist spots with names like "The Mermaid Hotel" and "Charisma Villas" are in ruins. The only people I saw in the picturesque port of Kyrenia were a Turkish army patrol and a waiter hosing down a cafe terrace for customers who would never arrive. Turkish soldiers were the only human beings visible along the coastal road, where entire Greek villages, their buildings charred or in shambles, have lost all their inhabitants.

Turkish officials in the area are not only erasing the Greek presence by painting out the Greek letters on road signs and store windows, but they plan to repopulate the region with Turkish Cypriots and perhaps with Turks from mainland Turkey. A lonely Turkish police officer I encountered in Lapithos, a lovely hillside town overlooking the Mediterranean whose 6000 Greek inhabitants had fled south, explained to me that the departed population will be replaced by Turkish families that were driven out of the place by Greeks during the disturbances of 10 years ago. He further explained that since the homes of the returning Turks were destroyed a decade earlier, they would be lodged "temporarily" in the houses of the Greeks who had escaped. "They did it to us and now we're doing it to them," the policeman implied. The only other person I found in the ghostly town was an elderly English doctor by the name of Wilkinson who had retired there 14 years

ago. He complained of lacking electricity and water, but when I asked why he remained, he stared at me with piercing eyes and replied: "This, young man, is my home."

Apparently as part of their strategy the Turks are also using refugees and captives as bargaining counters. They are holding numbers of young Greek Cypriots as hostages in Adana, a city in southern Turkey, and they have about 800 Greeks bottled up in Bellapais, the arty Cyprus village made famous by Durrell. I visited another group of Greeks being held in the Dome Hotel in Kyrenia. Denktash has described this group as "hotel guests," but they consider themselves to be something less pleasant. One of them, a Kyrenian businessman called Theodore Yavropoulos, expressed uncertainty about his status. "What kind of prisoner am I?" he asked me. "Am I a prisoner of war? Am I protected by the Geneva Convention? Who will know if I am taken out and shot?" A plan is now underway to permit him and 400 other Dome Hotel "guests" to enjoy limited freedom in Kyrenia. But as I understand it they will not be allowed to roam beyond the town.

The Turkish Cypriots in the south are in a predicament similar to the Greeks in the north. They fear for their lives in a Greek environment, and for that reason some 8000 displaced Turks refuse to leave a camp on a British base incongruously called "Happy Valley." Turkey has tried to persuade Britain to send them to the Turkish mainland, but the British, suspecting that these people will promptly be used to fill the population vacuum in the north, have refused. About 10,000 Greek refugees are also encamped in another British base, and they are clinging to the area out of fear that the Turks may move down to occupy the rest of the island. These refugees are not impoverished Vietnamese or Palestinians, but middle-class citizens, many of whom fled in their automobiles, and it is not uncommon to see, as I did the other day, an uprooted family clustered around its Mercedes.

The climate is mild at the moment, and many of the Greek Cypriot refugees harbor the illusion that the present mess will soon be solved and that they will return home. But as the weather grows colder and the mess gets messier their expectations are bound to decline sharply, and it is thought that the camps could become enlistment centers for terrorists and guerrillas desperate to confront the Turks. A resistance movement, should it take shape, would probably bring the Turkish army down through all of Cyprus and turn the island into a battlefield. Hence the refugee issue requires urgent handling. It is being dealt with on a humanitarian basis by the Red Cross, the United Nations, special American experts and others. But it cannot be really settled as long as the political configuration of Cyprus is not worked out—and that question is not going to be cleared up soon. Turkey plainly intends to carve out the northern zone for the Turks, and partition in one way or another is certain to be explosive.

It seems to me that if the case of Cyprus illustrates anything it is that the plight of small states ought to be resolved by international diplomacy. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have a responsibility in this instance, largely to prevent the island from becoming an arena for big power rivalries. The Greek junta that formerly ruled in Athens should have been stopped from toppling Makarios. Now the Turks, who have the upper hand, should be persuaded to adopt a more conciliatory posture. I have no idea what the Russians are doing, but I gather that Secretary of State Kissinger is talking to the Turks yet not leaning on them strongly. Given their current nationalistic fervor, the Turks are unlikely to respond to words alone. In the meantime, this handsome island continues to suffer—as it has periodically for centuries.

[The New Republic, Oct. 5, 1974]

TOUGH TURKEY

PREMIER ECEVIT'S PERSPECTIVE ON CYPRUS

(By Stanley Karnow)

Ankara

It seems paradoxical that Turkey's invasion of Cyprus, the first war this complex country has waged since it became a republic more than a half-century ago, should have been undertaken by Bulent Ecevit. For Ecevit, who has yet to consolidate his authority since he recently emerged as premier following a turbulent period of army rule, is hardly a belligerent figure. On the contrary, he is a quiet,

earnest intellectual who writes poetry and has translated such poets as Eliot and Ezra Pound, and he hopes to steer Turkey toward a sort of Scandinavian social democracy. While conceding that the war has strengthened his popularity because of its appeal to Turkish chauvinism, he nonetheless denies any desire to wear the laurels of a "national hero," contending instead that his political career ought to repose on his "communion with the people." Sitting in his large office under a huge portrait of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, whose mantle he has inherited, Ecevit speaks in measured tones as he stresses his intention to modernize Turkey, as Ataturk tried to do, through long-range social and economic programs.

With all this, however, the evidence is clear that Ecevit not only directed the Turkish thrust into Cyprus in July and ordered his troops to expand their control over the island a few weeks later, stubbornly defying rather weak American and British remonstrances in the process, but he currently shows no signs of adopting a softer stance toward the Greeks, his foes in the crisis. Thus he may be a reluctant hawk, but in my view he was seeking an opportunity to bear down on his Greek adversaries, even though by doing so he courted the risk of upsetting the equilibrium of the eastern Mediterranean.

Consider, in the first place, that Turkey and Greece were on a collision course months ago over the question of oil rights in the Aegean Sea. The Greeks, whose easternmost islands lie within spitting distance of the Turkish shore, believed that the Aegean was their lake, and they had on that basis been awarding drilling concessions to foreign firms. But late last year, in a challenge to the Greek theory, the Turks encouraged other companies to explore areas claimed by Greece, and that move touched off a sequence of alarms and excursions. In the spring, ignoring a Greek protest, the Turks sent two bomber aircraft out on target practice over the central Aegean without permission from either Greece or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to which both nations belonged. After the Greeks retaliated by withdrawing from a NATO naval exercise, the Turks put a survey ship into the region to test Greek reactions further. The Greeks threatened to sink the vessel, but finally backed away, leaving the Turks with the impression that Greece, then governed by an inept junta, was too feeble to menace Turkey in the event of a showdown. Therefore, months before the Cyprus affair erupted, the Turks were already estimating the solidarity of the Greek regime in the expectation that a confrontation might be in the offing, and consequently, when the crisis came, they knew that the junta was as flimsy as a house of cards.

Turkish receptivity to an external adventure was undoubtedly reinforced by the fact that Ecevit's government was, at the time, far from solid. Unable to win a majority in the elections last fall, Ecevit had formed a bizarre coalition with a crude religious party, and their relationship was wobbly. It foundered when Ecevit, circumventing the Parliament, pushed a bill through the Supreme Court granting amnesty to political dissenters imprisoned by the army. His government toppled as a result, and at this writing, he is working to create a new caretaker coalition that will prepare for elections. Hence the Cyprus crisis, while not originally of his making, offered him a chance to bolster himself against his parliamentary rivals. And, I think, Ecevit must have calculated as well that he had to act tough in order to convince the Turkish military establishment, which wields considerable political influence and which had doubts about him, that he was worthy of support.

The Turks also felt less constrained to submit to American sway, for a couple of reasons. They bitterly remembered an episode that occurred in June 1964, when during an earlier roil over Cyprus, Lyndon Johnson warned them in his blunt manner that the United States would drop them if they invaded the island, as they were planning to do. They desisted, but the "Johnson letter", as it has come to be known here, was taken by the Turks as an affront of the highest magnitude, and they were determined not to be humiliated again. Although they have remained within the Western Alliance, they have improved their ties to the Soviet Union—so much so that during the Middle East war last fall they permitted the Russians to fly over their territory en route to Egypt but refused to allow American supplies destined for Israel to pass through Turkish bases. So, when the latest Cyprus crisis broke out, the Turks were ready to resist American pressure, and at one point in the affair, as I will elaborate below, they even pulled a reverse of the Johnson tactic and warned that they would drop the United States if Washington attempted to lean on them heavily.

It should be added that the Cyprus business has revealed some deep-rooted traits of the Turks. One, which I have tried to emphasize in other articles from this region, is their attitude that they cannot, for the sake of their own self-respect, surrender to the Greeks. This attitude stems in part at least from their

resentment over the fact that while the Greeks are fully included in the Western community they, because of their Islamic heritage, their marginal geographic location and their terrifying historical reputation, are not totally accepted as Europeans. Their real or imaginary sense of remoteness is aggravated, too, by their awareness that they are an unknown quantity in comparison to the Greeks who have migrated far and wide and who, as Ecevit put it the other day, can muster votes in New York and London. Their perception of how others relate them to the Greeks is, rightly or wrongly, all the more galling to the Turks because, with a population of nearly 40 million, they are more than four times bigger than Greece, and as they insist with a certain amount of justification, their democratic institutions are far more stable.

At the same time that they argue their case, however, the Turks fall back on the theme that nobody understands them anyway and that their concern for world opinion is futile. So, they say, they intend to go their own way without regard for their image, and I suspect that this feeling that they had nothing to lose explains to a large extent why they pushed ahead in Cyprus despite American and British efforts to dissuade them. A senior Turkish army officer capsulized the feeling: "The world would have hated us even if we had fired roses instead of bullets."

Given this background—and there may be other elements that elude me—it seems that the diplomatic efforts by the Turks to avert military involvement in Cyprus were halfhearted at best, and perhaps even deliberately designed to meet with failure so that their invasion could be carried through. The key question here, then, is whether the United States could have behaved more forcefully than it did to prevent the Turkish drive. Looking back at the series of events, it strikes me that Secretary of State Kissinger had occasions in which he might have tempered the Turks. These occasions were lost, presumably because he was unwilling to gamble on the possibility that the American military installations in Turkey, which include an airfield, a naval base and an assortment of intelligence operations, could have been jeopardized. Thus this crisis, like so many others, again demonstrates the degree to which the United States can, because of its obsession with military real estate, be manipulated or at least outmaneuvered by a client. Much of this has come out in the talks I have had with Turkish officials and Western diplomats here within the past few days.

According to every source I have seen, Ecevit had pretty much decided to launch an invasion of Cyprus within a day after the ouster on July 15 of Archbishop Makarios and his replacement as president of the island by Nicos Sampson. For not only was Sampson known to have personally killed a number of Turkish Cypriots but, in Ecevit's eyes, his elevation as a stooge of the Athens junta signified that Cyprus would be united to Greece, and that was intolerable. My sources submit that Ecevit might have been deterred from military action or perhaps delayed had the United States quickly disavowed Sampson and called for a return to the *status quo ante*. But the State Department spokesman issued an even-handed statement on the subject, and it was interpreted by the Turks to mean that the United States accepted the situation. Ecevit therefore ordered the Turkish army to prepare for landings, yet anxious to give diplomacy a chance, he flew to London on July 17 to sound out the British, who along with Greece and Turkey were guarantors of the 1960 treaty that created an independent Cyprus.

In London he presented British foreign secretary James Callaghan with four proposals: that Sampson be removed, that the 650 Greek officers who had led the coup d'état against Makarios be sent back to Greece, that Cyprus be given a new federal system respectful of Turkish Cypriot rights, and that negotiations to create such a system begin immediately between Glafkos Clerides, the Greek Cypriot leader, and Rauf Denktash, his Turkish counterpart. According to my informants, the wind could probably have been taken out of Ecevit's sails, at least temporarily, by a British pledge to persuade the Athens regime to withdraw the Greek officers from Cyprus. But Callaghan stalled, evidently to await the American Undersecretary of State Joseph Sisco, then arriving from Washington. The proposals were put to Sisco. He promised to communicate them to the junta in Athens and deliver an answer to Ecevit in Ankara later in the week. But Sisco ran into two snags. The Greek junta, theoretically commanded by Gen. Demetrios Ioannides, had virtually evaporated, and Sisco squandered precious time as he searched for someone of authority in Athens; and when he did find somebody all he could obtain was an offer to replace rather than pull out the Greek officers in Cyprus. Sisco carried this offer to Ankara on the afternoon of July 19, and, when Ecevit predictably rejected it as inadequate, he went back to Athens to persuade the Greeks to do better. They refused, and he returned to

Ankara the same night to plead with Ecevit to give him another 48 hours. Backing up his envoy, Kissinger meanwhile had 11 separate telephone conversations with Ecevit, but to no avail. At four o'clock on Saturday morning, Ecevit instructed the Turkish forces lying off the coast of Cyprus to land in what the Turks now refer to as "phase one" of their operation.

Reconstructing the discussions that went on during that frantic day, one of Ecevit's close associates disclosed to me that the Turkish premier advised Kissinger against the kind of pressure Lyndon Johnson had exerted in 1964 and warned him that such a tactic would mean the permanent "loss" of Turkey to the Western Alliance. By that, the associate explained, Ecevit meant that Turkey would quit NATO completely if an attempt was made to stop its drive into Cyprus. This account may be overdrawn, but I gather from other sources that the Turks were in no mood to brook interference. In any case American diplomacy failed on two counts at that stage. It was unable to compel the Greek junta, despite years of pampering by the United States, to meet Ecevit's proposals with an offer that would have at least deprived him of the pretext to invade Cyprus. And it was unable to convince Ecevit, whose use of American military equipment for the invasion violated Turkey's aid agreements with the United States, to postpone the landings. That Ecevit may have really been relieved by Greek intransigence and American softness was mirrored in the remark he reportedly made to Sisco after the invasion began: "Now you have 48 hours in which to find a solution."

American commanders who observed the performance of their Turkish allies in Cyprus must have been appalled. The Turks sank one of their own ships, their paratroop drops were badly off target, and their coordination was so poor that they had to cancel a landing on the eastern shore of the island that was scheduled to coincide with their north coast invasion. Nor was their offensive on Cyprus easily accomplished. By the end of the month, when they begrudgingly agreed with the new Greek civilian government to a ceasefire, they had only managed to open a precarious corridor from Kyrenia to Nicosia, and that uncomfortable position would largely contribute to their conduct during the negotiations that began on August 8 in Geneva.

The Turks went to Geneva in sweet-and-sour style, carrying a proposal for a solution to the Cyprus problem but making it clear that rejection of their suggestions would provoke renewed military action on the island. As they tell it, they passed on their proposals privately through the British foreign secretary, James Callaghan, in order to spare the Greeks from having to respond publicly. Their initial idea was for a federal system under which the Turkish Cypriots, who comprise 18 percent of the island's population, would have separate administration in a zone covering 38 percent of Cyprus. When the Greeks spurned that, the Turks came back with a plan for a cantonal system, under which the Turkish Cypriots would occupy several areas. The Greeks considered this even worse. They asked for a 36-hour adjournment of the conference, and Callaghan, perceiving that the meeting might collapse, urged the Turks to be "generous." American diplomats, backed up by telephone calls from Kissinger, also counseled flexibility. Once again, however, the United States not only refrained from putting any real pressure on Turkey, but by issuing a statement gratuitously expressing support for greater autonomy for the Turkish Cypriots, the State Department seemed to be tilting toward the Turks. Ecevit therefore rejected the Greek request for an adjournment, and with the Geneva conference in disarray, he ordered his forces on Cyprus to take the offensive, and within a matter of days they held 40 percent of the island, the area they now control.

Turkish officials here say that "phase two," as the offensive started in the middle of August is called, was undertaken because their forces considered their military position to have been insecure. That was probably true in part. But Ecevit's foreign affairs adviser, Haluk Ulman, submits more plausibly that the real reason for the push was diplomatic. In the first place, he told me the other day, the Turks wanted to improve their bargaining posture, and consequently they were simply adhering to the thesis that they could not win at the conference table what they had not won on the battlefield. Secondly, and in my estimation more significantly, they feared that the United States might shift its stance during the Geneva meeting and apply strong leverage to prevent them from a second military drive. This apprehension was fueled by the fact that the British, who maintain sovereign bases on Cyprus, reinforced them with a battalion of Gurkhas and also sent in a squadron of Phantom jets to help a contingent of United Nations troops defend the Nicosia airport against possible Turkish attack. Ulman's

explanation, I think, undermines the official American argument that the United States could not halt the Turks. It indicates as well that Kissinger may have miscalculated the effect of the pressure he could have applied on Turkey.

The Turks now assert that their military actions are finished and that they are prepared to negotiate seriously with the Greeks. As I understand it, they have been warned by the United States that a move to take over the entire island would prompt the Ford administration to stop American military aid, which amounts to \$150 million per year. [Last week the House voted to cut off military aid to Turkey until "substantial progress" has been made to effect a Cyprus agreement. *The Editors*] But many diplomats here envisage situations that might lead the Turks to actions less dramatic than a complete occupation of Cyprus but nevertheless brutal. One possibility is that they may inflict severe reprisals against the Greek Cypriot population for attacks against the Turks by Greek Cypriot terrorists or guerrillas.

Ecevit is sticking to the same formula his representatives put forth in Geneva in August: Cyprus must be divided between Greek and Turkish Cypriot zones, with the Turks getting roughly one-third of the island. The Turkish zone would be the richer northern part now occupied by Turkish troops, and it would include, according to Ecevit, the port of Famagusta, which with its skyscraper hotels resembles a miniature Miami Beach. Since the Turkish Cypriot population is insufficient to fill this region, the Turks talk about migration from Turkey, citing the dubious statistic that some 250,000 Turks of Cypriot origin who have settled in Turkey since the 1920s could be transferred to the island. Turkish officials here strenuously rebuff the idea that, if their proposal for federal structure fails to carry, Turkey might annex the northern sector of the island. They point out that such a move would automatically incorporate a part of Cyprus into NATO and thereby offend the Russians. That, among other reasons, is why Cyprus is so important. Like Taiwan, it is intrinsically an inconsequential bit of terrain, but its location has made it disproportionately vital to the international scene, and thus its future transcends its own problems of ethnic harmony.

There is much more to say about Turkey than its preoccupation with Cyprus. It has a thriving economy, and despite generals in the wings, its commitment to democracy is genuine. But the Cyprus issue is the main topic of conversation here, and I have focused on it at length because, within the content of the current crisis, it illustrates the dilemma of a major power like the United States when confronted by choices. To contend, as Kissinger has in respect to this situation, that America is no longer the world's policeman is a facile but hollow argument, especially when he did not shy away from intervention in Chile and continues to bulwark the regime in Saigon. Therefore, in my opinion, the real question is not whether the United States plays a role in the world, but its judgment in deciding what role it will play in what area. In this instance, I believe, it made the wrong decision for the wrong motive, and for that reason, I would venture to predict we have not heard the end of the Cyprus business and its implications for this corner of the globe.

APPENDIX VI

Selected Press Reports and Commentaries on the Crisis in Cyprus

1. PRESS REPORTS ON EVENTS IN CYPRUS

[From The Economist (London), Aug. 10, 1974]

AN ISLAND COMING APART AT THE SEAMS

The attempt to work out the political future of Cyprus got under way in Geneva on Thursday, by the skin of its teeth; but the Greeks were dropping threats that they would walk out of the conference if the Turkish army kept on advancing. In fact Cyprus's future is less likely to be decided by the negotiators at Geneva than by the facts on the ground; and both sides—but especially the Turks—have been ruthlessly creating facts in the past week. By Thursday the growing Turkish enclave in the north seemed to extend to a point about 10 miles west of Kyrenia. On both sides of the new dividing line new refugees have been thrown out of their homes. This will powerfully influence the future political configuration of the island.

On Tuesday the Turkish government claimed that more than 21,000 Turkish Cypriots—nearly a fifth of the total—had fled, or been expelled from, the places where they had lived. About 6,000 got to a British base in the south; in Famagusta, a fair number gained relative security by pouring into the old city with its protective Venetian ramparts. Elsewhere, large numbers of Turks fled (or tried to flee) in panic from one village to another, but some went back again. The result is that the fighting has brought about some degree of concentration of the Turkish population of the island. But the majority of Turkish Cypriots appear to be where they were on July 20th, when the Turkish invasion started—except that they are now prisoners, or hostages, of the Greeks.

In a telegram to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on Sunday, Mr. Clerides had already submitted the Greek side's allegation: that 20,000 Greek Cypriots in the Turkish-held Kyrenia enclave had been driven from their homes. Some fled eastward, to relative security, at the start of the fighting; others were reported to have got to Nicosia. Whatever settlement is reached in Geneva, if any is, it is hard to see these Greeks ever settling again in Kyrenia.

All this has a bearing on what the politicians are talking about. If the Turkish army had been able to establish several predominantly Turkish cantons under its control, or even to advance as far west as Tylliria, the issue would be clearer. But even as it is the Turkish-held enclave is probably extensive enough to absorb a large proportion of the Turkish refugees—if they are willing to make the trek to the north. Already the Turkish government, in collaboration with the Turkish Cypriot administration, is planning to turn Kyrenia into Cyprus's second capital: a deep-water port is to be built (which will not be easy), oil and water pipelines are to link Kyrenia to the Turkish mainland, and a small airfield is to be constructed. The Kyrenia enclave is getting very close to being Turkey's 68th province.

Of course, this is not admitted by the Turkish government. Or not quite. On Sunday the prime minister, Mr. Ecevit, said that Turkey's idea of a "federal" solution was based on no more than the principle that Turkish Cypriots were the rightful owners of 30 percent of Cyprus's real estate. Last week the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Denktash, went rather further: he talked about the Kyrenia enclave being an "autonomous republic within a general republic", whatever that means. And then on Wednesday Professor Ulman—Mr. Ecevit's key adviser in foreign affairs, who may play an important role in Geneva—reportedly used the word "confederation". Cyprus, he said, should consist of two separate, autonomous republics theoretically subordinate to some nebulous central authority in Nicosia.

Mr. Mavros, the Greek foreign minister, has on two occasions in the past week ruled out both partition and federation. On Wednesday evening, however, in an interview with the BBC, he categorically excluded only partition. The signs are

that the Greeks, with precious few cards in their hands, are now prepared to accept the federal concept. The trouble is that the Greeks still want a strong central government in Nicosia, so that Cyprus should continue to be, in theory at least, a "unitary" state. Between that and the very loose form of confederation—not very different in practice from a sort of partition—which the Turks want, there is still a gulf.

THE BLOOD-DEBT

The ceasefire ordered by the first round of the Geneva talks on July 30th has achieved almost nothing. It has not brought an end to the bloodshed on Cyprus. It has not in any way diminished the mutual fears of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. And it has not deterred the Turkish army, which invaded Cyprus on July 20th and which has been reinforcing itself ever since, from extending its tentacles in the strategic mountain range west of Kyrenia and from doing, it seems, some brutal things in the process.

On August 4th, the acting president of Cyprus, Mr. Glafkos Clerides, sent a message to all heads of state. This said that the Turkish army had indulged in rape, arson and cold-blooded murder, that it had expelled civilians from their homes and had systematically looted and plundered property. There is enough evidence from reporters on the spot, together with the guarded statements by United Nations officers, to suggest that Mr. Clerides's charges may be substantially true.

It requires firm control by officers to prevent soldiers looting from abandoned shops and houses; this clearly did not exist in the Turkish units that occupied Kyrenia. Some Greek Cypriots who escaped from the Kyrenia area have told of acts of brutality by Turkish soldiers in the presence of their officers. These include rape at gunpoint, the shooting of male civilians and acts of even more savage murder.

Counter-charges of brutality by Greek Cypriots against the Turkish Cypriot community followed from Ankara. On August 5th the Turkish foreign minister told a press conference that Greeks had plundered and burned the Turkish village of Biscaya and had destroyed 50 Turkish houses in Limassol. The next day the information minister, Mr. Birgit, said hundreds of Turkish villagers had been massacred, and that in the Turkish Cypriot town of Lefka 500 civilians taking refuge in a school had been gunned down, only 19 women escaping. Independent evidence corroborates instances of Turkish Cypriot civilians being killed by the Greek Cypriot National Guard, but there must be serious doubt about the scale of the Lefka massacre. A correspondent from *Le Monde*, writing in the issue of August 7th from Lefka, reported that the Turkish Cypriot leader there told him that in the town itself six people had been killed, 13 had died in two neighbouring villages and seven women and children had been shot in a third village.

United Nations officials have confirmed that the Turkish army has been forcibly removing Greek Cypriots from the Kyrenia area. On August 4th soldiers brushed past UN soldiers guarding some 650 Greek Cypriots who, together with a number of British civilians, had taken refuge in Kyrenia's Dome hotel, and took away all the Cypriot men. Later the Cypriot women and children were removed by bus and taken to Nicosia where they made their way to the Greek sector. Similar action is reported to have been taken by the Turkish army in Bellapais, Karmi and Trimithi.

There has been no news of the men taken away, but they are thought to be in camps in the Turkish-controlled area outside Nicosia. They are being held as hostages against the safety of the Turkish Cypriot men whom the National Guard hold as virtual prisoners. Mr Birgit alleged that 35,882 people from 80 villages were held hostage by the Greek Cypriots and that another 21,157 in 60 villages had been surrounded.

Reports of the fighting have been no less contradictory than reports of atrocities but Turkish units have certainly advanced beyond the positions they held west of Kyrenia on July 30th. The villages of Karavas and Lapithos on the coast road have been regularly shelled and by mid-week the Turks, already firmly established on the hills to the south, were reported to have taken both villages. On the other side of the mountain range attacks have been made against the villages of Larnaca and Agriidhaki from Mount Kyparissiovouno, captured on August 2nd.

On Wednesday, the day before the second Geneva meeting, fighting continued in the coastal area and there were reports that the Turks had pushed as far as Vasilia. Their intention would seem to be to control all the strategic points over-

looking their beachhead at Ayios Yeoryios. In Famagusta, Turkish Cypriots from the old walled city, now numbering 10,000 moved out of the citadel to occupy points overlooking the harbour. UN officers failed to persuade them to pull back. This action was clearly designed to prevent the Greeks from using the harbour.

The Greek-Turkish-British supervisory commission, which was to define the ceasefire line and determine the buffer zone between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot forces, has made little progress. It has so far proved impossible to define a military line as the fighting continues west of Kyrenia. It needs more than three men in a helicopter to do that.

[From *The Economist* (London), Aug. 10, 1974]

GREECE—THE DISSENTING VOICE OFF-STAGE

Ten years ago—even ten weeks ago—it would have seemed wildly unlikely that leaders of the Greek Communist party, outlawed 26 years ago, would be holding news conferences in Athens and issuing press statements. That is what they are now doing, almost every day. Greece's left wing has resurfaced after two decades of harassment and seven years of persecution.

It is now thought likely that the 1948 ban on the Greek Communist party will be lifted, and that the Communists will be allowed to operate in the open after working underground for 25 years. Mr. Karamanlis almost promised this when, in his first policy statement, he undertook to give the country "a genuine and progressive democracy in which there shall be room for all the Greeks". An indication of his intentions was the inclusion of Communists in the amnesty, and he has since let them resume party activity and publish their two newspapers. In return Mr. Karamanlis has obtained from the Communists a vote of tolerance for his government until he can consolidate his hold on the country.

The two branches of the outlawed Communist party have both held press conferences in Athens to explain their positions. Mr. Tony Ambatielos, a member of the politburo of the Moscow-leaning branch, said that although the Karamanlis government was no more than an unsatisfactory change of facade on the American-managed stage of Greece the nation was now facing the threat of the Cyprus crisis and it was the duty of all democratic forces to unite. Mr. Haralambos Drakopoulos, secretary of the communist group which broke away from the main party in 1968, described the Karamanlis government as a "first step towards democracy" and urged his followers to support the government during the Cyprus emergency.

The breakaway group—the "Greek Communist party of the Interior"—made a dramatic apparent change of policy last year, when it declared that it had renounced marxist revolution as a means of gaining power, and pledged respect for parliamentary methods. This attitude gives it a better chance than its older brother of being allowed fully back into Greek politics.

Even warmer support for Mr. Karamanlis has come from Mr. Elias Eliou, the chief parliamentary spokesman of the United Democratic Left, the party which pulled in the Communist vote in Greece from 1950 onwards, when it had nothing to vote for directly. Mr. Eliou, who had a 20-minute talk with Mr. Karamanlis, has publicly expressed his bitterness at the exclusion of the left from the government, but has spoken of the "imperative need" to help Mr. Karamanlis. Even Mr. Mikis Theodorakis, the enormously popular composer whose political influence among Greek youth should not be underestimated (and who is now a dissident Communist planning to set up his own party) said Mr. Karamanlis had his fullest backing. It is an impressive litany of encouragement for the new prime minister.

Nearer the centre there are many new-left radicals who found some sort of common identity in opposing the dictatorship. It will be some time before they sort out where they stand, but the hope is that some of them may form a social democratic party which might fill a long-unoccupied place in the Greek political spectrum. Such a party is needed if voters are to be discouraged from drifting to the extreme left.

This is where the future of Mr. Andreas Papandreou becomes important. Mr. Papandreou, the son of the old liberal leader, is the only politician to have rejected the Karamanlis government as a creature of Nato and the only expatriate leader not to have returned to Greece. His extremely radical views aroused much emotional support among Greeks when they were broadcast from Germany during

the colonel's rule. The question today is whether Mr. Papandreu and his ideas could still awake the same response from a people who have had time to think about their newly regained freedom. Mr. Papandreu seems to be keeping his head down until the Cyprus crisis is no longer an obstacle to his purposes. He probably hopes that humiliations over Cyprus will undermine the popularity of Mr. Karamanlis. But many Greeks trust that by then the prime minister, who is already moving swiftly to repair the ravages of seven years of government by improvisation, will have done enough to make the Greeks less susceptible to demagoguery.

[The Economist (London), Aug. 17, 1974]

THE RUSSIANS ARE COMING OUT OF IT LAUGHING

(From our Athens Correspondent)

"Whether the Greeks and Turks choose to go for each other's throats or fight a war by proxy in Cyprus," a western ambassador said in Athens at the peak of this week's crisis, "I can see only one winner. The Russians must be laughing their heads off."

Greece's decision on Wednesday to pull out from the military organisation of the Nato alliance reflects the jumble of emotions that hit Mr. Karamanlis's government when the Geneva talks broke down on Wednesday morning and Turkey resumed its offensive in Cyprus. Most western diplomats in Athens seem convinced that Greece will resume its military role in Nato once the Cyprus crisis is over. They could be wrong. It is a bad sign for Nato and the west that the Karamanlis government felt it had to take this action to placate Greek opinion. It will be an even worse one if the Soviet Union ends its opposition to enosis (the union of Cyprus with Greece) now that Greece has poked a finger in Nato's eye.

Even before the Geneva peace talks collapsed there was growing disillusionment in Greece over the attitude of the western powers. Conspiracy-minded Greeks have been running two campaigns: first, an effort to make people believe that Britain had positively helped the Turks in their invasion of Cyprus; second, the assertion, from a wide number of sources, that the United States had arranged the whole crisis in pursuit of its aim to bring a partitioned Cyprus into the Nato alliance.

True, this is in line with the Greeks' age-old instinct to blame others for their own mistakes. But the fact remains that the Greeks are blaming Britain and the United States for not stopping the Turkish invasion, or preventing Turkey's Mr. Gunes from walking out of Geneva this week. A minister in the new government put it this way: "The Americans managed to turn the Turks back in 1964 with a simple letter from President Johnson to Ismet İnönü. They could have halted them just as easily this time." The Greeks are not concerned with the price that the Turks made the Americans pay for that "simple letter", which the Turks still regard as an affront to their national pride and which has added a dimension of defiance to their dealings with foreign powers. It is a measure of Greek bitterness that one newspaper claimed that the Americans had sold out Cyprus in exchange for a Turkish pledge to reimpose the ban on growing opium poppies.

The possibility of Greece quitting Nato to become non-aligned was often discussed by the Greek politicians now in power during the days of the military dictatorship—whose survival they generally attributed to the United States. But that Greece should side with the Soviet Union, or even seek its military help, was unthinkable except by the far left. It is all the more striking that last week Estia, the most rabidly anti-communist daily in Athens, could write: "If the Soviet Union can guarantee [our territorial integrity] let us even go with Russia."

The Karamanlis government is alarmed by the extent of this swing in public opinion. Its concern is all the greater because it recognises that it has nothing to thank the Russians for either; it has got sweet words but no action. The government felt that the Russians could have put pressure on the Turks either by a few reminders about their array of missiles, as Khrushchev did in his time, or by moving some of their divisions in the Caucasus nearer to the Turkish frontier.

In fact the Russians clambered onto the fence in mid-crisis. Although they were right about what was going to happen in Cyprus, they, like others, had not taken into account the subsequent political changes in Greece. Their tacit support for the Turkish invasion reflected a shrewd political judgment so long as Greece was governed by military men who were lending the country to dangerous, and senseless, adventures. But once the Karamanlis government took over, and the

chances of Archbishop Makarios's return to Nicosia dwindled, the Russians were caught on the wrong foot. They barricaded themselves behind the Security Council resolution calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops, but never said which troops.

The Russians are not expected to come out from behind this barricade and intervene directly. Militarily, they are in a position to do so. They control the Bulgarian army, they keep at least seven battle-ready divisions in the Crimea, and they have air bases in Syria. Their Mediterranean fleet is a bit thin but three destroyers were rushed down to the Dardanelles on Wednesday. Yet most western observers rule out the possibility of Soviet intervention. So, for doing more or less nothing, the Russians have been rewarded with the bonanza of Greece's withdrawal from Nato—the best news they have had in the 25-year history of the alliance.

The Greeks themselves were faced with the agony of choosing between war and going back to Geneva to negotiate a capitulation. If it was to be war, there was again a choice. The first possibility was a direct engagement on the mainland frontier with Turkey. But here the Greeks are outnumbered nine to five by the Turks in fighting men. Short of a miracle, the odds against Greece were too high. The second was war by proxy. Greece could send troops from Crete to Cyprus: but that would mean asking Britain, as a guarantor power of Cyprus's independence, to provide adequate air cover.

What other way out is there? As the Greek government sees it, it can return to the Geneva table only if it looks like having the chance to secure an honourable agreement on Cyprus. For only thus can the survival, and prestige, of the Karamanlis government be ensured. And the restoration of democracy in Greece needs that.

EASTWARD HO

Within two hours of the breakdown of the Geneva talks, Turkish forces moved into action to take by force the 30 percent of the island they had so far failed to get at the bargaining table. As in the earlier fighting, Turkey's tough professional army, hugely outnumbering and outgunning the remnants of the Greek Cypriot National Guard, achieved its objectives—but probably behind schedule.

By Wednesday night it had broken through the Greek positions around the Turkish-held Kyrenia triangle, all but surrounded Nicosia, and pushed its armoured columns to within 10 miles of Famagusta. Turkish jets struck targets throughout the island—with good accuracy and perhaps with better control than before, although they did destroy a clearly-marked United Nations jeep near Larnaca, killing three Austrian soldiers, and again damaged Nicosia's mental hospital.

In last month's fighting Turkey's air support had lacked co-ordination; this problem now seems to have been largely overcome. But the army's methodical advance was not fast enough to throw, and keep, the Greeks off balance. They fought hard from several strongpoints between Mia Milea and Asha, slowing the Turk's advance and denying them Famagusta on the first day. Regrouping during Wednesday night, the Greeks put together a determined if ineffective resistance at the gates of Famagusta.

Early on Thursday morning the Turks launched powerful artillery and air attacks against the port area and the western suburbs of Famagusta, where the Greek defences were concentrated. The Greeks put up unexpectedly heavy anti-aircraft fire, both from the port area and from the Boghaz naval installations to the north. Later in the day two Turkish destroyers joined the fighting, bombarding the Boghaz base and the fortifications near Trikomo. By noon on Thursday Turkish tanks were fighting in Famagusta itself, and by the afternoon the Greek defence had been reduced to action by isolated groups.

At the outset the United Nations forces, under the command of an Indian soldier, Major-General Prem Chand, withdrew from the obviously indefensible buffer zone around the Turkish area. But the UN troops controlling Nicosia air port had a different mission, and remained stubbornly in position throughout Wednesday, eventually becoming involved in an exceptionally confused firefight there which left 17 Finnish soldiers wounded. They retained control of the landing area itself; it is probably the single most important piece of real estate on the island, since both sides would have liked it for flying in supplies and reinforcements.

On the western front, clearly second in importance to the Turks, the attack does not seem to have got under way until late on Wednesday morning. But by Thursday night the demarcation line that the Turks had proposed at Geneva—running from Lefka to Famagusta via Nicosia—had been reached in most sectors.

Mr. Callaghan tried, all right. He hauled the antagonists off to dinner parties, and went without sleep, and pulled out all the conventional stops of diplomatic persuasion. But given the way the Turks were playing it he may have been doomed to failure from the start. At 2 o'clock on Wednesday morning the Geneva conference on Cyprus collapsed. The delegates—the foreign ministers of Britain, Greece and Turkey, plus Mr. Clerides for the Greek Cypriots and Mr. Denktash for the Turkish Cypriots—had had five days of talking about talking, and waiting to talk about talking, rather than real negotiation.

It was a conference where few things happened on time; for example, the plenary session scheduled for 10 o'clock on Tuesday morning finally started at 6:40 in the evening. Yet the Turks were watching the second-hand of the clock; they claim they issued no ultimatum, but they arrived in Geneva determined to railroad through a federal settlement for Cyprus while their army was firmly installed in the Kyrenia enclave and the Greek Cypriots were still stunned by the fact of the invasion. It was a fairly typical Turkish performance; and what happened in Cyprus within a few hours of the conference's end was not untypical either.

The thing began on Thursday evening, August 8th. By Friday night there seemed to be a flicker of hope, when the six-page agreement spelling out the terms of the supposed ceasefire—the third since the Turkish invasion—was signed in Nicosia. This conspicuously imperfect document even encouraged speculation that the Turks had renounced the temptation to enlarge their Kyrenia enclave. But on Saturday morning it was back to par for the course. Mr. Gunes, the Turkish foreign minister, promptly walked out (followed by Mr. Denktash) because he did not like the name-cards that gave Mr. Clerides the predominant position in Cyprus. Mr. Callaghan got round that—no namecards at all—and the session eventually began, seven hours late. Sunday's schedule went similarly awry; the three foreign ministers were to have met in the morning, but Mr. Gunes asked for two postponements on suddenly discovering other engagements.

The atmosphere was slightly sweetened by the Greeks' announcement on Sunday that they were about to start handing over prisoners, and withdrawing their forces from Turkish areas occupied in the early stages of the fighting. At the same time Britain announced that 600 Gurkhas were being flown to Cyprus, and that the withdrawal of a battalion of Fusiliers, and 12 RAF Phantoms, had been cancelled. The Turks interpreted that as evidence of British bellicosity, but it did Britain no good with the Greeks: on Saturday the Greek Cypriot newspaper *Agon*—which usually reflects Mr. Clerides's views—vehemently denounced Britain for having failed to prevent the Turkish invasion.

The real crisis took shape on Monday and Tuesday, when it became obvious that a gulf remained between the two sides. The Turks spelled out their proposition: Cyprus would remain an independent republic, but it would consist of two autonomous regions—equal in status—within a federal framework. The Turkish area must amount to 30 percent of the island. This figure seems to have been derived from the 1960 constitution, in which the Turks were allotted 30 percent of the posts in the civil service, although they number only 18 percent of the population. The curious thing is that the Turks now argue that the 1960 constitution is defunct, whereas the Greeks maintain that it is still legally operative.

And then a rather better Turkish offer emerged, in a statement from Mr. Denktash. Instead of one consolidated Turkish autonomous province in the north of the island, covering about a third of the total area, there could be six autonomous "cantons," the largest by far being the area around Kyrenia occupied by the Turkish army: it seemed clear, however, that this would be expanded beyond the ceasefire demarcation line agreed to on August 9th. Where would the other five Turkish cantons be? The Turkish population is scattered all over the island. There are (or at least there were on July 20th, when the Turkish invasion force landed) sizeable Turkish enclaves in the Tylliria district, in Famagusta old town, in Larnaca, Limassol and Paphos-Kotima. Turks from other areas could conceivably be moved into these districts, but Mr. Denktash did not say explicitly that they should be. Some Turkish Cypriots have said that they would prefer to see those Turks who have been made homeless since July 20th move into the Kyrenia enclave.

This cantonal solution does not seem to be all that different from the ideas that Mr. Callaghan put out for discussion in Geneva. But the Greeks would not have it. On Tuesday Mr. Clerides urged an adjournment of a day or two, in order to talk to his colleagues in Nicosia; Mr. Mavros, the Greek foreign minister, wanted

to confer with his government in Athens. Mr. Callaghan duly put this proposal to the Turks, but it was brusquely rejected.

The two sets of Greeks have been negotiating at pistol point. On the eve of the conference Mr. Mavros seemed to be veering towards acceptance of the federation idea. Mr. Clerides indicated his willingness at least to consider a cantonal solution. But his own proposal, reportedly put forward in Geneva on Tuesday, did not seem to go greatly beyond what he has suggested in the past: that Cyprus should have a strong central government (whether he would be willing publicly to call it "federal" is still unclear), and that the Turkish areas should have extended local-authority powers in such things as education and religion.

The Greeks had still not explicitly abandoned the belief that Cyprus could remain a unitary state, which in constitutional language means a non-federal one. This had been the insuperable obstacle in the Clerides-Denktaş talks over the past six years. Mr. Clerides, a realist, knows very well that the Turks have now changed the situation. That he was even prepared to consider a cantonal solution was a significant shift. But he could not see his way to signing an agreement in the time span the Turks set. And so the Geneva conference collapsed.

[from *The Economist*, September 14, 1974]

GREECE—GREECE, C'EST MOI

(From Our Athens Correspondent)

The sooner elections can be held in Greece the better it will be for the prime minister, Mr. Karamanlis. Until now the government has held that its first priority must be to solve the Cyprus problem, but unless this can be done soon, which seems exceedingly unlikely, it would be to Mr. Karamanlis's advantage to switch priorities and to hold elections first. He could then put the blame for the Cyprus mess firmly on the fallen military junta and take credit for averting a disastrous war with Turkey. An early election would also give the prime minister and the conservative elements in his government the advantage of denying the left sufficient time to get ready for the fight. No social democratic party has ever tried its hand in a Greek election, and the last time the Communists entered the lists was in 1936.

Mr. Karamanlis is now seeing his greatest aspiration coming within his grasp: to unite all Greeks under his leadership. Today this unity is a reality, but it is unlikely to survive once people realise that the danger of the tanks rolling back into the streets, and bringing another lot of colonels with them, has passed. So Mr. Karamanlis has to try to consolidate the support events have given him. His wish is to form a de Gaulle-style political movement spanning the widest possible range of Greek political opinion. Having got that movement elected to power, he could then set about liquidating Greece's Algerian problem—Cyprus—and set the nation on a course of rapid economic and social development.

The present government line-up is likely to become the basis of Mr. Karamanlis's new movement. It would comprise the old right (which is so reformed that it is unfair to label it as such), the centre-left led by Mr. George Mavros, whose performance as foreign minister has greatly increased his standing, and the non-professional politicians, such as Mr. Pessenazoglou and Mr. Mangakis, who have a special appeal for the intellectual left.

This broad coalition, which would have the advantage of having proved itself in office, would provide formidable opposition to Mr. Andreas Papandreu, who still needs time to persuade Greek voters to accept his ideas of socialism. The programme Mr. Papandreu put forward last week is so radical that it makes the policies of the splintered Greek Communists sound like Sunday sermons. But the Communists have the organisation that Mr. Papandreu lacks, and for this reason he may try to work with them. For their part, they might welcome the idea of an alliance of the left to disguise their own divisions.

After so many years of political stagnation, it is anybody's guess which way the Greek electorate will turn. It is generally thought that, whoever wins the election, the abolition of the monarchy will be accepted. It is also expected that if Mr. Karamanlis wins the day he will introduce a gaullist-style presidential republic and then seek election as president. The stage would then be set for him to introduce the drastic reforms of Greek political and economic life which he was thwarted from implementing by his election defeat in 1963.

TURKEY—HE MUST WAIT

Turkey's prime minister, Mr. Ecevit, would also profit from an early general election. With his reputation high after Turkey's invasion of Cyprus, he would stand a good chance of winning an absolute majority, thus dispensing with his present coalition partners, the rightwing National Salvation party. But the Turkish constitution does not allow for a premature election unless a majority of the National Assembly agrees—and parliamentarians, especially those who have taken four-year leases on apartments in Ankara, are reluctant to incur the expenses of an election until they have to. So, instead, Mr. Ecevit is making plans changing coalition partners.

He seems to be preparing to get rid of the National Salvation party. Whether he will actually do so depends on the attitude of other smaller parties in the Turkish parliament; his own Republican People's party has only 185 seats of the assembly's 450. But Mr Ecevit's patience with the Islamic enthusiasts of the NSP has worn so thin that he is now actively seeking support elsewhere. He has made approaches to the small right-wing Democratic party, which in return for a spell in government might vote for an election next spring.

The partnership between Mr Ecevit's social democratic Republican People's party and the National Salvationists, patched together with difficulty in January after the election in October, always looked precarious. It almost fell apart in March when the National Salvationists opposed an amnesty for political prisoners. The latest breach is over Cyprus. The National Salvation leader, Mr Erbakan, has openly shown his jealousy of Mr Ecevit's growing popularity. He has allowed himself to be proclaimed as "Erbakan the conqueror" at party rallies, and his party newspapers have been alleging that Turkey would never have invaded Cyprus at all but for him.

There are indeed deep differences between the coalition parties on their Cyprus policies. Whereas Mr Ecevit has been insisting that Turkey has no intention of partitioning the island permanently, and wants a federal solution, Mr Erbakan has been openly advocating partition. If Mr Ecevit can get rid of his hard-line partners he may feel freer to take a more conciliatory line. But his new reputation as Turkey's national hero has been built on his toughness and if he is to win the next election, whenever that is, he cannot afford to start looking too reasonable.

GREECE AND NATO: STARTING TO BITE

Greece has now taken concrete steps to limit its Nato involvement. Not much was done when Greece first announced its withdrawal from the military side of the alliance on August 14th, but after Greece advised Nato at the end of the month that the decision was final things began happening. The Greek part of the Nato Air Defence Ground Environment (Nadge) network cut down the amount of information it sent to the rest of the system. The Nato communications circuits that go through Greece to Turkey became unusable. And, more important, the United States was told to stop using Greek bases for routine operations.

This denial to the Americans of Greek bases is beginning to bite. There is a lot of Nato and American equipment in Greece that needs American maintenance and supervision. This includes missile batteries in the north, some special longrange radar and communication facilities, and nuclear weapons for both American and Greek use in wartime.

The major loss will be at Suda Bay in Crete. This is the main supply point for the American Sixth Fleet in the eastern Mediterranean. Its airfield is vital for the aircraft-carriers operating there. Some of the weapons held in Crete are not duplicated anywhere else in Europe. By reducing, and changing, their operations the Americans can get along without any of this. But it will be expensive, and Nato will lose in effectiveness.

The Americans have not publicised the Greek actions, apparently hoping that the problem can be solved before anything worse is done. The repeated assurances by the Greek foreign minister, Mr. Mavros, that the decision to leave the military side of Nato is irrevocable do not make this seem very likely. Yet there are one or two very curious things. Greek officers are still on duty at Nato headquarters. Nothing has yet been said about the squadron of American destroyers based in Elefsis, west of Athens. Nor, the other way around, has anything yet been said about American military credits to Greece, which totalled more than £25m in the year ending on June 30th.

[From the Economist, Sept. 21, 1974]

TURKEY—ALL OUT

Mr. Ecevit, who on Wednesday resigned from his job as Turkey's prime minister, has acted just as decisively to get his way at home as he did over Cyprus. His purpose is to break up the coalition between his Republican People's party and the traditionalist National Salvation party, led by Mr Erbakan—and cash in on the popularity he has won over Cyprus.

There is no doubt that Mr Ecevit will be asked by President Koruturk to form another administration. His problem is how to force an early election. Under the constitution he can do so if he is defeated three times within three months, and he may form a minority government in the hope of this happening. Alternatively, he may join up with the right-wing Democratic party, which would give him, just, the necessary parliamentary majority to call for an election. The sooner the election is held the better will be Mr Ecevit's chance of gaining an absolute majority.

CYPRUS—STILL TALKING, JUST

Mr Ecevit's attempt to take more power for himself in Turkey makes the business of getting negotiations going again about Cyprus no easier. Britain is still trying to persuade everyone concerned to resume the Geneva talks. But the Greeks and Greek Cypriots are pinning their hopes on the United Nations General Assembly that started this week. Archbishop Makarios, who intends to present the Greek Cypriot case in New York, left London on Wednesday for Cairo, Algiers and Belgrade in a bid to rustle up support. But Turkey has already let it be known that it thinks the archbishop has no right to speak for Cyprus as a whole, and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr Denktash, may ask to be heard by the UN as well.

The one glimmer of hope is that Mr. Denktash and the acting president of Cyprus, Mr. Clerides, are still on talking terms. They have agreed to a limited exchange of elderly or wounded prisoners: 245 were set free on Monday. But even this minor question is barbed with difficulties. The Turkish side insists that released prisoners should be allowed to go to the part of the island occupied by the Turkish army. The Greek Cypriots maintain that they should go back where they came from. This argument is at the core of the dispute over the 8,000 Turkish Cypriots who took refuge in the British base area at Episkopi. The Turkish government wants to take them back to Turkey, and thence to the Turkish-controlled part of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots say that if Britain agrees it will be tantamount to British acceptance of the division of the island. So for the time being these refugees stay where they are.

Although Mr. Clerides cannot possibly admit it yet, the signs are that he realises that Turkey will accept nothing less than a geographical separation of the two Cypriot communities. The best he may feel he can work for is a federal government with strong powers and a reduction in the size of the Turkish area. The return of the Greek part of Famagusta, the Morphou area and the industrial zone of Nicosia would go some way to mollify the Greek Cypriots.

If Mr. Clerides eventually has to sell the idea of a divided Cyprus to the Greek Cypriots he will need the wholehearted backing of Archbishop Makarios. The archbishop is keeping his options open. In one interview last week he said he could not accept any geographical separation of the two communities, but would agree to an autonomous Turkish community controlling groups of Turkish villages; he was also careful not to be specific about when he might return to Cyprus. But then *Le Monde* reported him this week as saying that he would go back to the island next month.

There is a tendency among Greeks, as others, to tell their superiors what they believe they want to hear. Archbishop Makarios is very likely being told he has more supporters in Cyprus than ever. But his presence on the island would deepen the divisions within the Greek Cypriot community and stiffen Turkish resolve to make as few concessions as possible. Mr. Clerides has enough to contend with already.

[From The Economist (London), Sept. 21, 1974]

THE EMPTY THIRD

(From Our Special Correspondent)

For the "liberated" Turkish Cypriots life behind the Turkish line in Cyprus is a strange and uncomfortable business. For the visitor the first impression is one of eerie emptiness—natural enough when one realises that the area has been depopulated of 75 per cent of its former inhabitants. In the twin towns of Karavas-Lapithos, which had a joint population of about 7,000, there now lives a single British couple determined to protect their house from looting. "Even the sparrows have been pushed off," says Geoffrey Brierley.

But where, one asks, are the Turkish Cypriots? One does not meet many on the roads, because petrol has been strictly rationed (food for civilians is also in short supply because, like petrol, it now has to be shipped from Turkey and not as before bought from farms and orchards just down the road). But the main reason for the missing human element is the finely-meshed security net that has been fastened down over the Turkish-occupied area. The road from Nicosia to Famagusta is about 35 miles long but on it one is checked at least 25 times at road blocks manned by Turkish soldiers, whose shaven heads, high cheek-bones and conical helmets bring the cold breath of the steppes of central Asia into the warmth of the Levant. The frustration of foreigners at this interminable checking is mitigated only by the realisation that Turkish Cypriots have to endure it too; in what is supposed to be their own country they have to book in and out of their villages or towns, give their names and destination and, sometimes, their reason for travel.

The Turkish Cypriots brought this army control down on themselves by giving in to the temptation of looting. The network of checks, the Turkish army explains, is for police purposes rather than military security in order to stop looting by Turkish civilians. Famagusta was saved from looting only because the army promptly sealed the Turkish Cypriots into the walled city. Houses in Kyrenia are still being picked over for small objects that can be pocketed, and disappointed looters are now turning to vandalism with things being smashed and slashed—a Turner canvas in one house miraculously escaped. A Union Jack on the door no longer provides protection, and when one British boat owner tried to hoist the Red Ensign on his yacht in the harbour he was promptly ordered to haul it down by a Turkish sergeant. With animals and pets running wild it is now true, modifying the Rubaiyat, that the donkey and the lizard keep the villas where John Smith idled and drank deep.

On the other side of the line, the Greek Cypriot community is in a sorry emotional state, deeply wounded in its *philotimo*, the Greek concept of self-respecting honour. Large numbers of the middle class are simply running away from a country that perhaps gave them too much prosperity too quickly (in the National Guard most of the hard fighters were village boys). Belatedly, the Cyprus government announced over the weekend that there would be restrictions on leaving the island, and, in particular, on taking money out. Certainly, if the panicky Greek Cypriots do not pick up enough courage to go back to their homes, they will be inviting Turkish replacements, especially from mainland Turkey.

The Turkish government is already working towards that replacement. Since it has now been estimated that there are only 45,000 Turks in the Greek area (not 60,000 as claimed by the Turkish Cypriot leader Mr. Denktash) they could be that much more easily moved to the under-populated Turkish area. But one great difficulty in any exchange of population is that Cyprus, though small, has a very varied crop pattern. Turkish vinegrowers from the south and west would be moving into northern areas where there are very few vineyards; Greek tobacco growers would be pushed into areas where no tobacco has ever been grown.

Both Cypriot communities have been ravaged by events. So has their natural environment and the economic infrastructure on which both equally depend. For no good reason the Turkish air force burnt down hundreds of acres of cedars and pine trees on the Troodos hills, which were far from any fighting. Immolated in the flames were 500 of the 600 moufflon, the rare mountain goat that is the national symbol of Cyprus, which had just been saved from extinction. The unwatered fruit orchards in the Turkish-held area are on the point of dying and hundreds of thousands of livestock are already dead. For the Greeks this is the rake of war; for the Turkish Cypriots it is the result of their supposed liberation.

[From The Economist, September 28, 1974]

CYPRUS—PEOPLE AS PAWNS

Turkey looks to be in for another long spell of political uncertainty. On Tuesday Mr. Ecevit, its prime minister, failed in his bid to patch together another coalition government and it is now unlikely that he will be given a mandate to form a minority government. This hiatus in Ankara brings one possible bonus: it gives the Greek prime minister, Mr. Karamanlis, breathing space to organise his own country's election. The Greeks could go to the polls in November and, whatever the complexion of the government that emerges, it will be in a stronger position to reach an agreement with Turkey than Mr. Karamanlis's present interim administration.

But the delay strikes harshly at the Cypriot people. At least a third of the population has been uprooted and many of them are living in refugee camps unsuitable for winter shelter. Although Mr. Clerides, the interim president, and Mr. Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, agreed on September 20th to exchange all prisoners, and let them choose where they wanted to go, they made no progress on the future of the refugees. And even the prisoner exchange showed signs of breaking down on Thursday when the Turks suddenly objected to Greek prisoners electing to go back to their homes in the Turkish-held zone.

This is the problem at the root of the impasse over the refugees. The Turks insist that only a limited number of Greeks should be allowed to return to their homes in the north. At the same time the Turks are adamant that all Turkish Cypriots in the Greek zone, and there are more there than in the northern part of the island held by the Turkish army, should be allowed to move to the north, where they would occupy abandoned Greek houses and lands.

Last weekend the Turks tried a new tack in their campaign to force the British government to agree that the 8,000 Turkish Cypriots who took refuge in the British base area of Episkopi should be shipped to Turkey—and return to the north of Cyprus. The refugees were encouraged to mount demonstrations against the British and to threaten damage to the installations. Yet it is far from certain that all, or even most, of them want to move to the north; many make daily visits to their villages near the base.

The British line is that the question of where these refugees should go must be decided in the context of a general settlement of the refugee problem by the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders. The Greeks happen to have a fairly strong card to play against the British government if it shows signs of weakening to Turkish pressure: the road between the two British bases, at Dhekelia (which is the supply depot for both the British and the UN) and Episkopi, is in Greek hands. But, quite apart from this, there is another argument against Britain's giving in to Turkish demands at this stage.

If it becomes inevitable that the Greek and Turkish communities are to be divided geographically, it is important for the future of Cyprus that the zones be equitably divided. This will not be so unless the Turkish army withdraws from some of the land it now holds; areas that could go back to the Greek Cypriots include the Greek part of Famagusta, the Morphou area and the section of Nicosia that the Turks occupied in August. The refugees at Episkopi, who are better off than most of the other Cypriot refugees, should remain where they are until some plan along these lines is evolved—or until there is a settlement of the whole refugee question.

[From The Economist (London), Sept. 7, 1974]

WHY WOULD THEY?

IT'S TIME TO PUNCTURE THE CONTINUING GREEK ACCUSATION THAT THE AMERICANS COOKED UP THE CYPRUS CRISIS FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES—MR. KARAMANLIS, PLEASE READ ON

Somebody's got to try to persuade the Greeks it isn't so. There is hardly a Greek who does not believe that the Americans not only failed to do anything very energetic to discourage the Turks from occupying part of Cyprus in July and August—which is probably true—but actually organised the whole crisis for their own purposes, which is a very different business and almost certainly not true. The Greeks are genuinely angry. Look at the letters on page 6; the

interview with the Greek foreign minister, Mr Mavros, in this week's *Time* magazine; the article by Professor Devletoglu in Monday's *Times*.

It is true that in these matters the Greeks are the Arabs of Europe: in politics they tend to believe what their emotions make them want to believe, and that makes them great hunters for scapegoats. In 1967 Nasser almost persuaded the Arabs that the American and British air forces were to blame for his defeat. Still, this is one of the few occasions when what people believe really is almost as important as the truth. The Greek's anger has made even the conservative government of Mr Karamanlis say it is pulling out of the military side of Nato, although that may not mean very much; and on Tuesday Mr Papandreou, who wants to be leader of a Tony Benn sort of party of the Greek left, said that his country should go neutral all the way.

Part of the trouble with the Greek theory about the Americans is that there is virtually no evidence to support it. The rumors about an American threat to shoot down Greek planes heading for Cyprus; and even about British help for the invading Turks, were flatly denied and have now died away. The only mildly curious thing of any substance that this paper knows about is the fact that Mr. Kissinger's press conference on July 22nd gave a pretty good hint that Greece's military dictatorship was about to be overthrown, just before it actually was; but even that proves no more than that Mr. Sisco, who had been Kissingering in Athens the day before, had been talking to the right Greeks—the ones who saw that the Cyprus fiasco was their chance to throw the junta out—and had reported this back to Washington. That isn't all. The other major weakness of the American conspiracy theory is that those who believe it cannot make up their minds what they think the Americans could have been trying to achieve. The accusing Greeks have been suggesting three quite different—and mutually exclusive—American aims:

(1) That the Americans helped the junta in Athens to organise the coup against Archbishop Makarios because they wanted Cyprus, united with Greece through the coup, to become a good, solid, Greek-junta-run military base;

(2) On the contrary, that the Americans were fed up with the difficulties the Athens junta had been making about the bases the Americans already have in Greece, and the American fly-in of supplies to Israel during the Middle East war last October, and wanted a new government in Cyprus—but one quite separate from Greece—that would offer them an alternative to the Greek bases;

(3) On the contrary again, that the Americans knew the Cyprus coup would fail, and that their chief aim was to bring about the overthrow of the Athens junta as a result of its failure, so that they could get the credit for the restoration of civilian government in Greece.

All three of these arguments have been coming out of Athens in the past month. The fact that all three of them cannot possibly be true does not mean, of course, that one of them may not be. But, again, no supporting evidence has been produced; and the fact that furious Greeks have so easily jumbled the three together is very revealing.

The Greeks are the latest victims of the confusion which so many people who live in small countries feel about what big powers such as the United States can do with their power. There are plenty of small nations that simultaneously, and with equal passion, want the Americans to be less interventionist in general and more interventionist when it suits that particular small nation; and they all exaggerate what either American action, or nonaction, is capable of doing. The closer one looks at the sequence of events in Cyprus after the July 15th coup against Makarios, the greater the limitations on American, or British, power seem to have been.

NEITHER THE POWER NOR THE MOTIVE

Neither the Americans nor the British—who have come in for some of the abuse the Greeks have been throwing at America—were in a position to stop the thing at the very beginning by putting Makarios back in power. The Americans had no troops on the island and no claim to intervene under the 1960 treaty of guarantee. The British, who had both the treaty rights and the troops on the spot, were not at all sure that the 2,600 fighting men they had in Cyprus were enough to take on the Greek Cypriot National Guard, and were frightened for the safety of the thousands of British dependants scattered around the island; and anyway the issue was settled for them within 36 hours because Makarios had left Cyprus. From then on the British were out of it: they certainly did not have enough troops in the Mediterranean to fight the Turks.

The Americans might have blocked the next stage of the proceedings, the Turkish invasion on July 20th, by putting the Sixth Fleet between the mainland and Cyprus; but at that time most people were arguing that the Turks, as guarantors of the 1960 treaty, were entitled to intervene against an apparent attempt to unite Cyprus with Greece. And then, once the Turks had got their Kyrenia bridgehead, the Americans too began to lose their power to control events. They might have tried harder to discourage the second Turkish attack, on August 14th, by threatening to cut off military aid, but discouragement is all it would have been: the Turks already had enough men on the island for the one-day blitz that finished their campaign. Nobody could have stopped that dead.

These are the raw facts of what it was in anybody's power to do. It is true that the Americans have interests in the eastern Mediterranean. It is their interest to have airfields and harbours they can use, both for what they want to do in the Middle East and for the defence of western Europe. It is their interest, and that of their European allies as well, that the Russians should not acquire the use of airfields and harbours in that region for themselves. But on July 15th there was no evident American desire for new bases, and no evident danger that the Russians were about to acquire bases of their own in Cyprus, urgent enough to make the Americans set out on a course of action that would split an island and lose them an ally. The causes of the Cyprus trouble lie in Cyprus itself, in the old rivalry between Greece and Turkey, and in the fact that Turkey is the stronger of the two. When the Greeks look at it coolly, they will recognise that.

[From The Economist (London), Sept. 7, 1974]

THE NUMBERS GAME OF A BROKEN ISLAND

(From Our Special Correspondent in Cyprus)

The old men still sit under the Tree of Idleness in the square outside the abbey at Bellapais and in the cafe across the road sit the women and children. No tea or coffee is served, except to the Turkish soldiers, and there are no young or middle-aged men around. It was their disappearance, and all the other things which the Turkish invaders did in and around Kyrenia, that produced the massive refugee problem which is now the crux of the Cyprus issue and will determine whether there will be peace at all on the island.

In those first few days of the Turkish invasion in late July many of the Greek Cypriots of the Kyrenia area did not run away. The Turks got them moving by a very simple stratagem. They began rounding up all men between the ages of 15 and 65 for "interrogation", and many of the women, left on their own, accepted the Turkish "invitation" to be transported to Nicosia. The Turks still refuse to reveal to anyone, including the Red Cross, the number of these civilian detainees or where they are held. Indeed, they are still playing a cat-and-mouse game of releasing some, rearresting others and moving them about from camp to camp.

In addition to this breaking up of families there was some rape and random gunning-down of civilians, mostly by Turkish troops, and looting of shops and homes, mostly by Turkish Cypriots. This is still going on by night in Kyrenia even while by day the new Turkish "owners" spruce up their shops, restaurants and hotels. To the credit of the Turkish army it needs to be said that there was little looting in Varusha, the Greek Cypriot area of Famagusta, and practically none at all in Morphou, the other large occupied town.

The Cyprus government claims that there are 191,000 "refugees"; but this figure is not strictly accurate, because the word refugee is being applied imprecisely to cover four different groups of homeless people. The first, in time and importance, were those expelled from the original area occupied by the Turkish army around Kyrenia. They were followed by displaced persons escaping from the fighting that then took place west of Kyrenia and east of Nicosia. It was the stories brought out by the expellees that produced the largest group—the refugees proper, who fled before the advancing Turks. The fourth and rapidly increasing group may be called the "bolters", who are people now moving into towns because they feel apprehensive in their villages near the Turkish line: strictly speaking, these are not refugees at all.

The total for the first three groups of homeless people must be somewhere around the 140,000 mark. The figure for Turkish Cypriot refugees, 30,000, very largely consists of bolters. Even at the lower figure, the number of refugees represents at least a quarter of the entire Greek Cypriot community. No Greek

Cypriot government can accept any political settlement predicated on the non-return to their homes of one in four of its people. The Cyprus economy would founder, because the refugees represent a good portion of the solid middle-class spine of the Greek community which has been cracked across the Turkish knee.

Where do these people fit into the constitutions and frontiers that were discussed in August at the now-stalled Geneva negotiations? The more moderate of the two plans put forward on the Turkish side—the idea of six Turkish Cypriot cantons that would form the Turkish part of a Cyprus federation—would exclude Varusha and Morphou. The tougher plan for a two-section federation very nearly coincides with the present dividing line on the island. The Greek Cypriots are still prepared to consider the six-canton plan, trading territory for a return of the Greek population to their homes. But President Clerides feels he cannot go back to Geneva without an initial conciliatory Turkish gesture. He could start talking again if, for instance, Greeks were allowed to return to Varusha, to Morphou and to the villages east of Nicosia which are in territory not included in either of the Turkish plans.

Once the negotiations start again, everything will turn on a heartless numbers game of how many Greeks will finally be allowed to return home. In the areas now under Turkish occupation there used to be 162,000 Greeks and 71,000 Turks. So the return of all the refugees would mean that the Turkish administrators of their autonomous region would be ruling over a Greek majority. At one point the Turkish Cypriot leadership accepted this possibility, but not any longer. Even a substantial Greek minority is being ruled out. Even if the 60,000 Turkish Cypriots living in other areas—the “potential refugees”, as the Turkish Cypriot leader Mr. Denktash calls them—move into the region it would still have a Turkish population of only 131,000. Since it is estimated that about 26,000 Greeks have remained on the Turkish side one cannot see the Turks allowing many more than another 25,000, if that many, to go back home.

Thus if the Turks, for racial or security reasons, insist on a safe Turkish majority in their area at least 100,000 Greeks are going to remain homeless. There are already disturbing stories of mainland Turks, being brought in to change the population balance in the north of the island, and if the area is not to remain underpopulated some such scheme of colonisation becomes an evil necessity. The analogy of the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey in the early 1920s does not apply because in Cyprus there will be a land frontier, not the sundering safeness of the Aegean sea.

Can some ingenious constitutional formula offer a way out of the dangerous cul de sac of racial separation? Two years ago Greece and Turkey agreed on a Turkish proposal for functional federation with two island-wide administrations but Archbishop Makarios rejected the idea. President Clerides revived this cumbersome but sensible plan at Geneva but now the Turks will have none of it. Perhaps, instead of one single Turkish area, with its distortion of so many people's lives, the main previous Turkish areas could be connected in a large number of sprawling tentacular blobs—10 or even 15 subcantons. The main obstacle is the apparent Turkish ambition to have a large slice of Cyprus in which the 18 percent minority seeks to convert itself into a substantial majority through largescale population transfers. If that in fact is thrust on the Greek Cypriots, then they may feel left with no alternative but guerrilla war.

As one travels through the Turkish-occupied areas of Cyprus, the heavy-handed presence of mainland Turkey is so omnipresent that one gets the impression that these neo-Ottomans are establishing a colony in which the subjects will be not the Greeks but the Turkish Cypriots, who are quite different in temperament and behaviour from their simpler and rougher Anatolian brethren. One small, sinister fact: official signboards which formerly were all trilingual are now in Turkish only. The ghost towns and villages of this area, empty but reasonably intact, are like so many sleeping beauties awaiting the awakening kiss of Prince Charming. Has Mr. Ecevit, that most improbable second Atatürk, poet as well as prime minister of Turkey, cast himself for this romantic part?

BUT WHERE'S THAT GUERRILLA WAR?

The guerrilla campaign against the Turkish army in Cyprus that has been confidently predicted for the past three weeks has not happened yet. No doubt that is partly because there is still a possibility of a negotiated settlement. Turkey

has said the amount of territory its troops hold at present is negotiable, and that it is prepared to withdraw its entire army under certain conditions. A guerrilla campaign would be likely to derail any talks, so the Greek government and the Greek Cypriot leaders are holding the potential fighters in check. But that is not the only reason.

The second—and vastly more important—reason why the guerrillas are not fighting yet is the way Cyprus is split. There is no shortage of potential recruits for a guerrilla war. Many of the remnants of the Greek Cypriot National Guard have filtered back into the Troödos mountains, the traditional stronghold of the island's resistance movements. They have been joined by a mixed bag of Eoka toughs, some Greek army officers and a few wild-eyed young "patriots". They tend to roam around the roads in civilian cars and talk about the struggle to come. But the Troödos is outside the Turkish zone; the Turks have no reason to attack them there, and it would be extremely difficult for Greek Cypriot guerrillas to get behind the Turkish lines in any strength.

In the entire Turkish-held area there remain only about 26,000 Greek Cypriots, most of them carefully controlled by the Turkish army or watched by Turkish Cypriots. So the would-be guerrillas cannot count on much help from them: they do not amount to a Mao-style sea guerrillas can swim in. And there is no question that Turkish retribution against anyone caught aiding a guerrilla attack would be swift, brutal and bloody.

These things alone would not stop some groups of irregulars from launching some attacks somewhere. But the absence of any really good guerrilla countryside behind the Turkish lines—relatively inaccessible terrain that has plenty of vegetation or other concealment—would make it a chancy business indeed. The only reasonable hiding places are in the Kyrenia mountain range. But even here the guerrillas would have to dig holes and camouflage them, as the cover is mostly scrub and would not conceal much from searching helicopters. Turkish tanks and troopcarriers can get into most parts of these hills. And the Greeks would have to carry in all their supplies; there is some water in the area, but little else. All this adds up to a difficult and dangerous time for any guerrillas, and a near impossibility for large groups of them—more than five or six men—to stay behind Turkish lines for more than a few days at a time.

But although even a medium-sized guerrilla campaign does not seem to be on the cards for the Greek Cypriots, they could well carry out ambushes and terrorist attacks. These too would be risky and hard to do, in an area where virtually the entire population actively supports the occupying army. But there is a long tradition of violence and terror in Cyprus. If a reasonably satisfactory settlement is not reached soon, such things will come.

[From *The Economist* (London), July 27, 1974]

THE SEVEN LEAN YEARS ARE OVER

(From our Athens correspondents)

To many people in Athens—who like to look at things that way—the past ten days' events have seemed so methodical that it was as if a giant hand were moving pawns to prearranged positions. The mastermind behind the plan, whether it was that of the gods or of Mr. Kissinger, appeared to be determined, at one blow, to solve the Cyprus problem and bring the Greek dictatorship to a painless end.

In Athens a government of national unity, under that grand old man of Greek politics Mr. Constantine Karamanlis, has taken over from the army after seven years of dictatorship without one nose being bloodied. In Niccisia, Mr. Glafkos Clerides, a moderate and conciliatory leader trusted by the Turks, has taken over from the extremist Mr. Nicos Sampson. And Archbishop Makarios, whose dogmatic attitudes have been partly responsible for blocking an agreement on Cyprus for the past six years, is out of the picture—at any rate for the moment.

It might have worked out differently and disastrously. The escalation of the crisis between Greece and Turkey—first over oil in the Aegean, then over Cyprus—seemed to be leading inexorably to a confrontation. After Turkey invaded Cyprus and Greece mobilised its forces the Greek junta was faced with the choice of either declaring war on Turkey, despite all the risks, or backing down and swallowing its pride. And the preservation of pride has been, on every previous issue, its prime concern. Either alternative damned the military men. So on Tuesday they gave the whole thing up.

In the event, mobilisation turned out to be a blessing. By the time the news of the regime's collapse was known Greece's most active young men had been corralled into the discipline of military service; the danger that uncontrolled enthusiasm—or political orders—might have led to violence had been contained. Mr. Karamanlis's homecoming, after 11 years of self-exile, was cheered by at least half a million people who spent Tuesday night in the streets of Athens to catch a glimpse of him. It was a measure of the relief the Greeks felt in knowing that the country would be led by known and experienced politicians instead of soldiers playing at politics.

On Wednesday afternoon Mr. Karamanlis announced the main members of his government. Mr. George Mavros, the leader of the Centre Union party and a man who suffered at the hands of the military government by being exiled to the prison island of Yiaros, becomes foreign minister, and will lead the Greek delegation at the Geneva conference on Cyprus. The ministry of defense, a key post in view of the ever-present possibility that the army might try to come back into politics, goes to Mr. Evangelos Averoff, who was foreign minister in Mr. Karamanlis's government when the original Cyprus settlement was negotiated in 1959. Although he was twice arrested by the military regime that began in 1967, he is a man who the army knows has no sympathy for the left. Another man who suffered at the hands of the Papadopoulos regime, Mr. John Pasmazoglou, formerly a deputy governor of the Bank of Greece who negotiated Greece's association agreement with the EEC, takes over finance.

The new government now has to pick up the Greek-Turkish mess from where it has been left. Since no member of the new team bears any responsibility for the events of the past two weeks, it can afford to negotiate terms which the pride of the military men and the weakness of their political mouthpieces would have precluded. And yet Mr. Mavros, at a news conference on Wednesday, did not appear to be in a compromising mood over Cyprus.

He accused Turkey of breaking the cease-fire and of trying to improve the Turkish position on the island before the conference opened. This was a cold response to the fulsome message of congratulation and praise the Turkish prime minister had just sent to Mr. Karamanlis. The new Greek foreign minister also made it clear that his government still regarded Archbishop Makarios as the legal president of Cyprus. And he suggested that the Geneva talks should be limited to sorting out the constitutional position on the island, and to security matters. This is not quite how Turkey sees it.

On the home front Mr. Karamanlis acted quickly to disperse any suspicion that he was under orders from Greece's former military leaders. An amnesty was declared for all political prisoners (these include some 200 students arrested in November, and perhaps as many as 45 people detained on Yiaros), and Greek citizenship and Greek passports are to be restored to all those who had been deprived of them. One of the first to return was Mr. Mikis Theodorakis, the composer; another was Mr. Panayiotis Lambrias, a journalist living in exile in London, who is now in charge of Greek press affairs.

Although some sections of the crowd outside the Grande Bretagne hotel, where Mr. Karamanlis talked with his ministers, were calling for vengeance against the military junta, the general mood in the capital is more relaxed. Brigadier Ioannidis, the head of the military police and the military government's strong man since November, is said to be under house arrest in an army officers' rest camp, and ex-President Papadopoulos and his wife are rumoured to have fled the country. But it is most unlikely that Mr. Karamanlis is in any position to take really vigorous action against the men who turned out the politicians in 1967.

For all the support he commands in these euphoric early days, there are a substantial number of people on the left of Greek politics, and some on the right, who will not be content to see a smooth evolution to a democratic constitutional order. They want revolution, or a return to the uniformed order of the past seven years. Mr. Karamanlis's political skill, which is said to have gathered no dust during his years of retreat in Paris, will be taxed to the limit if he is to steer a course successfully between the two extremes. His partners from the Centre Union, and especially those on its left, will come under great pressure from outsiders such as Mr. Andreas Papandreou, who will be seeking to take advantage of every opening to further their own cause.

Mr. Karamanlis, faced by grave foreign and domestic problems, is expected to move quickly to elections for a constituent assembly which would hammer out a new constitution. The same assembly might answer perhaps the most delicate question of all—whether Greece wants its king back.

[From the Economist (London), July 27, 1974]

WE DID IT!

The Turks are satisfied that their military and political objectives in invading Cyprus on July 20th have been achieved. The government claims credit both for getting rid of Mr. Nicos Sampson in Nicosia and for the downfall of the military regime in Athens. The Turkish prime minister, Mr. Ecevit, said in parliament on Tuesday that the military operation not only attained but exceeded its three-day target; military sources say that the outcome was exactly as planned by the general staff.

There were contingency plans should the Greeks join the battle, but the initial three-day plan was to establish a strong military presence in the major Turkish enclave that runs from the Turkish quarter of Nicosia along the central road (which has long been under Turkish Cypriot control) to the outskirts of Kyrenia. Government spokesmen flatly deny foreign suggestions that Greek resistance was stronger than expected and that because of this their forces failed to achieve all their planned targets. The minister of information told your correspondent that, for the first three days, there was no plan to occupy any other area or to take over Nicosia airport. The sole objective, he said, was to put the airport out of action, and this—he claimed—was done.

The first military aim was to establish a bridgehead at Kyrenia which could act as a revolving door for Turks and Turkish Cypriots to enter or leave the island. The second was to establish "a northern triangle" with its apex in Nicosia and its base along the coast. The third was to swell the Turkish military presence and to provide greater safeguards for the Turkish Cypriot community and rectify the balance between Greek and Turkish forces in Cyprus.

The primary political purpose was to make the union of Cyprus with Greece impossible. Once this was attained, Turkey's military presence on the island would strengthen its negotiating position both in demanding the withdrawal of Greek officers and in longer-term talks about the future of Cyprus. Not least, the Turks set out to prove that Turkey means what it says and no longer needs to bow to foreign pressures.

Mr. Ecevit may also have had the motive, which is now being claimed with hindsight, of provoking a change of regime in both Cyprus and Greece. In all the statements that he made after the invasion the prime minister voiced the hope that this action would eventually benefit Greek Cypriots as well as their Turkish compatriots, and that civilian democratic governments would take over in both Cyprus and Greece. With Mr. Clerides in Cyprus and Mr. Karamanlis in Greece, both of whom are regarded in Ankara as moderates, the Turkish government is optimistic about a Cyprus settlement—and hopes that the dispute over Greek and Turkish rights in the Aegean sea can be resolved.

The decision to invade Cyprus was not imposed on the government by Turkey's military men. The government was in favour of invasion from the moment of the coup against Archbishop Makarios on July 15th. The deciding factor in Mr. Ecevit's mind was his conclusion, after his talks with Britain's Mr. Callaghan and America's Mr. Sisco, that nothing else would oblige Greece to withdraw its officers from Cyprus and its support of Mr. Sampson. The government believed that if immediate action were not taken there would be nothing to prevent the union of Cyprus and Greece. And the Turks were encouraged by a pledge from the United States that this time round it would not twist the screws as Lyndon Johnson did in November, 1967, when Turkey was preparing for, but prevented from, an invasion of Cyprus.

Turkey's immediate concern now is to see that the cease-fire is maintained and to keep a sizeable military force in Cyprus until a settlement is reached. Mr. Ecevit is not thinking in terms of partitioning Cyprus, although his coalition partner, the leader of the National Salvation party, seems to be. Mr. Necmettin Erbakan declared on Tuesday that the only permanent solution was partition. The prime minister is resolved that Cyprus should be an independent federal state.

THE BATTLE

Turkey's well-polished and carefully-limited invasion plan was executed not brilliantly but with competence. Its troops, whose fire discipline is probably the best of all the Nato forces, faced the Greek Cypriot National Guard, number-

ing at least 11,000 men with some armour and light artillery. The Guard's officers are mostly regulars seconded from the Greek army, and there is some evidence that reinforcements were flown in from Greece after the coup on July 15th. The Turks had to assault this force without the benefit of surprise. Their only clear-cut monopoly was their air power.

The invasion itself involved one of the most complicated operations a modern army can be asked to perform: a co-ordinated airborne and amphibious assault on an area defended by superior numbers equipped with armour. At dawn on July 20th the Turks began their naval and air bombardment of the invasion beach five miles west of Kyrenia. Parachutists were dropped into the area between Nicosia and the mountains, and troops landed from helicopters in the hills. The beach landing met stiff resistance, including mortar and artillery fire from the hills above the coastline. The Turkish air force provided close support to the invasion force, and to the big Turkish Cypriot enclave between Nicosia and Kyrenia; it also raided Nicosia airfield.

The Turks advanced slowly throughout Saturday. Their main effort was the attempt to consolidate their beachhead at Kyrenia and to get supplies and equipment into the Turkish Cypriot areas along the central road to Nicosia, which had already come under attack from the National Guard. The paratroops dropped near Nicosia stiffened the Turkish Cypriot forces there.

On Sunday the main battle took place. This was in the triangle formed roughly by Five-Mile Beach, Boghaz and Kyrenia. The Turkish drive was against Kyrenia but it was stalled about three miles away by National Guard troops and armour, much of which had come down the eastern road during the night. Turkish Cypriot forces, supported by a few scattered air strikes, attacked Greek positions in the hills south-east of Kyrenia, but were unable to cut the eastern road. To the south Turkish troops from the beach-head managed to link up with the parachutists.

The battle spluttered on most of the night as the Turks steadily put more troops on to the invasion beach and the air force and navy poured fire into National Guard positions. Nicosia airport, despite repeated attacks, remained in Greek hands, and in service. During that night several Greek transport planes were reported to have landed, bringing Greek troops and equipment.

On Monday the cease-fire was arranged for 4 pm. Turkish pressure on Kyrenia was gradually squeezing the Greeks into the town itself, and the Turkish forces continued to reinforce the Turkish Cypriot enclave all the way to Nicosia. Fighting continued in the triangle right up to the cease-fire; Kyrenia itself fell to the Turks shortly after it, and Turkish troops entered Nicosia on Monday night. Later that night Turkish armoured forces near Nicosia airport had a sharp but brief fight with the National Guard. The UN forces on the scene stopped the fighting and took over the airport themselves. This was probably the last battle involving regular Turkish troops.

An early assessment suggests that the Turkish army achieved its objectives, with the possible exception of capturing the airport, but that the performance of its air force operations was spotty. Observers reported bold tactics and individual instances of extremely accurate close-support bombing. But co-ordination was poor. Air-support operations appear to have been sporadic even in the Kyrenia triangle, and far less effective in support of Turkish Cypriots in other parts of the island. The bombing of a hospital for the mentally ill, and of the Salaminia Tower and other hotels on the seafront of Famagusta, was undoubtedly a major error. An even worse mistake was the sinking by Turkish bombs of a Turkish warship off Cyprus's western coast on Sunday. This seems to have been a small ship, perhaps a destroyer. Some 42 survivors were later picked up by an Israeli ship.

Turkish casualties, particularly in the fighting around Kyrenia, were heavy, although not unreasonably so far an amphibious assault. Turkey has given a figure of 57 dead, 184 wounded and 242 missing. This is surely an understatement. Even if all those listed as missing were in fact killed, this hardly accounts for more men than are likely to have been lost on the sunk warship. The Turks made their initial attacks with 7,000 men. Given the scale of the fighting in the Kyrenia triangle and the loss of that ship, and cutting by half the Greek claim of the number of aircraft shot down, it is hard to see how Turkey could have had fewer than 700 casualties.

Greek casualties are even harder to estimate. Not only was the National Guard engaged in more places than the Turkish army—it was fighting, or at least shooting, in Nicosia and several other cities and villages—but there is no reliable figure of how many reinforcements came in from Greece. Since the National Guard eventually lost the major battle—for the Kyrenia triangle—and was pounded heavily by aircraft and naval gunfire, its casualties may well have been between two and three times greater than those of the Turkish forces.

THE BODIES HAVE YET TO BE COUNTED

When the bodies are counted and the dead are identified, it could be found that even more Cypriots were killed by their fellow-countrymen than by the Turkish invaders. And a high proportion of the civilian casualties are likely to be Turkish Cypriots. Ever since inter-communal violence erupted in Cyprus in December, 1963, it has been accepted that one of the strongest deterrents to a Turkish invasion was the fact that a large number of Turkish Cypriots would be at risk the moment a Turkish soldier put foot on Cypriot soil. The Greek Cypriots regarded the Turkish community as their hostage against a Turkish invasion.

The stories now coming out, admittedly many of them from overwrought Turkish Cypriots returning to London after being caught up in the fighting while on holiday, suggest that the hostages did indeed suffer. There have been no reports of Greek Cypriot revenge from Nicosia, where the largest Turkish community on the island lives in comparative safety behind the Green Line that divides the city and is patrolled by the UN, or from the walled city of Famagusta, which is a well-guarded ghetto. But from Larnaca, Limassol, Paphos, Polis and two Turkish villages, Kophinou and Mari, there have been eye-witness accounts of Greek Cypriot groups shooting down Turkish Cypriot civilians and setting fire to their houses.

Many of these stories may be deliberately or accidentally exaggerated. But those that are found to be true will affect the peace talks at Geneva. The Turkish government will come under great pressure to insist on a settlement that is certain to protect the Turkish Cypriot community. Since the community is scattered throughout the island (see the map on page 18) the mechanism for doing this will be a very complicated one.

During the internal violence in Cyprus in 1963-64, and again in 1967, Archbishop Makarios and his government condemned all attacks against Turkish Cypriot civilians and did their best to ensure that the Greek Cypriots—the National Guard and armed civilians—did not take such actions themselves. But after Makarios's overthrow discipline may well have broken down.

One reason for this would be that after the coup the security forces were bitterly divided among themselves into factions for and against Makarios. There have been reports, unconfirmed and probably as embellished as those coming from Turkish Cypriots, that Mr. Sampson's supporters took quick and ruthless measures to suppress the archbishop's most powerful followers. There was certainly fighting and killing within the police force; many people were arrested and some fled for safety to foreign embassies.

The Turkish invaders also have much to answer for. The bombing of five Famagusta hotels just before the ceasefire on Monday, which caused the death of 20 Greek Cypriots and the wounding of 200 others, had no military value. Nor is the announcement that the Turkish army has taken 600 Greek Cypriot prisoners back to Turkey, on the doubtful argument that there is nowhere to hold them in Cyprus, at all helpful. It looks as if Turkey wanted its own hostages to hold against the fate of the Turkish Cypriots who are surrounded by Greek Cypriot forces throughout the island. The fate of the prisoners and hostages should top the Geneva agenda.

THE MEN CLERIDES HAS TO DEAL WITH

Mr. Clerides, the interim president of Cyprus, gave no hint at his press conference on Wednesday about the composition of his new cabinet or about where he stands in relation to the political forces on the island, including the supporters of Archbishop Makarios. He did, however, say that he would not advise the archbishop to return to the island "at the moment". That can be an elastic phrase, and it seems to put Mr. Clerides closer to the Turkish government's point of view about Archbishop Makarios than the Greek foreign minister's (see page 16).

For the time being the ministers chosen by Nicos Sampson (or by the Greek officers behind him) have not been publicly removed from office. Not all of these are the sort of wild men one would associate with Mr. Sampson. A few are reputable lawyers; all share an intense hatred of Archbishop Makarios. Mr. "Dimmy" Dimitriou, the Sampson foreign minister, is a member of a prominent Anglophile family; Mr. Panayotis Dimitriou, Mr. Sampson's minister of education, is the leader of the right wing of the so-called Unified party, which was supposed to be the archbishop's vehicle in parliament.

The Unified party, which is the largest political group in Cyprus, has been presided over, rather than led, by Mr. Clerides himself. At the last election to the House of Representatives in 1970 it won 15 out of the 35 seats. Its policy then was

pro-Makarios; now it will presumably be pro-Clerides, even if Mr. Clerides formally drops his party functions.

The mainspring behind the Unified party since 1970 has been Mr. Tassos Papadopoulos, the deputy speaker of the House of Representatives. He and Mr. Clerides are both friends and rivals. He is deeply disliked by many of the leaders of the Eoka-B guerrillas who support union with Greece because of his close links with the archbishop. He was reported to have been imprisoned immediately after the coup, but to have been released when the Turks invaded.

The Communist party of Cyprus, Akel, has also supported Archbishop Makarios, if only for tactical reasons. Leaders of the party are believed to have sought refuge in east European embassies immediately after the coup: large numbers of rank-and-file communists are likely to have been killed in the fighting on July 15th and 16th or temporarily imprisoned. Mr. Clerides, who was once left-of-centre himself, may release those who are still in jail—unless, despite the changes in Athens, he is still under the thumb of the Greek officers of the National Guard. Akel might then swing behind him, particularly if Makarios stays out of Cyprus.

The one certainty is that the Cypriot communists will support the independence formula, which would keep Cyprus outside the orbit of Nato. Mr. Clerides's long negotiations with the Turkish Cypriot Mr. Denktash, which aimed to preserve that independence, may earn him Akel's support. But he can return their embrace only at the risk of antagonising the still militant right.

RESCUE

On Sunday morning the British forces in Cyprus began their major rescue operation to take stranded foreigners into the safety of the sovereign bases. That day, 40 army vehicles escorted 1,000 private cars with some 4,000 passengers in a convoy from Nicosia to Dhekelia. Other smaller convoys collected families of British servicemen and tourists from Limassol, Famagusta, Larnaca and Troödos. By Wednesday, 27,000 foreign civilian refugees had been accommodated at the bases. About 16,000 of these were dependants of British servicemen who came in by road; nearly 2,000 were tourists who had been collected by helicopter and launch from beaches near Kyrenia on Tuesday and then brought to Akrotiri by ship. Thousands of Cypriots, mainly Turks, were also given sanctuary in the bases.

Several foreign governments helped their own citizens to escape the fighting: Swedish troops from the United Nations force escorted 800 Scandinavian tourists from Famagusta to Dhekelia; American helicopters lifted 350 American tourists from Dhekelia to an aircraft-carrier 20 miles offshore and France sent four planes to evacuate French tourists. Britain offered its relief facilities to all. By the end of this week the RAF will have flown more than 8,000 people, of 40 nationalities, to Britain.

The one British agency which some of its own citizens complained about was British Airways: after the coup its planes were still flying back to Britain with as many as 100 empty seats while anxious tourists waited for transport at Nicosia airport. The explanation: these were charter passengers and therefore ineligible for commercial flights.

[From the Economist (London), July 27, 1974]

BY COURTESY OF THE RAF

Fortunately for those of us trapped and then held hostage in the Ledra Palace hotel the stupidity of the Cypriot National Guard was more than matched by the courage of the UN and British soldiers who rescued us. For 30 hours from dawn on Saturday a National Guard platoon blazed away into the Turkish sector, which starts at the bottom of the hotel's back garden. The guardsmen used every sort of weapon, from shotguns to 3-inch mortars; their shooting was the amateur sort aimed at no particular target. The din alone was enough to give most people the impression that heavy fighting was going on around the hotel—which was not so.

We advised the guardsmen to save their ammunition, imploring them not to draw retaliatory fire on to the hotel where many women and children were trapped. "Go talk to your Turkish friends," they shouted back. Some of us had, and the Turks, showing great restraint, fired back at the Ledra only four times, killing one person and wounding three. On Sunday morning, in warning, they lobbed in two very accurate mortar shells. At this point our protests to the soldier-diplomats of the UN produced an agreement by which the guards at the hotel would fire back

only if fired on. This arrangement held, more or less, until we left in mid-afternoon: without it we could not have been rescued.

All through that Saturday night the Canadian UN unit across the road, which took six casualties, had been trying to enforce a ceasefire. With rising anger and in strange Quebecois accents the sergeant bellowed reprovingly at both front lines through a bull-horn. By mid-morning on Sunday we discovered that we had become political hostages as well as a human firescreen. The Guard commander shouted instructions that nobody was to leave the hotel because "we have something cooking for tonight". More guards appeared, more ammunition and, for the first time, bazookas were stacked in the lobby in preparation for a night attack, all behind the cover we provided. There were some exceptions to the ban on leaving; Americans and Israelis were allowed to go.

The worst moments came after the rescuing convoy, British vehicles under the UN flag, arrived in the forecourt. Then, at the last minute, we were refused permission to board because the National Guard would not allow people of several nationalities to leave until their embassies had received permission from the Cyprus foreign ministry. This was apparently an attempt to enforce recognition of the Sampson regime—and to compel those embassies which had given asylum to its opponents to hand them over. The UN, in the person of a young British lieutenant, said firmly that it either evacuated all civilians or none. The ensuing deadlock was eventually resolved when the British high commissioner made it his personal responsibility that the offending nationals should leave the hotel. Stout fellow. As the convoy pulled away the National Guard fired their last bullets over our heads. Judging by the "Ledra battle", the new Cyprus government is going to have problems in disbanding and disintoxicating these misled youngsters after their brief hours of swaggering glory.

The disembarking area on the sports fields of the Dhekelia base looked like a race meeting; lines of brightly-coloured cars and groups of women in summery dresses sitting on the grass. It was, in fact, a gathering of refugees. The hospitality was cheerful and thoughtful. We were documented, allotted rooms, given camp beds and asked to pay the modest sum of 80p for board and lodging. Dinner was standard British army corned beef stew, but after 30 hours without food it was glorious. Registration began immediately for the onward flight to Britain because each wave had to move on to make way for the next, particularly since the base was very short of water.

The Hercules C-130 is not meant to be a comfortable plane and is a very noisy one. But on the short ferry flight to the RAF base at Akrotiri the children became the special care of the cabin crew, who fed them chocolates and, in mid-flight, produced pieces of water melon, carefully wrapped in cellophane. Again at Akrotiri we were met with thoughtful efficiency. But there was a surprising setback when, at the last check-through desk, Scandinavians, Arabs, Yugoslavs and Spaniards were told that they could not leave Cyprus without the same special permission as had been demanded the day before.

When we eventually arrived at Lyneham RAF base in Britain, it took no more than half an hour to process our batch of about 80 people. We were offered food and clothing, overnight accommodation, medical care, financial assistance and travel guidance; even those who had lost their passports were admitted.

There were not many countries, I said to an American colleague, that could mount such a rescue operation. Still fewer, he replied, who would have bothered to take the trouble and responsibility. And he was right. The United States took off its own citizens plus the Canadians. The Russians and French looked after their own. Britain took everyone else. My anti-colonialist colleagues confessed that they would never again be able to look coldly at a Union Jack. Military bases in foreign countries often prove unnecessary, but some bases are clearly less base than others.

[From Washington Post, Aug. 19, 1974]

TURKS GRIP PENINSULA

(By John Saar, Washington Post Staff Writer)

AYIOS THEODHOROS, Cyprus, Aug. 18—*Turkish troops occupying the isolated Cyprus panhandle are looting homes and stores and intimidating Greek Cypriot villagers.*

Extending 50 miles into the Mediterranean, the narrow peninsula is a fertile grain-growing region. Greek cypriot officials allege that the Turks have forced

most Greeks to leave their homes and farms and are deliberately making life difficult for those who stayed.

In an area where Greek Cypriots normally outnumber 18,000 to 6,000, most of the Greek villages are deserted except for Turkish sentries. Doors to most of the Greek stores and homes are broken open and drawers and closets have been ransacked. A Turkish army officer said this resulted from a military search for fugitive members of the Cypriot National Guard.

The few Greek-Cypriots who could be found in a visit to the area were plainly nervous about speaking in the presence of an armed Turkish information officer. Nevertheless, they complained they were short of food and said their sheep and cattle were dying of thirst and hunger because of Turkish rules restricting residents to their homes and villages.

On the main street of Trikomo, an all-Greek village of more than 2,000 people in normal times, 8 to 10 Greek men, young and old, were walking in a tight group under the guard of an impassive Turkish soldier. They seemed almost joyful to see the Turkish information officer and eagerly extended slips of paper which they said the local Turkish command issued to permit them to leave their homes to buy food. The officer ordered the soldier to back off, but when the group moved on again the soldier was again striding purposefully behind them.

(One of the men, a 70-year-old retired chef, said: "We have been given passes to leave our houses to get bread but always there are these soldiers pointing their guns at us and I thought they were going to shoot us.")

Sweat broke on the man's brow as he made his complaint in the presence of a Turkish officer.

"They came in our houses searching and they broke everything," he said. "The people who have gone, their houses have been broken into." Then he looked directly at the officer and said, "I am telling it because it is the truth."

The looting and intimidation of the Greeks occurred in circumstances of such tight military discipline that they could not be dismissed as the acts of unruly individuals. Turkish soldiers were driving civilian cars and motorcycles and getting gas at unattended filling stations. One soldier obstructed traffic while he dragged a rebellious cow through a narrow village street with two calves skittering ahead. Other Turks loaded sacks of corn from a Greek Cypriot granary into a truck. Two truckloads of commandos paused beside a drugstore long enough for a few of the men to force their way in and return with sodas and ballpoint pens.

A truck which headed west through Ayios Theodhohos village in midafternoon was loaded with cooking stoves.

Civilian Turkish Cypriots emerged from a Greek Cypriot house with armfuls of clothing while jeeploads of Turks passing by appeared not to notice. It was as though the Greeks had abruptly disappeared, leaving the land to the Turks and their Cypriot-born brothers.

Only three Greeks could be found in Ayios Theodhoros, sleepy village normally populated by 805 Greeks and about 20 Turks. One was an old man of 83 who said his mind wasn't what it used to be and raised his hand in a feeble reflexive salute each time a Turkish patrol went by.

Another old man and his wife said the Turkish soldiers told them, "If you stay here we won't do you any harm and we will give you food." But it was 4:30 p.m. and they said they had been given nothing to eat since the previous day, and all the village stores were closed.

In the nearby village of Patriki, the headman said that while 400 or so villagers had fled, 200 remained in their homes without interference from the Turks. He kept saying "everybody's happy," but the faces of the other villagers indicated otherwise. They were relieved to see a non-Turkish foreigner and said so.

The villagers were worried about their own food supply, but more so about their precious livestock. Two oxen and two sheep died from lack of water yesterday, the headman said. The villagers are keeping the animals close to their homes for safety.

When told of the situation in the panhandle, a Greek Cypriot spokesman for the Cypriot government commented: "I think it is intentional. The Turkish government wants the Greeks to flee so Turks living in other areas of the island can be transferred up here to take the land."

[From the Times (London), Aug. 19, 1974]

NEARLY HALF THE GREEK POPULATION OF CYPRUS ARE REFUGEES

(From Paul Martin, Nicosia, Aug. 18, 1974)

The repercussions of the Turkish occupation of Greek Cypriot territory are only beginning to be felt. The refugee problem is enormous. Between a third and a half of the island's Greek Cypriot majority have been uprooted from their homes in the path of the occupiers and put to flight.

In the British base area of Dhekelia alone there are 60,000 refugees from Famagusta and towns around Larnaca. By their thousands they are camped along the main road through the base and in the Athna forest. Food is desperately short. There is no sanitation and no medical facilities.

They have left behind all their belongings. They fled with a few bare essentials. Only the lucky few were able to bring mattresses and bedding strapped to the roofs of their cars.

Most of the 24,000 Greek Cypriot inhabitants of Famagusta poured out of the port town when the Turkish jets struck in the heart of the city. Cars, sometimes packed with two families, poured out of the city for the Dhekelia base. Fruit lorries carried women and children in their dozens, bewildered and pathetic looking.

The southern towns of Limassol and Larnaca were already full of refugees from the first Turkish assault, more than 40,000 from the Kyrenia range and surrounding areas. Others headed for the mountains to the safety of Troodos and Platres. Now the latest Turkish push bringing the tanks to the Nicosia-Larnaca road has caused a new exodus from Nicosia and Larnaca.

Already there are the warning signs of a serious food problem throughout the country. With as many as 60,000 Greek Cypriot men called to arms, battling along the receding defence lines, farms have been left untended, meat and vegetable markets have come to a virtual stand still and distribution is in chaos. If the Turks close the ring of armour around Nicosia, the city will be starved into submission.

No attempt has been made to count the dead and wounded. But every Greek Cypriot one talks to has lost a father, brother, son or some relation in the month of war. The list of missing is in the thousands. The Turks have done nothing to relieve Greek Cypriot anguish. They have so far withheld lists of Greek Cypriot men captured in the fighting or rounded up from villages that fell into their hands.

That is the human side of the Greek tragedy. The economic one is no less black. The invasion has left them in economic ruin. The creation of the Attila Line has robbed the Greek Cypriots of most of the sources of their wealth. Indeed, it has been estimated that the Turks have grabbed as much as four-fifths of the island's wealth.

Tourism, which accounted for 30 per cent of foreign exchange earnings, was snatched by the Turks when they grabbed Kyrenia and Famagusta, the two touristic jewels. They also control the biggest port, Famagusta. Likewise with the grain producing area in the Mesaoria plain and the citrus growing centre at Morphou. The copper mines in the west are also now in Turkish hands.

More than 120 Greek Cypriot villages are now at the mercy of the Turks. The areas they seized north of the Attila Line between Morphou and Famagusta were almost entirely Greek, with a sprinkling of small Turkish Cypriot villages.

The problem of resettlement is enormous. That of creating jobs in the less privileged two-thirds of the island left in Greek hands is even greater.

On the Turkish side of the island partition is now being openly discussed. The Turks in Ankara and their clients in Nicosia appear to be merely paying lip service to the idea of a federated independent state. Turkish Cypriot leaders make it clear that the area taken by force of arms by the Turkish Army will remain in their hands.

Nicosia, Aug. 18.—Six young Greek Cypriot girls claimed on television here tonight that they were raped by Turkish soldiers every day for a week before being freed yesterday.

The Cyprus Government arranged the television interviews, but no medical evidence was offered.

The girls said they had been among 287 men, women and children held in a mud-brick sheep pen four miles north-east of Nicosia since the Turkish invasion of the island on July 28.

A statement by the British High Commission at the base of Dhekelia said today that a middle-aged British woman had complained that she was raped at the town of Bogaz in northeast Cyprus. The High Commission said it was taking the matter up with the officer commanding Turkish troops in the Famagusta area, and with Turkish authorities in Ankara.—Reuter.

[Washington Star-News, September 12, 1974]

MORE CYPRUS TALKS—REFUGEE ACCORD LACKS SPECIFICS

(By Andrew Borowiec, Star-News Special Correspondent)

Nicosia.—On paper, the most recent agreement between Cyprus' Greek and Turkish communities looks good and optimists feel that it will enhance further dialogue on the island's future.

Yet the propaganda war between the two camps continues with the same intensity and rumors persist that the Turks plan a military thrust to reach the Turkish Cypriot enclaves in the southern portion of the divided country.

Greek Cypriot leader Glafcos Clerides and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denkash met yesterday to implement last week's decision to free the young, the old, the infirm and sick now held behind the barbed wires of Cyprus.

The two officials have also decided to free students and allow teachers to return to their jobs.

Dates and more concrete details are expected to be announced tomorrow when the two men meet again. The United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross participate in these negotiations. The most important thing, however, is that Denkash and Clerides have continued private discussions on "humanitarian questions."

Although the communiques on the refugees can be considered encouraging, few concrete acts could be cited to boost the island's morale.

The refugees are receiving new tents and blankets—an ominous spectacle reminiscent of other mass movements in the turbulent history of this country. Ships are unloading foodstocks in the parts of Limassol and Larnaca. The main highway south of Nicosia is jammed by trucks carrying supplies to some 190,000 homeless Greek Cypriots.

The Turkish occupied sector is still a wasteland, with the exception of the main Turkish enclave north of Nicosia and the former resort town of Kyrenia which was the center of the July 20th Turkish invasion.

Some cafes have reopened in Kyrenia—called by the Turks Girne—and floral wreaths have been heaped around the newly unveiled statue of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, founder and hero of modern Turkey.

The main street is still barred to civilians and all Greeks are incarcerated in the waterfront Dome Hotel. Teams of Turkish soldiers have swept the debris and garbage trucks have gone to work. The post office has reopened and several foreign residents have returned to their looted homes.

West of Kyrenia, along the coastal road to Morphou, all is silence and devastation. Only an occasional rumble of heavy Turkish army vehicles breaks the oppressive silence.

Travelling some 50 miles southwest through the Turkish sector, I saw abandoned villages where hungry donkeys brayed piteously. Here and there rabbits and chickens darted across the empty road.

In Morphou itself, once a town of 8,000, only steelhelmeted Turkish soldiers patrolled the deserted streets. The town's 163 Turks have remained in their homes and some 100 Greeks who have not fled are kept under guard.

The policy of the Turkish military authorities toward the Greek Cypriots is simple: As long as the Greek Cypriot leadership continues to talk of a possible guerrilla war, the Greeks will not be allowed to return to their homes. The Turks feel that without support of a friendly population, no guerrillas could operate in their territory.

Thus it would appear that Greek threats are self-defeating. Meanwhile the economy of the richest part of the island continues to stagnate, despite some rather pathetic Turkish appeals to foreign businessmen for "continued confidence and investments."

New York Times, Oct. 2, 1974

MAKARIOS, AT U.N., REJECTS A FEDERATION FOR CYPRUS

(By Paul Hofmann, Special to The New York Times)

United Nations, N.Y., Oct. 1—Archbishop Makarios, the exiled President of Cyprus, in an address to the United Nations General Assembly today, sternly denounced Turkey as an "aggressor," and rejected geographical federation as a means for bringing peace to the island.

The Archbishop declared that Turkey had made clear at the Geneva conference on Cyprus in August that she wanted a federation of geographically distinct ethnic Greek and Turkish areas on Cyprus. Such a separation would be "not only artificial but also inhuman," the Archbishop said, because it would mean large-scale resettlement of inhabitants.

KISSINGER SEES PROGRESS

The Archbishop's speech followed suggestions by Secretary of State Kissinger that progress was being made in defining the positions of Greece and Turkey toward the Cyprus problem.

Mr. Kissinger is conducting talks with the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers on the issue.

An American official said he did not know whether the Secretary of State was planning to meet with Archbishop Makarios.

In his appearance at the United Nations, the Archbishop, speaking unemotionally in English, likened the methods employed by Turkey in her intervention on Cyprus to those of Attila and Hitler.

Archbishop Makarios has been living abroad since a coup last July 15 forced him to flee Cyprus. He has been touring countries around the Mediterranean and elsewhere to seek support.

The United Nations recognizes Archbishop Makarios as head of state of a member nation.

This afternoon, delegates rose when the Cypriote leader was escorted into the Assembly Hall according to the ceremony for visits by heads of state and government.

Many delegates, including those from Communist and African countries applauded. Arab delegates seemed generally cool. The seats reserved for the Turkish delegation were empty.

The Archbishop recalled in his address that he had appeared before the United Nations Security Council to protest the coup in Cyprus.

The coup, he said, was instigated "by the military junta then ruling Greece." He asserted that the plotters had been seeking his death.

The Archbishop welcomed the collapse of the military regime in Athens. This allowed Greece, he said, to find again "its way to democracy and national dignity."

The evil of the coup in Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios declared, was followed by another evil when Turkey seized the opportunity to intervene militarily.

The treaty that created Cyprus as an independent state in 1960, under the guarantee of Britain, Greece and Turkey, did not give Turkey the right to intervene, the Archbishop declared. He added that Turkey "has embarked upon destroying what she herself has guaranteed"—the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus.

Charging that the Turkish forces on Cyprus had committed atrocities, the Archbishop asserted that "the victims of this aggression were in proportionate terms greater than the victims of many years in Vietnam."

SEES RISK OF ANNEXATION

A geographic federation would be tantamount to partition of Cyprus, the Archbishop said. He added that this would lead to annexation of one part of the island by Turkey and of the other by Greece.

"This will be the end of Cyprus as an independent state," he said.

"Such a development may perhaps be favored by certain powers for their own interests."

The Archbishop did not specify which countries he had in mind, but he said that Cyprus's strategic position had in the past often caused the island to fall victim to "foreign interests."

In what sounded like an allusion to secret contracts, the Archbishop remarked that "some who appear as realists" were counseling negotiation on the basis of geographic federation, suggesting that Turkey might be flexible.

There has been some talk, he said, that Turkey may be amenable to reducing the area occupied by her forces from, at present, 40 percent of the island, to "something below 30 percent."

The Archbishop said he was opposed to such proposals, even if the alternative was to be Turkish occupation of all the island.

[Christian Science Monitor, Thursday, September 12, 1974]

TURKEY PROMOTES CYPRUS POLICY

(By Sam Cohen Special to The Christian Science Monitor)

Istanbul Turkey has launched a big diplomatic offensive to win support for its Cyprus policy and legalize its military gains on the island.

Turkish officials are confident that the current worldwide campaign to win friends and influence people will pay off. They say that already Turkey's Cyprus policy is understood and supported in many parts of the world, and predict a Greek defeat at the United Nations if Greece asks the General Assembly to condemn Turkey and demands Turkey's withdrawal from the Mediterranean island.

"Our position in the international diplomatic arena is as strong as our position in Cyprus itself," a member of the government said. "Greece's hope after the military operations that Turkey would lose the diplomatic battle has not materialized."

Turkish officials point out that Turkey's foreign relations have not suffered from the Cyprus situation, whereas Greece's decision to withdraw its forces from NATO have weakened its ties with the West, and particularly with the United States, without providing any significant benefit from other sources, such as the Soviet bloc.

SUPPORT ANTICIPATED

The Turks now seem assured of wide support from many governments and a large portion of world public opinion on a basic point in their Cyprus policy: the principle of setting up a federal system in Cyprus, with separate Turkish and Greek autonomous administrations in geographically divided regions.

Turkish diplomats, politicians, officials, intellectuals, businessmen, labor and youth leaders have been mobilized to propagate this view throughout the world. Several officials and delegations are now touring various countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa, and the feeling here is that the Turkish view, particularly concerning the readiness to negotiate a peaceful solution on the basis of an independent, federal Cyprus state, with Greece and Britain and the two Cypriot communities, is receiving good attention and sympathy.

"The Greeks will finally understand that resorting to international forums will not solve the problem, and sooner or later they will have to return to the conference table," the Turks say.

But Turkish Premier Bulent Ecevit has warned that undue delay in taking action for a solution might make "double enosis" inevitable. This would mean the partition of the island into two regions, with each region uniting with the "motherland"—Greece and Turkey—thus ending the island's independence. This is not a solution favored by Turkey, but Ankara might eventually accept it if it sees no other solution in sight.

NEW CONFERENCE URGED

The Turks hope that international efforts will lead to a new conference in the near future. However there is concern in foreign diplomatic circles here that the current diplomatic efforts deployed particularly by the U.S. and Britain might be wrecked by new tension on the island as a result of the disclosure of massacres and atrocities, which could lead to new military action by Turkey.

Mr. Ecevit has repeatedly stated that Turkey's aim is not to conquer the island, not to occupy it, but he has also warned that if the Turkish Cypriots' security is threatened, the government will not hesitate to take "the necessary effective measures." These "measures" would include a "limited" military action in areas

outside Turkish control, without holding them under Turkish occupation, or air attacks against given targets, according to military sources here.

Such new action might turn friendly nations and world public opinion against Turkey, and Turkish leaders seem aware of this. Mr. Ecevit is known to want to maintain a friendly dialogue with the U.S. in particular and with other Western and nonaligned countries in general. Indeed U.S.-Turkish relations, strained over the Turkish decision to lift the ban on cultivation of the opium poppy, have considerably improved in recent weeks.

Turkish public opinion seems satisfied with the U.S. stand on Cyprus. Even the leftists are talking about the existence of "two kinds of Americans—the ugly and the handsome Americans"—and list Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger at the head of the latter.

Mr. Ecevit said that if Greece's withdrawal from NATO's military setup would cause a void in the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey could play a larger part to fill it. This would not necessarily mean to grant the U.S. or NATO new military bases but to give the Turkish armed forces a greater role in the defense of this region, in close cooperation with other NATO forces.

Turkish relations with the Soviet Union do not appear to have suffered as a result of the crisis, despite Moscow's limited overtures to Athens. The Turkish Government has sought to reassure Moscow that the Turkish military action is not intended to end Cyprus's independence—which seems to be the Soviets' main concern. The Soviet note suggesting an international conference was handled with utmost care, and the Turkish reply, although it rejected the proposal, was written in a friendly style.

[From Baltimore Sun, Aug. 17, 1974]

2-WAY AUTONOMY SOUGHT ON CYPRUS

Ankara (AP)—Premier Bulent Ecevit of Turkey said yesterday that Turkey's victories on Cyprus "laid the foundation for a federated Cyprus state with two separate autonomous regions, one for the Greek Cypriot majority and one for the Turkish minority."

Mr. Ecevit indicated at a news conference that Turkey would be inflexible in its demand for Turkish autonomy in at least one-third of the island, a demand supported by the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash.

Mr. Ecevit said he would be willing to return to the Cyprus peace talks at Geneva, which broke down Tuesday night, "as soon as possible." He also said he would be willing to meet with the Greek prime minister, Constantine G. Caramanlis, at a place and time chosen by the Greek leader.

"GIVEN UP OUR EMPIRE"

When asked whether Turkey would be willing to give up any of the land captured by Turkish troops on the island, Mr. Ecevit answered: "This can be discussed later. I cannot say anything now."

"We do not have irredentist ambitions," the premier said. "We could have taken the whole island. But we have given up our empire for good."

He was referring to the Ottoman Empire which collapsed after World War I. It held Cyprus from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Century.

But Mr. Ecevit said Turkey would not give up the eastern port of Famagusta, where Turks have been living in the enclosed old city ever since the island became a British crown colony in 1925.

"We had no outlet to the sea before. We had no port facilities," he said.

The inaccessibility to ports has been the Turkish minority's most persistent complaint. Turkish troops now also control the small port of Kyrenia on the northern coast.

Mr. Denktash said possibly as many as a fourth of Cyprus's 120,000 Turkish residents are outside the zone now controlled by Turkish troops. There are 520,000 Greek Cypriots on the island.

"NOW FEEL SECURE"

But Mr. Ecevit said Turkey was not contemplating a third military advance to the south.

"Why should we resort to force? We now feel secure in Cyprus," he said.

He ruled out a new outbreak of fighting even if possible third-round negotiations in Geneva failed to produce results.

Mr. Ecevit did not elaborate on a federal state. But he said Turkey did not intend to enforce a population displacement by moving thousands of Turkish Cypriots north and Greek Cypriots south.

"The Greeks can stay in Turkish areas and the Turks in Greek areas, he said. "One will be the guarantee of the other."

But Mr. Denktash said of Turks living in the south that they "have no choice but to move."

[From the Manchester Guardian Weekly, Sept. 14, 1974]

TURKS DEFIED RED CROSS

(By Martin Walker)

What is potentially the most important single document concerning the bloody and tragic events in Cyprus is now languishing, unpublished, in the plush headquarters of the International Red Cross in Geneva.

According to sources within the IRC, the Turkish Government officially wrote to the Red Cross, renouncing the Geneva Conventions on the rules of war shortly before the great attack on Famagusta on August 15. The Turkish Government stated explicitly that in its view, the Geneva Conventions did not apply to the actions and behaviour of its troops in the island.

The Greek Information Ministry, to which this story has also been leaked via Geneva, is now preparing a major propaganda campaign on this issue. Its theme will be that the Turkish Government was effectively giving its troops a free hand in their conduct towards civilians on the island, and by implication, that this Turkish action was responsible for many of the atrocities and much of the misery that have ravaged the miserable isle.

On July 21, the day after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the International Red Cross wrote to the Turkish Government reminding the Turks that they were signatories to the Geneva Conventions, and that, moreover, standing committees of the IRC had been at work extending and elaborating the Protocols (in particular, the Protocols under Article 3 of the Convention, which applies primarily to the behaviour of armed forces towards civilians). These extended Protocols, the IRC wrote, were to be noted and applied by Turkish forces.

The Turkish reply to the IRC said that the Turks did not recognise that the Geneva Conventions applied to Cyprus. In Turkey's view the military operations on Cyprus were an internal affair, and essentially a peace-keeping operation. The writ of Geneva did not run. Forty per cent of the population of Cyprus, who are now refugees, may choose to differ from this ingenious line.

The IRC has traditionally not released correspondence of this kind, and has only released reports of its own investigations in special circumstances. It holds that the credibility and good standing of the IRC depends upon its maintaining a discreet and official relationship with all governments, in which the findings and views of the IRC are made known on a confidential basis.

The best known case of the IRC going public was when the Greek Government of the Colonels misleadingly edited an IRC report on conditions in Greek prisons. The IRC then published its damning report in full, to the Colonels' embarrassment. This precedent is now being cited by Greek diplomats as part of their attempt to persuade the IRC to release the Turkish letter.

[From the Baltimore Sun, Aug. 18, 1974]

WAR SCARS CYPRIOT ECONOMY

Nicosia, Cyprus—"Everything is in an absolute shambles," Stellies Garanis, chairman of the Cyprus Employers Federation, said.

He was describing the state of the island's economy and the effect on the life of this eastern Mediterranean island, a tourist paradise with a high standard of living only five weeks ago.

"We haven't even got a rough estimate of the total damage yet, but it must be in the hundreds of millions of dollars," said the minister of finance, Caundreas Patsalides.

"We are faced with an immense task of reconstruction that is likely to take years to accomplish," he added. "But first of all we have the most urgent basically humanitarian problem of taking care of tens of thousands of refugees—more than a fifth of the total population. We have tried to feed them, house them, provide jobs for them, restore their dignity."

Nor could officials provide an estimate of the casualties since the Turkish Army invaded the island July 20.

"Hundreds, thousands who knows?" asked a health ministry official. "We haven't had time to count them. The fighting only ended yesterday. Hundreds of people are missing, and we don't know what is going on in the area occupied by the Turks."

The urgency of the task facing the government was underlined yesterday by the first decision of the government of President Glafcos Clerides after the cease-fire went into effect.

A special broadcast on Cyprus radio decreed that henceforth everyone on the island—civil servants, shopkeepers and workers—must work seven full days a week.

Estimates of losses and reconstruction needs are further complicated by the uncertainties of the political situation in the aftermath of the war.

The Turkish Army controls 34 percent of the 3,752 square mile island, but the Turkish area incorporates installation and resources amounting to four-fifths of the economy, according to George Eliadis, director general of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

Most of the island's wheat granary in the Mesaoria plain and the orchards and citrus plantations around Morphou—representing a Greek Cypriot investment of millions of dollars whose export in money terms amounts to one-fifth of the island—are all within the Turkish occupied area.

Much of the southern part of the island, the part left to the Greeks, used to be lush mountainpine forests. But even the potential exploitation of this timber wealth has been wrecked by the war. As much as 90 percent of the forests, with an estimated value of \$600 million, was burned to cinders in the Turkish bombing raids, the director of the Cyprus Forestry Department said.

Two-thirds of the island's hotels—overwhelmingly Greek-owned and most of them luxury buildings erected in the economic boom of the past five years—also lie in the Turkish belt.

The Turkish government already has stated that the Greek Cypriots who fled the occupied area would be welcome to return to their homes and businesses.

But many Greeks are unwilling, through fear or political considerations, to live under a Turkish administration.

Many of the Turks in the Greek part of the island would like to move to the far more prosperous sector overrun by the invasion forces.

The desire of the Turkish community in the south to move north is evident at Larnaca, a quietly old-fashioned seaport south of Nicosia. Early last week Greek national guardsmen pulled out of the Turkish part of Larnaca, leaving the United Nations peace-keeping force in control.

Reporters who visited the Turkish quarter were told emphatically by Turkish political leaders that they wanted to move out lock, stock and barrel.

"We are happy to see the Greeks leave, but we are still not secure. We never will be until we are protected by the Turkish Army," Dr. Halouk Aini, a Turkish member of the Cyprus Parliament, said.

[From the Baltimore Sun, Sept. 15, 1974]

CYPRUS LOSING \$5.2 MILLION A DAY

(By G. Jefferson Price III)

Nicosia, Cyprus.—These are depressing and frustrating days for Andreas Patsalides, the Greek Cypriot finance minister who has been among the leading architects of the economic boom this island was enjoying until two months ago.

Each day the Harvard-educated economist mulls over the wounds to the island's economy, not certain how widespread the damage has been, but calculating that there will continue to be a loss of about \$5.2 million a day, and anticipating that in the event of a political settlement it will take a lot of foreign aid to bring the once-independent economy back to life.

Not far from Mr. Patsalides's office, across the "Green Line" that separates the Greek and Turkish communities, there has been a steady flow of visitors from Ankara, high-ranking Turkish officials surveying the territory they have taken since invading the island July 20, and planning to put industry and agriculture back into operation.

The Greek Cypriots scoff at the idea of the Turks being able to establish a viable economy on their part of the island without help from the Greek community.

The Turks insist they can go it alone with the help of mainland Turkey and are already in the process of planning for factories, businesses and hotels and to cultivate the farmlands now under their control.

The Turks are now in control of 40 per cent of the island, but that area is estimated to produce between 75 and 80 per cent of the island's economic output. With the July invasion and the additional gains of the push in August, the Turks now control two ports: Famagusta and Kyrenia; practically all of the island's tourist industry; the areas where citrus is grown; and the plains where the island's grain crops grow, and much of the livestock is raised.

The Greeks are left with the port of Larnaca, Limassol, with the island's major oil refinery, the island's electric power plant, the fruit crops of the south, and the vineyards of the south. The Greeks also still control all of modern Nicosia, the island's capital.

Simple logic would seem to point out that one side cannot survive without the other, unless the Turks expect to import from the mainland the very goods and services that are available to them on the island itself, under Greek control. Thus economists on both sides agree that any political settlement for the island would do well to facilitate trade between the two sides.

But as each day passes without a settlement, the economy deteriorates and the prospect of reviving it to its pre-war status seems more remote.

The immediate physical damage of the war, by some estimates, would have been enough to set back the economy 10 years even if both sides already were co-operating in trying to put it back together.

Mr. Patsalides contends that the citrus crop, worth millions of dollars in exports, may have been totally lost because the war disrupted the irrigation process in the areas where the citrus is grown. He also says that at the time the war broke out there were vast quantities of fruit waiting to be shipped from Famagusta, another source of export income possibly lost.

About 100 square miles of pine forests were destroyed by fires during the battles here, and it would take "up to 50 years to restore the forests to their pre-invasion position." Also under Turkish control is land where about \$20 million worth of livestock grazed, and their fate is uncertain.

Meanwhile the tourist hotels in Kyrenia and Famagusta are empty, and both towns are under martial law. Tourism, a boon to the island's economy in the last two years of drought, is out of business for the time being and it may be a long time before any tourist wants to return, no matter which side is running the hotels.

Economists here were predicting a growth rate of 6 to 7 per cent in the island's gross national product this year over last year's level of about \$910 million, but those figures have been thrown out the window now.

So has the expectation that the average per capita income would reach more than \$2,000 a year. Under the present circumstances with the Turks, who make up about 20 per cent of the population, controlling approximately 75 per cent of the island's productivity, the rate of unemployment and underemployment, usually between 1 and 2 per cent, may go as high as 10 per cent.

[From the Baltimore Sun, Sept. 15, 1974]

TURKISH JETS SWEEP LOW AT CYPRUS

Nicosia, Cyprus (AP)—Two Turkish warplanes flew over the Greek Cypriot zone of Cyprus yesterday for the first time since the August 16 cease-fire, prompting a government protest to the United Nations peace force.

The Phantom jets skimmed over the capital and the Greek Cypriot city of Larnaca on the east coast. Independent military sources said the planes were unarmed.

President Glafcos Clerides protested to the U.N. force that the flights were violations of the island's airspace. The Turkish command said the planes were "reconnoitering Turkish positions."

International efforts were reported on several fronts to end the crisis that followed the July 15 ouster by Greek-officered national guardsmen of the Cyprus president, Archbishop Makarios.

Leonid Ilichev, deputy foreign minister of the Soviet Union, arrived in Athens after talks in Ankara with Turkish leaders. Mr. Ilichev made no statement at the Greek airport. He heads for Nicosia tomorrow.

In London, the *Sunday Times* reported that President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan is leading secret international efforts to bring Greece and Turkey into direct negotiations on the future of Cyprus.

The *Times* said high-level exchanges already were under way with the approval of Britain and the United States.

Greek Cypriot residents of Nicosia, nervous over persistent rumors about a renewed Turkish offensive, again packed their belongings and headed south yesterday as the Turkish jets flew over. Such panic flights have occurred frequently since the Turks invaded Cyprus in July.

A government statement Friday saying, "It is generally calm all over the island—the public is urged to remain calm," appeared to add to the tension instead of relieving it.

"It has been quiet for the past 24 hours, with no unusual military movements reported," said the U.N. spokesman, but he added that "for days, both sides have been strengthening their positions."

Greek Cypriots have been leaving Cyprus by the hundreds since the fighting ended a month ago, fearful that hostilities might resume. Many lost their homes or jobs when the Turkish invasion force captured 41 percent of the island.

To slow the exodus, the Clerides government has restricted exit permits. An announcement said permits would be given only to children and citizens over 50, travelers needing medical care, university students, businessmen promoting the economy, and a few other categories.

With Nicosia airport damaged by bombs and closed for the last two months, travelers have been packing 400 to 800 at a time aboard ships leaving Limassol for Greece, and some sailed to Lebanon.

The Red Cross reported that recent prisoner lists showed 5,693 POW's, detainees and hostages still held on both sides of the cease-fire line, 3,366 of them Turkish Cypriots and 2,327 Greek Cypriots.

The two sides are to start exchanging sick and wounded prisoners tomorrow. President Clerides and Turkish Cypriot Vice President Rauf Denktash had not yet accepted a Red Cross plan for exchanging all prisoners, detainees and hostages, the Red Cross official said.

[From the Manchester Guardian Weekly, Aug. 31, 1974]

CLERIDES—THE TIGHTROPE ACT

(By Eric Silver)

Glafkos Clerides is playing it long, slowly consolidating his authority over the Greek Cypriot community, and defusing the opposition. Last week's assassination of the American Ambassador in Nicosia pointed to the limits of Clerides's control. It did not prove him to be a man of straw. Clerides has never been anyone's stooge.

There is no evidence that he is now. He assumed office, after the Turkish invasion, with the advantage of legitimacy. Under the 1960 Constitution, Cyprus had a Greek President and a Turkish Vice-President. It specified, however, that if the President was absent, the Vice-President did not step into his shoes. That would have given too much to the Turkish minority.

Instead the (Greek) President of the House of Representatives was to fulfill the duties of President. The Constitution did not call him acting President, but merely said that he should do the job. Clerides was President of the House and duly took over.

The transition from Nicos Sampson to Glafkos Clerides enabled foreign Governments to treat with a Greek Cypriot leader other than the exiled Makarios. This was critical in the aftermath of defeat when the community had little but international opinion to fall back on.

Sampson said in his resignation speech that the situation required a different kind of leader and that Clerides had the appropriate skills. Clerides's task since then—one month and one more Turkish offensive later—has been to convince the Greek Cypriots that Sampson was right, that they must trust him and follow him. They could not be expected to do so by instinct alone.

Although Clerides was the leader of the biggest single party in the House, the party itself was a loose conglomeration with no ideological or emotional care. Clerides had a reputation for slyness and selfseeking. He was a little too British—Bomber Command, Grays Inn, pipe-smoking—for some tastes.

His strategy has been to let the enormity of the Greek humiliation sink in. Eventually there will have to be talks with the Turks but before that he wants his people to appreciate just how few cards they have. At the same time he is carefully strumming local sentiment. He visits refugee camps, he tells the press (to enthusiastic applause from Greek Cypriot reporters) that he will not accept Turkish dictation "anywhere in this world or the next world."

Nicosia newspapers of all hues appeal daily for a closing of ranks. Clerides is exploiting the mood. For the time being at least, he has coaxed the Church out of politics. The three "rebel" bishops removed by Makarios a year ago are back in their sees, cheek-by-jowl with the three "loyalists" who replaced them. Whatever is going on in the bishoprics, none of the bishops are fighting in public.

The Communists are bewildered by the speed of events and the lack of guidance from Moscow. Dr. Vassos Lyssarides, the exiled President's left-wing confidant, is content to keep the Makarios flag flying high without actually challenging Clerides.

The enigma, as always in this isle of furtive fantasy, is EOKA-B. Its bearded guerrillas are armed and organising. Almost certainly they killed the American ambassador. But how powerful are they? Foreign diplomats here estimate that before the coup their full-time fighters numbered between 500 and 1,000. Perhaps another 4,000 could be counted as reserves, men who would rally to the cause if they felt the moment was ripe.

Of these, many are now neutralised by service in the National Guard (though there would be nothing new in Cyprus about a man fighting in two uniforms at the same time).

It was EOKA-B, the heir of George Grivas, which precipitated the crisis. The archbishop discovered that the movement was directed by Greek officers, posted to command the National Guard. He demanded their withdrawal, and the sequence of the past seven weeks followed with the inevitability of a classical tragedy. No one can be sure how much of an appeal EOKA's death-or-glory ideas make at this stage, though I suspect the Clerides style of realism is percolating through.

But the most significant change is that EOKA-B no longer enjoys even the tacit support of Athens. The Karamanlis Government is working in tandem with the Cypriot leadership, not against it. A new commander has been appointed by Athens to the National Guard, a new Greek Ambassador has presented his credentials. Both are men trusted by the democratic regime.

The National Guard still has some of the mainland Greek officers who stage-managed the coup, but their influence is being eroded. Clerides in turn is fostering the Athenian connection. His attitude towards the Turks has tended to be slightly more flexible than that of Karamanlis and Marvos, the Greek Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.

He has not insisted on a return to specific positions on the ground. But Clerides had never strayed from under their umbrella. Like them, the Cypriot leader treads delicately. The forces that brought them to power—in Athens as in Nicosia—could just as quickly push them off again.

2. ASSESSMENT OF THE MAKARIOS YEARS

[From the Economist (London), July 20, 1974]

CYPRUS—THE MAKARIOS YEARS

(By Ken MacKenzie)

A STATE, BUT NOT A NATION

Cyprus has been the victim of geography for 3,000 years—and history has always lent a hurtful hand, too. This predominantly Greek island is only 50-odd miles from the Turkish mainland, but it is 600 miles from Athens. It may look only a speck on the map, but contemporary geopolitical factors give it a strategic significance out of all proportion to its size. Arguably, no country so minuscule has provided the world's press with more headlines, usually alarming ones, over the past 20 years. Privately, the Cypriots, spontaneous, volatile, theatrical, have rather enjoyed it—up to now.

At the outset it is important to understand what Cyprus is not. It is a state, but not a nation. Indeed, to talk about the Cypriots generically is almost misleading. The population is made up of some 520,000 Cypriot Greeks, and some 120,000 Cypriot Greeks, and some 120,000 Cypriot Turks (plus a few thousand Armenians and British). After 14 years as a sovereign, independent state, Cyprus still does not have a national anthem; and the pallid Cyprus flag is significantly absent on occasions of national fervour. It is the blue and white colours of Greece or the blazing crimson of Turkey that dominate political gatherings.

In 1960 the hope was that the two communities would live in partnership, and that the hybrid state, hatched at the Zurich and London conferences of the previous year, would form a bond of friendship, rather than an apple of discord, between Athens and Ankara. This illusion was brutally shattered during Christmas week, 1963, when savage fighting in Nicosia between Greek and Turkish armed bands turned the tourist island of Aphrodite into a cauldron of hatred. (The Greek Cypriots, as the Turks are always eager to point out, were much the more heavily armed and better prepared, and the Turks inevitably were battered—but not subjugated.) After a great international flurry, a United Nations peace-keeping force was rushed to the scene, with a mandate for three months. Today, over 10 years later, it is still there, and looks like being there permanently.

There are, in fact, now six different armies (or armed contingents) on the island, which for a place much less than half the size of Wales seems a disproportionate concentration of military manpower: the Greek Cypriot National Guard, the Turkish Cypriot Fighting Force, the official Greek (mainland) contingent, a corresponding Turkish contingent, the British garrison at the sovereign bases and the UN force. And, for good measure, there are still one or two private armies (very small in size but potentially dangerous politically), plus the paramilitary Police Tactical Reserve, which was the strong arm of President Makarios's government. The wry comment that every Cypriot regards a gun rather as an Englishman regards his umbrella is as valid as ever.

Nevertheless, the island, believe it or not, has been an oddly happy place. If that claim seems the ultimate in irrationality, it is another way of saying that any student of politics who is attracted by the paradoxical will find Cyprus a subject of inexhaustible fascination. A country where the head of the church has also been the head of state—and in tactical alliance with the communists—plainly does not conform to accepted political norms.

Yet for a small third-world state Cyprus can boast able administrators (one of the better by-products of British colonial rule) and a plethora of talent in the commercial field. Its citizens may be volatile, but—as thousands of tourists can testify—its hospitality is overwhelming. If it sorted itself out politically, it could go places. Alas, this is a big "if". Perhaps, in time, a sense of Cypriot nationhood will emerge; but many sound judges are sceptical about that. Meanwhile, the prevalent idea is that, despite the bloody events of the past few days, the island should remain an independent, sovereign state—enjoying and exploiting its 300 days of sunshine every year. This is one tourist brochure claim that cannot be falsified.

ANOTHER KIND OF MARATHON

During his brief visit to Nicosia in May for talks with Mr. Gromyko, his Soviet opposite number, Mr. Henry Kissinger is said to have told local journalists that, although we had been quite prepared to take on Vietnam and the Middle East, he would never tackle the Cyprus question. (The Cypriots took this as a compliment.) He was doubtless being facetious; but clearly if there were a solution to the Cyprus problem somebody would have thought of it long ago. Negotiations to work out a definitive settlement have been going on in Nicosia, the "intercommunal talks". The trouble is that they began six years ago (which must almost qualify them for the "Guinness Book of Records"), and are no nearer success today than they were in 1971 or 1972. Nevertheless, as always, jaw-jaw is better than war-war.

This week, the basic problem—the atavistic antagonism between the Greeks as a whole and the Turks—has been overshadowed by the coup in the Presidential Palace; but, though the eyes of the world are focused on the vendetta within the Greek community, the reaction of the Turks in the coming days could conceivably determine the island's fate. For a long time, President Makarios regarded Turkish opposition as an "artificial" factor, created by the British in a spirit of divide-and-rule. Latterly, he began to revise his ideas; but he has also been responsible for much intercommunal distrust which, historically, tarnishes his claim to statesmanship in other fields.

Understandably, the Turks make great play with the fact that, as they are outnumbered by four to one, they are physically at the mercy of the Greeks. Four to one is a tricky and, indeed, crucial ratio; if the Turks numbered about 35 percent of the population, they would have a strong case for being treated as an equal and separate community. If they totalled only about 10 percent they would have no claim to anything more than the ordinary minority rights. Eighteen percent, the actual percentage, is in between; and what matters, anyway, the Turks say, is the essential separateness of their cultural and religious traditions. They insist that they constitute a separate community; but in the equally adamant Greek view they are merely a minority. United Nations officials have suggested that the Turks should be described as a "minority community"; but this semantic compromise does not appeal to either side. Semantics, it needs hardly to be added, is always of paramount importance in Cyprus politics.

At the root of the Turks' craving for separatism is a deep-seated fear that, if they become a mere minority within a unitary state, they will be treated as second-class citizens. For tactical reasons, they have made great propaganda out of the excesses perpetrated by the Greek Cypriot armed bands during the onslaught of December, 1963. Yet basically it is the Greek assumption of moral and cultural superiority as much as the fear of physical persecution that sustains the Turkish Cypriots' determination to go their own way. This is what raises the hackles of the educated Turkish leaders, who regard themselves as the peers of their former Greek colleagues. For their part, the Greeks argue that they are indisputably the more dynamic people and that their ancestors ran the island centuries before the Turks ever set foot in it. (And the Greeks produce about 90 percent of the wealth.)

In terms of the island's political configuration, the net result today is a bizarre ethnic montage, which cries out for rationalisation on social and economic grounds. Nicosia is almost as divided a capital as Berlin. During the last few years the Turks have begun to cross the artificial frontier that runs through the city—the so-called "Green Line"—for business purposes or for shopping, and hundreds of them used to go daily to work in the Greek part of Nicosia; but the Greeks are still not allowed into the Turkish zone. The 17-mile road from Nicosia to Kyrenia, the island's most picturesque holiday resort, is under tight Turkish Cypriot control, the Greeks being permitted to use it only under the protection of a United Nations convoy. In the other main towns, notably Limassol and Famagusta, the sense of division is less pronounced, but by and large there is little intermingling of the two communities. In the north-west, around the town of Lefka and the hamlets of Kokkina and Mansoura, the Turks are penned into tightly controlled (and economically straitened) enclaves, which, of course, no Greek dares enter. On the outskirts of Nicosia there is a Turkish refugee centre, by now something of a township, which provides tolerable living conditions for 10,000 of the people who were driven from their homes in the fighting of 1963–64.

Over the last few years, President Makarios offered occasional inducements to the refugees to resettle in their former homes, but on the whole his policy was to leave the Turks to stew in their own juice. He clearly believed that time was on his side, and that Turkish resistance would crumble under the pressure of economic hardship. But there is very little sign of this at the moment; and the Turkish government seems prepared to go on subsidising the Turkish Cypriots, to the tune of £12m a year, rather than let them come under Greek Cypriot rule. It is arguable that, with every passing day, the de facto partition of the island simply hardens.

Can these conflicts and contradictions yet be resolved within the framework of a new constitution? The marathon intercommunal talks have been conducted by two able and likeable men who have known each other for years and who, on the face of it, ought to be able to do a deal with each other: on the Greek side, Mr. Glafkos Clerides (who as speaker of the House of Representatives was President Makarios's deputy), and on the Turkish side Mr. Rauf Denktash, who is both the leader of his community and the vice-president of Cyprus in accordance with the 1960 constitution (which is theoretically still operative). They have the assistance of two constitutional advisers from Greece and Turkey, and the special UN representative on the island is always at hand to provide his good offices.

It was—and is—argued that if Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash was left to themselves, they would hammer out a settlement. Unfortunately, nothing in Cyprus is as simple as that. Today, Mr. Denktash is more adamant than ever that the Turkish Cypriots must have the maximum degree of separatism; and his attitude has been supported by the new Turkish government. To the surprise of many observers, Mr. Ecevit, who became prime minister in Ankara in January

of this year, promptly came out in favour of "federation" as the best solution for Cyprus. This marked a reversion to the Turkish attitude of the mid-1960s.

Semantics are at large again. To the Greek Cypriots, the word "federation" is anathema, for rightly or wrongly they equate it with partition and with the concomitant spectre of Turkish mainland troops and officials installing themselves on Cypriot soil. Over this issue President Makarios came close this April to breaking off the negotiations once and for all. After a minor international contretemps, the talks were resumed in June, but in an unpropitious atmosphere. The atmosphere is worse now.

Of course, Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash could hardly have been talking away for six years without accomplishing something. By late 1971, or thereabouts, the outline of a compromise had emerged. For example, the Turks agreed to relinquish the special veto rights (in defence and budgetary matters) that had been accorded them in the 1960 constitution; and broad agreement was reached on the composition of the new legislature (60 Greeks and 15 Turks, in accordance with the population ratio) and about the powers and functions of the executive and judiciary. But as the quid pro quo for relinquishing their veto rights at the top, the Turks wanted broader powers at the bottom, so to speak; hence their emphasis on regional autonomy, dressed up in the formula of "functional federation". (In plain language, this means separate Turkish street-sweepers and separate Turkish policemen.) The Greeks will have none of this; to all of them, it is inconsistent with the concept of a unitary state, on which they insist. If a new regime in Nicosia can resolve this dilemma, the world will be in its debt. But it is hard to see in the new circumstances anyone reaching a compromise with the Turkish leaders.

Even before this week's events, two dangers loomed. The first was that the talks would break down for good. Many western diplomats in Nicosia regarded the whole operation as a charade, and wondered how long it could be kept going; fortunately, neither side wanted to incur the odium of causing a final rupture. If the talks do finally end in failure, the more chauvinistic elements in the Greek camp would almost certainly clamour for a domestic economic blockade of the Turkish community (the Greeks imposed such a blockade during 1964); and that could mean the start of further trouble.

The second danger is more subtle, and more distant. If the present crisis should be resolved, the talks might yet be successful—but the end-product might be a constitution which, although meticulously fair on paper to both sides, would be so complicated as to be unworkable. Indeed, the amount of horsetrading which has already taken place over legal and constitutional minutiae is mind-boggling. The 1960 settlement produced a Frankenstein monster of a constitution which was patently unfair to the Greeks; the new constitution, if it ever is completed, will not make that mistake, but it could be of equally intolerable complexity. Even without the events of the past week, the experience of having to operate a second unworkable constitution would probably make most Cypriots despair of the whole concept of independence.

All this, however, is negative speculation. Conceivably, in Cyprus's peculiar fashion, the talks will be resumed and drag on, and on. But the recent comment of a senior UN official is apposite: "I can't see a settlement, because I don't think that either community wants one at the present moment." In other words, each side believes that time is on its side. And, after Monday's dramatic upset, further speculation about the talks seems academic now.

INSOUCIANCE WAS NOT ENOUGH

If Archbishop Makarios was reluctant to put his signature to another Cyprus settlement that rules out enosis, there were good psychological reasons for his hesitation. The signing of the Zurich and London agreements in February, 1959, was a traumatic experience for him. For the previous four years the Eoka guerrilla movement, inspired by Colonel (as he then was) Grivas, had fought for the ideal of enosis; this is what the bombs and bullets in Ledra Street were all about. At the twelfth hour—the archbishop, in Grivas's view, signed the Hellenic birthright away for a bowl of insipid pottage called independence. The fact that he did so under duress (mainly from the Greek government, although the British did their bit of arm-twisting) did not mitigate his apostasy in the eyes of Grivas and his fanatical followers. By July, 1959, Grivas was denouncing the archbishop as a traitor, and a new chapter in the Cyprus saga had begun.

To give him credit, Makarios faced the continuing threat from Eoka B (the new version of Eoka formed by Grivas on his return to the island in 1971) with apparent insouciance, fortified by pride in his remarkable capacity for survival over 20 years. Since 1960, Greece (the supposedly stable parent power which under the 1960 settlement was empowered to keep a wary eye on the rumbustious Cypriots) has suffered two military coups and one abortive counter-coup; and Turkey (similarly empowered under the Zurich agreement) has had one full coup and the so-called mini-coup of 1971. Up to this week, Cyprus had had many alarms, but parliamentary government was preserved—though there is no shortage of cynics who will tell you that it was all a facade. The archbishop himself had a narrow squeak in March, 1970, when the helicopter in which he was travelling was shot down a few moments after taking off from Nicosia; he emerged shaken but unhurt. After that, he greatly strengthened his personal bodyguard, composed of his most trusted followers; but—apart from acquiring a healthy distrust of helicopters—he displayed remarkable confidence in his own inviolability, and in his capacity to outmanoeuvre his enemies: too much confidence, perhaps.

It is fascinating to speculate on what he might have become had he not entered the priesthood at an early age—conceivably, a smooth, London-educated lawyer, with a penchant for esoteric litigation. What is incontestable is that his position as head of the Church gave him his political base. As plain Michael Mouskos (his real name) Makarios would have started off as just one more politician (though a very skillful one).

At the same time, the support of the mass of the God-fearing peasantry has proved a diminishing asset, for the gradual emergence of anti-clerical feeling has been a significant political phenomenon in Cyprus in the past few years. Indeed, criticism of the church's involvement in the affairs of this world is now openly expressed by many pro-Makarios partisans. To outside observers it is astonishing that, under the 1960 constitution, the church is wholly exempt from paying tax. How much of the island the church actually owns is hard to assess, but monuments to its affluence exist, for example, in at least three of Cyprus's luxury hotels. The archbishop did not help matters by his recent acquisition of 13 acres of land in the Seychelles, a transaction which has become a major *cause célèbre* in coffeshop politics. (Asked why he chose of all places the Seychelles—to which he was deported by the British in 1956—he replied: "For sentimental reasons.") The archbishop has always had his sense of humour. What kind of leadership will emerge in the coming weeks is a baffling conundrum. The flamboyant Mr. Nicos Sampson was nominated president on Monday, but he is a maverick, Mr. Clerides, Makarios's heir apparent, is an able and perceptive man, admirably equipped to take on the burdens of the presidency if it were ever offered to him. (His record includes distinguished wartime service in the Royal Air Force.) But, like many able and perceptive men, he lacks a broad political power base; and the Unified party, which he leads, must be about the most inappropriately named organisation in contemporary politics. It is certainly not unified and it is doubtful whether it is a party; rather it is a loose coalition, or front, of diverse centre or right-of-centre factions. It came out on top at the last general election in 1970, although it won only 15 out of the 35 Greek seats in the House of Representatives.

After Mr. Clerides, the most prominent figure in the Unified party is Mr. Tassos Papadopoulos, a brilliant lawyer who proved a highly capable minister of labour when still in his twenties. His ambitions are a subject of much speculation; by and large, he has contrived to keep in step with Makarios's policies during the vicissitudes of the past few years. A score of other names might be mentioned as possible future presidents, if democratic government is reestablished, not least that of Mr. Nicos Dimitriou, the able ambassador in Washington. But at the moment everything is in the melting pot. Cyprus may be undergoing a revolution of historic proportions. To many perceptive people, Makarios's position as head of church and head of state was becoming an anachronism.

POLITICS OF POLARISATION

How strong is Eoka B? This is the teaser which men of the intelligence services—who seem to be deployed in droves all over the island—find unanswerable. Until recently, the accepted theory was that, after Grivas's death in January of this year, Eoka B lost its inspiration and its momentum; and, in the early spring, the archbishop seemed serenely confident that he was the master of the island's destinies. By early July, he had changed his tune; Eoka had fallen under the control of Greek officers, and the threat to the president was greater than ever. But he

continued to believe that, somehow, he could outmanoeuvre his enemies. Ironically, if Grivas were alive today, Makarios would probably be more happily placed than he is now.

At the same time, Grivas himself remains a living legend. It is hard to imagine a man with a Chaplinesque gait and a Groucho Marx moustache possessing charisma, but Grivas had it in abundance; the thousands who make the pilgrimage to his grave in Limassol testify to it still. Moreover, he was imbued with a sense of messianic mission—to unite Cyprus with Greece—and he instilled into his followers an almost religious devotion to the concept of enosis.

That there was some effective central direction of Eoka after Grivas's death seemed apparent to all perceptive observers. Without such control, the local Eoka warlords would certainly have unleashed a wave of impromptu attacks on government targets; in fact, during the past few months Eoka has been a reasonably disciplined force. It may have had only 50-70 "paid-up" guerrillas in the mountains, as Makarios claimed, but it almost certainly had armed cells in all the main towns and many of the villages. In an underground movement of this kind, numbers are not necessarily very important. The archbishop certainly had the support of the great majority of his compatriots, but this was offset by the intensity of the hatred which his enemies bore him. And by repeatedly playing down Eoka as a minuscule, fanatical movement—a line which he unflinchingly sold to visiting correspondents—the archbishop only enraged his enemies further.

Yet, until the coup on Monday the archbishop for several years displayed remarkable skills in holding the disparate Greek Cypriot factions together, and in maintaining Cyprus's status as an independent sovereign state. For a country of its size, it played a relatively significant role in the affairs of the third world and of the Commonwealth. Indeed, in the early 1960s, the archbishop aspired to play a role on a larger stage—but the outbreak of the intercommunal fighting in 1963 killed these ambitions; he could hardly tell other nations how to conduct their affairs when his own country was in such disorder. During the past few years, he traveled extensively in Europe, Africa and Asia, solely with an eye to enlisting support for the Greek Cypriot case at the United Nations and elsewhere. His latest trip was to China in May of this year, to "balance out" his visit to Russia in 1971. Only last week he announced his intention to visit five of the east European countries. (This move probably contributed to the upheaval, for to the Athens junta it was intolerable that he should be currying favour with communist countries and simultaneously demanding the expulsion from Cyprus of Greek officers.) His enemies cannot gainsay that as leader of his country he had a presence—and for a small third-world state that was no small asset.

There was another remarkable achievement of the Makarios years. Despite the bitterness of the 1950s, relations between the Cyprus government and the British were remarkably harmonious. After being Britain's enemy, he became Britain's friend.

His biggest diplomatic failure—though nobody saw it in these terms at the time—was to fall foul of a coterie of Greek officers who served in Cyprus in the 1960s. One of these was a relatively unimportant captain, called Ioannidis; he is now Brigadier Ioannidis, the strong man of the Greek junta, and the person who probably gave the signal for the attack on Makarios.

Under constant pressure from the right, the archbishop, not surprisingly, turned to the left. There are few more law-abiding communist parties in the world than the Akel party of Cyprus. (Akel is an acronym for the Greek words meaning "Progressive Party of the Working People".) Indeed, it is the only significant political group in the island which has never resorted to violence. But there were signs that the left was anxious to infiltrate the controversial Police Tactical Reserve units, the paramilitary organisation which President Makarios built up as a counterforce to the National Guard. The strong-arm methods of the PTR were an ominous portent; there is little doubt that it resorted to torture in its grilling of Eoka suspects.

In the 1970 election to the House of Representatives, Akel, for tactical reasons, put up only nine candidates for the 35 available seats; all nine were easily elected. If it had put up 15, probably all 15 would have been successful. As it was, the communists' share of the total poll came to over 40 percent. Yet the total paid-up membership of the Akel party is only around 12,000. The secret of its success lies in its cohesion and superior organisation.

At the moment, the communists are both stunned and enraged by this week's events. They would get short shrift from a new regime. More than any other political group, Akel wants the intercommunal talks to succeed, for this would

keep Cyprus an independent, non-aligned republic, outside the orbit of Nato. At the same time, the communists are careful never to on record as opposing enosis in principle; when they adopted an anti-enosis posture in the late 1940s they lost ground to the Nationalists, and they are not going to make the same mistake again.

The communists' greatest source of strength lies in the trade unions. They wholly control the main workers' movement, the Pan-Cyprian Federation of Labour (PEO), which has over 40,000 members (though not all are paid-up). Its secretary, Mr Andreas Zhiartides, is respected throughout the island, and indeed internationally, for his moderation and skill as a negotiator. Paradoxically, it is the right-wing, pro-enosis workers' organisation, the SEK, that has set the pace in labour militancy, primarily with the objective of harassing the Makarios government. Its membership has increased remarkably in the last few years, and it has the services of some dedicated men, but it still lags behind the PEO in the techniques of labour-management relations.

Behind all these complexities and contradictions, there is a fundamental trend toward polarisation in Greek Cypriot politics. Inevitably, the enosis-versus-independence argument is crystallising into a right-versus-left conflict, on conventional European lines, the right being spearheaded by the National Council and Eoka and the left by Akel. There is an element of oversimplification in this theory, but it as a basic validity. The joker in the pack has been Makarios himself. During the past two years, with the Greek officers breathing down his neck, he became more and more beholden to the left. The communists, after all, were amongst his most vociferous supporters when Eoka B first posed its challenge in 1972. Some of his closest counsellors were men of pronouncedly left-wing views, without being members of Akel. The most notable was Dr Vassos Lyssarides, the archbishop's personal physician. Basically, however, President Makarios never wanted Cyprus to go communist; during his presidency, his aim always was to play one faction off against the other, walking the tightrope and riding the tiger at the same time.

THOSE DIFFERENT HISTORY BOOKS

Cyprus not merely has no national anthem, it has no university. It is an extraordinary lacuna for a country whose inhabitants, in cultural terms, can claim to be superior to much of the third world. Bright young Greeks flock to Athens or London—mainly the Inns of Court—for higher education; the Turks to Ankara and Istanbul (and London, too). Despite the bitterness of the late 1950s, the Cypriots still look to Britain as a shrine of cultural values. (In fact, because of the authoritarian nature of the present regime in Athens, an increasing number of Greek Cypriots want to study at British universities.)

There has been speculative talk about founding a national university in the island, through the possible help of one or two benefactors, but it is hard to see this happening in the foreseeable future. And what kind of university would it be? An institution where Greek and Turk youths mixed freely together, absorbing each other's values, could contribute enormously to the growth of a sense of "nationhood". But, by the nature of things, it would be dominated by the Greeks, and would accentuate the ethnic division within the island.

In many ways the present system of school education is harmful politically. Through latitude or folly, British colonial administrators permitted the educational structure to be almost a carbon copy of that in Athens, with the result that generations of schoolchildren have absorbed Hellenic values; to them the central date in history is 1821—the start of the Greek War of Independence. Many of the teachers come from Athens, or have been educated there. Schoolchildren played an extraordinarily militant role in the first Eoka rebellion, as tension-raisers, and General Grivas used them astutely. Today, teachers and pupils are usually in the van of pro-enosis demonstrations and at the end of June President Makarios had to dismiss 62 primary school teachers who were noted for their right-wing views. In slightly less pronounced fashion, the Turks' schools follow the educational guidelines of Ankara and Istanbul; and because of the rigid separation imposed by the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot Administration, a generation of Turkish youth is emerging which has never had any contact with the Greeks. Education in itself rarely solves political problems; but until the scholastic system in each community sheds its nationalist overtones—and this applies particularly to the teaching of history—the concept of Cypriot nationhood will remain a distant dream.

Some people may argue that the convulsions of the past week are based on a political illusion; and that Cyprus's real fate will be determined by the tidal wave of inflation, now engulfing the world. The Cypriots—and more particularly the Greek Cypriots—are beginning to feel the pinch, like everybody else. Inflation is currently running at a rate of 14 or 15 per cent a year. Some pessimists forecast that before long it will be about 20 per cent—which, one is told, is the level at which democracy becomes inoperable—but these prophecies are probably too alarmist. Through the medium of the central bank, the government in March imposed severe restrictions on borrowing; and for many local entrepreneurs it is a distasteful experience to be refused easy credit.

Cyprus was not directly affected by the Arab's oil embargo, and supplies of crude oil have continued to arrive from Saudi Arabia and Iraq (via the Sidon and Tripoli pipelines) at a satisfactory rate. But as nearly every urban Greek Cypriot family has its car, the fourfold rise in oil prices has taken a heavy toll. A gallon of petrol after tax now costs about 570 mils (about 70p in sterling); only two years ago it was about a third of this price. A wide range of industries dependent on petroleum derivatives has been hard hit; and the cost of food and drink has soared. The days when the visitor could dine agreeably for around £1 are gone for good. This is the sort of inflation which might keep tourists away.

All this has caused considerable anguish to the man in the street and, more positively, considerable heart-searching among the ministers and officials concerned with the economy. As a result, an embryonic prices and incomes policy was initiated at the start of this year, under the aegis of an "advisory prices committee", which includes representatives from the government, employers, and the trade union federations. This is a voluntary system, based on the pious hope that the local manufacturers and importers will not increase prices unless this is absolutely necessary and that the workers will show a sense of responsibility in submitting pay claims. So far it has worked moderately well, but these are early days. The possibility of introducing a statutory system has not been ruled out, although officials are reluctant to talk about it. For the moment, the coup attempt has obliterated all else.

Linked with the prices and incomes policy is a new cost of living bonus system which is claimed to be something peculiar to Cyprus but which is not so very different from what is now happening in Britain. Every three months the salaries and wages of public servants and all employees covered by collective agreements are statutorily reviewed against a price index, the basis of which (reckoned as 100) is the cost of living average for 1973. By May the index had risen to 115, and a large section of the labour force found itself entitled to a 6.9 per cent bonus in wages in June. This no doubt brought smiles to many faces, but it has not brought a check to the inflationary spiral.

The basic problem with Cyprus's economy, however, is that it rests on a slightly wobbly tripod: agriculture, tourism and revenues derived from the British bases. The experts in the ministries of commerce and finance, who, by third-world standards, are capable men, know this only too well. Over the past year, agriculture has given them the worst headaches, because of the appalling droughts in 1972 and 1973. This year providence has been kinder, but the rainfall has still not been enough to replenish the reservoirs. The net result is that the growth rate in agriculture has been virtually nil since 1971. This in turn has affected the total growth rate, which last year was 6.5 per cent instead of the 7.4 per cent forecast in the present five-year plan (1972-76). In the process, the government had had to subsidise the drought-stricken farmers to the tune of around £5m annually.

What can be done to provide more water? Arguably, the government should have tackled the problem more energetically some years ago, but strenuous efforts are now being undertaken to make up for lost time. Backed by the World Bank, a £36m water development project, the biggest of its kind in Cyprus, is now under way in the Paphos district. With luck, this should boost the production of citrus fruits, grapes and bananas over much of the west of the island. There is also talk of building a desalination plant, probably near Larnaca, similar to the one already operating in the British base at Dhekelia; but desalination is a costly business. A more intriguing suggestion is that fresh water should be piped to Cyprus from the gushing streams of southern Turkey, only 50-odd miles away. This solution was mooted as long ago as 1961 by the UN special adviser on Cyprus's economy, Mr. Willard Thorp, but for political reasons the Greek Cypriots have always resisted it. They do not wish to depend on Turkey for something as essential as water, and they even conjure up nightmares of the tap being turned off in times of crisis.

With agriculture in the doldrums, the government's planners are wisely turning their attention more and more to the development of light industries; indeed, the files of the ministry of commerce bulge with memoranda about fertiliser plants, asbestos goods, hygienic equipment and the like. But the essential aim is to promote those industries with some export potential, diverting capital and effort from the production of "saturation" commodities, such as footwear and furniture. For new overseas markets, Cyprus is looking hopefully to Africa. Already countries like Libya and Tanzania are showing more than a modicum of interest in its light industrial goods. (Both countries were visited officially by President Makarios.) All this implies a sensible diversification of Cyprus's trade pattern, though it is hard to see Africa replacing Britain and western Europe as its most important market.

The island needs all the commercial openings it can get, for its trade deficit has risen appreciably in the last two years. There is cause for concern but probably not for alarm. Foreign exchange reserves stand at the reasonably healthy total of £105m, some £15m less than at this time last year but nevertheless enough to cover imports for the next eight or nine months. Other third world countries might be happy to be in such a position.

IN THE STEPS OF APHRODITE

"The philosophy underlying our policy is that tourism should complement our national life and should not destroy its good qualities". This unexceptionable sentiment is the motif of a prolix review by the government of Cyprus's tourist prospects during the current five-year plan; and any future Cyprus government must trust that the troubles will be quickly forgotten by potential visitors. In terms of the economy as a whole, tourism has become one of the leading sectors and the plan is that it should earn about £42m gross between 1972 and 1976. At peak levels, tourist revenue could wipe off the trade deficit, and offset the financial losses that would be incurred if the British decide to withdraw from their two bases on the island.

The figures for 1972 and 1973 were encouraging; performance surpassed the target growth rate of 20 per cent. But it will be a different story this year. Quite apart from the fighting, potential visitors from Britain and western Europe do not have the money to spend. A modest growth rate may be achieved, but for a small country which has staked its future largely on tourism it may not be good enough.

The island has an immense amount to offer. It is one of the few places where in the spring one can ski in the morning and swim in the early afternoon. Or so the brochures say. The basic issue is what sort of place the tourist planners want Cyprus to be. At the moment, they give it the image of having a bit of everything. The variety of Cyprus's attractions does, indeed, appeal to many holiday-makers. But, by and large, the local entrepreneurs, backed by foreign capital, have moved in too fast; and in particular Famagusta—which has the best beach on the island—has been turned into a hideous rash of neon-lit cement. The Germans and the Scandinavians flock there, and it is the west Europeans whom the Cyprus Tourist Organisation is particularly anxious to attract. This is now reflected in the menus of the leading hotels and restaurants.

What pains most Cyprus-lovers is the possibility that Kyrenia will go the same way as Famagusta. Paradoxically, Kyrenia's essential beauty was saved in the 1960s by the outbreak of intercommunal fighting, which temporarily scared off the property developers. After seven years of relative peace, its picturesque harbour is walled in by high-rise flats and hotels. A kind of Clovelly transplanted to the eastern Mediterranean, it has long been the haven of the retired British; a faintly pro-consular sniff used to be in the air, and there used to be much good conversation about more leisurely days.

Now, at the height of the package tourist season, the sniff is of eggs and chips, and the golden covers on either side of the town look like being converted into plagues, which sounds distasteful if not actually hideous. But it all makes for invisible earnings and the Cyprus government needs the revenue. There is good potential in the western sector of the island, particularly around Paphos, which because of its distance from Nicosia tends to be the least visited; and a local entrepreneur who is about to launch a direct air-service could be on to a good thing.

But tourism, like other sectors of the economy, revolves around oil and water. With an inadequate public transport system, many tourists want to hire cars, and the cost is now becoming prohibitive to many ordinary holiday-makers. The

continuing drought means that water-supplies at the height of summer are liable to be cut off; and it is not much fun paying for comfort and excellent service in a first-class hotel if one cannot get a shower.

But this may seem carping criticism. The fascination of the island lies in its life-style, which is neither easy to harness by a government department nor open to convincing description in a brochure. It is epitomised in the sip of an Anglias in a Troodos coffee-shop, or in the hilarity of Lemonias's tavern, in Nicosia, whose owner (once a Lieutenant-Quartermaster in the Cyprus Regiment) is a Hellenic Jove with the frame of a Vulcan and a laugh that reverberates around the island like thunder. Whatever the regime, people like Lemonias are indestructible.

BASELINE

If Kyrenia is a Mediterranean Clovelly, Episkopi—the British Near East headquarters—is a Mediterranean East-bourne. The essential point about the two British bases (Episkopi-Akrotiri and Dhekelia) is that they are as British as the Isle of Wight, being sovereign British territory. In 1960, after a marathon negotiation between President Makarios and Mr. Julian Amery (then Under-Secretary at the British Colonial Office), it was finally agreed that the British sovereign area should comprise 99 square miles. (It has never been absolutely clear to observers which sovereign state, Britain or Cyprus, owns the Salt Lake near Dhekelia; but, as its use for military purposes is problematical, to say the least, no dispute arises.)

The relationship between the British and the Greek Cypriots has long been a curious love-hate affair. If British colonial administrators made mistakes—as all colonial administrators do—the chickens came home to roost with unexpected ferocity on April 1, 1955. All-Fools' Day marked the start of General Grivas's guerrilla war to drive the British out—and to unite Cyprus with Greece. There followed nearly four years of Ulster-style terrorism, during which excesses were committed by both sides and the hatred between Briton and Greek could be cut with a knife. (The Turks were to some extent on the sidelines, but were basically pro-British.) The Greeks vehemently alleged, and still allege, that successive British governments deliberately favoured the Turkish community. Historically, that is at the root of the Cyprus problem. More recently, all has been sunshine—or almost.

After trying to kick the British out, most Greek Cypriots want the British who are left (mainly in the bases) to stay. It is not, of course, entirely a matter of sentiment, though sentiment enters into it. The basic factor is economic. Revenue, one way or another, from the bases is a pillar of the island's economy; last year it totalled over £30m. (The Makarios government, for understandable reasons, put the figure nearer £27m, but the exact total is hard to quantify.) Limassol, in particular, would become almost a ghost town if the British should quit Episkopi and Akrotiri, for one quarter of Limassol's population (around 55,000) is composed of British service families or civilians connected with the nearby base. For the Cypriots—Greeks and Turks alike—the bases mean jobs: clerical jobs, labouring jobs, catering jobs and so on. Even the police force within the two bases is composed of Cypriots, whose relations with the British authorities are harmonious.

It is a mark of the astute restraint of Mr. Zhiartides, the union leader, that he has never pushed the communist line on the bases to crisis point. Ideologically, he wants the British to quit—and that is the declared aim of the Akel party. But realistically, Mr. Zhiartides and the other communist leaders know that, if the British do leave, thousands of their compatriots would come on the labour market, and Mr. Zhiartides did not want to embarrass the archbishop. So the communists were prepared to impose on themselves a self-denying ordinance; in the new situation the communists' tactics may change.

With the British defence review still uncompleted, the future of the Cyprus garrisons is still in doubt. It is one thing to quit Singapore, and another thing to quit the Mediterranean, especially at a period of crisis in the Middle East. In the present explosive situation a hasty British withdrawal would create a dangerous vacuum in the island. Under the terms of the Cyprus treaties of 1960, the sovereign bases are to revert to the government of Cyprus in the event of a British evacuation. But the Turks have let it be known that they want at least part of the 99 square miles; and in this understandable claim there is the hint of a nasty new twist to the Cyprus problem. One possibility, obviously, is that the two bases might eventually be telescoped into one (Episkopi-Akrotiri), but this does not appeal to Britain's service chiefs, who claim that there are not really enough training grounds in the United Kingdom.

During the past decade, the Dhekelia base has served another extremely useful purpose; it has become the logistic centre for the United Nations peace-keeping force (Unficyp). Food and equipment for the 2,000-odd UN troops (who consist of British, Canadians, Danes, Finns, Swedes, Austrians and Irish) are sent through Dhekelia, and all the repairs are done there. As a result, the UN operation in Cyprus has run on oiled wheels, and UN officials are the first to admit it. Indeed, the facility with which the British have donned their blue berets has been one of the pleasanter aspects of the Cyprus story, especially after the acrimony between Britain and the UN secretariat during the Congo troubles in 1961. Over the past 10 years (March, 1964–March, 1974) Cyprus has cost the UN \$350m. Arguably, it is money well spent; but one wonders what greater use it could have been put to, in development aid, if the Cypriots had settled their affairs.

The Americans have argued that Unficyp could be reduced to a mere observation force, although, probably, it is too small as it is to be effective militarily (if fighting should break out again between the two communities). Again, this sends shivers down the spines of Cypriot traders and restaurant-owners; for the free-spending UN troops, like the British troops in the bases, boost Cyprus's invisible earnings substantially. The element of artificiality which this introduces in the island's economy is all too obvious.

ON A SEE-SAW

It is almost impossible to draw the contradictory strands of Cypriot history into a rational pattern, as the past week has amply demonstrated. Cyprus is a captive of its geography, as well as of ethnic compulsions. To the Turks, it is their off-shore island. At the same time, the Greek connection has dominated its history, and will continue to do so.

However hard the Cypriots try to assert their independence, relations between Greece and Turkey will decisively sway the island's future. Even before Monday the strains between Athens and Ankara were acute; the prospect of sizeable oil deposits in the Aegean Sea has provoked a bitter dispute over continental shelf jurisdiction; the matter is being argued at the current international law of the sea conference in Caracas, but is unlikely to be resolved there.

Tension between the parent powers automatically has repercussions in Cyprus; the Greeks somehow become more Greek, and the Turks more Turkish. Even the Akel party has recently come out on the side of the Athens junta over the oil dispute, although the island's communists whisper privately that it is the inevitable result of "commercial imperialism".

On the face of it, the friction between Greece and Turkey seems to knock on the head, at least for the time being, the prospect of an imposed Athens–Ankara solution of the Cyprus problem. Such a deal has long been the aim of the Turkish government, and of the Turkish Cypriots, who feel that their destiny can be entrusted to their masters in Ankara. (President Makarios never felt any such sentiment towards successive Greek governments.) What is just conceivable, but unlikely, is that, instead of going to war, Greece and Turkey might put their heads together and make a package deal on all their contentious issues, Cyprus being the most important. The Makarios supporters bitterly resist this idea.

But would an imposed solution of Cyprus work? It was tried at Zürich in 1959, and four years later the settlement fell to pieces. On paper, there is a lot to be said for "double enosis" (which is a euphemism for partition). But the harsh reality was that President Makarios would not have it; and Cyprus has now had a history of 14 years as a sovereign independent state. The best minds in the Greek foreign ministry fully perceive this; and as a result Greece has continued to support the intercommunal talks designed to preserve Cyprus's independent status.

The 14 years of Makarios's presidency are a curious mixture of achievement and confusion. History will pronounce its verdict upon him; but to have remained president for so long was in itself a singular accomplishment. And the Greek Cypriots prospered economically.

What is incontestable now is that the politics of the whole eastern Mediterranean have never been more complex, and possibly never more explosive. Greece is at loggerheads with Cyprus and Turkey; Turkey is at loggerheads with Greece and Cyprus; and Cyprus is at loggerheads with Turkey and Greece. If there were a triangular conflict, baffled observers wonder who would be on whose side. The answer is clear; the Greeks would close ranks—temporarily—against their "traditional" enemy. Such is the strength of nationalism.

Meanwhile, the island has blundered along, under a quixotic form of de facto partition. President Makarios periodically asserted his view that "enosis is desirable, but not feasible" (which in fact probably summed up his own inner thinking). The implied ambivalence in this statement infuriated the Turks, who somehow still detect enosis implications in every word uttered by the Cyprus government, not least during the present crisis.

During his presidency, Makarios came to the conclusion that Cyprus should stay as it is. That may sound defeatist, but he had one current of events pulling his way; and time has its way of altering the configuration of political problems. For all its troubles, the island was a happy place.

3. EDITORIALS & COMMENTARIES ON THE CRISIS IN CYPRUS

[From the Times, Sept. 24, 1974]

(By Lord Caradon)

UN SHOULD ACT TO STOP DRIFT TO DISASTER IN CYPRUS

Earlier this month a few of us who love Cyprus and her people came together to form the Friends of Cyprus. We at once received support from members of all political parties in this country, and we were anxious from the start to make it clear that our aim was wholly impartial; it was to help, if we could, to bring succour and peace to all the people of Cyprus.

We sent Brigadier Michael Harbottle, who was at one time Chief of Staff of the United Nations Force in Cyprus, to the island to bring us the most up to date information on the present situation with special reference to the urgent and desperate need for relief. He will be back to report to us soon.

At the same time, I was asked to go at once to New York and Geneva to report on United Nations endeavours to stop further bloodshed, bring relief and search for a peaceful settlement.

In addition to discussions with those concerned at United Nations headquarters in New York and in the United Nations High Commission for Refugees in Geneva, I was able during the week to have talks in the United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations in New York, and in the United States State Department and with members of the Congress in Washington.

I came back to report to Friends of Cyprus with several strong impressions in my mind.

First, the extent of the tragedy. The accounts of ruthless and senseless violence are fresh in our minds. But what is not adequately realized is the extent of the suffering of countless innocent people both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. There are far more Turkish Cypriots south of the line than north of the line, and far more Greek Cypriots north of the line than Turkish Cypriots. It is a disaster for all the people of the island and with every week that passes things get worse with winter approaching; something like a third of the whole population has been uprooted from homes and livelihood. Industries stop, crops are lost, animals die of neglect, the means of survival rapidly diminish.

My second impression is that I see no early escape from the disastrous drift. True Glavkos Clerides for the Greek Cypriots and Raouf Denktash for the Turkish Cypriots, old and wise friends, have shown compassion and courage in the agreements on exchange of prisoners, but no one I have consulted expects the Turkish Government to agree to an early withdrawal from the line of division, except perhaps for a token withdrawal in Famagusta. It would obviously be difficult or even impossible for the Turkish Prime Minister, having stirred the enthusiasm of his people by the decision to invade, to withdraw unilaterally before the Turkish elections. Equally impossible for the Greek Government, also facing elections, to accept in effect a partition of the island. So no early advance to a settlement seems possible. Indeed the danger is that deadlock will lead to new conflict.

It follows that the suffering of a quarter of a million refugees will become much worse in the winter and the New Year.

What then can be done to escape from the danger of fresh conflict and the prospect of escalating economic ruin and widespread and prolonged and growing human feeling.

The Secretary General of the United Nations has not underestimated the challenge. Though comparatively small in the scale and numbers, this is the greatest test for the United Nations. The situation he said "calls in question the very essence of the United Nations Charter, weighing upon the credibility of the

organization and its future effectiveness". He says that the hopes of the world are centered on the Security Council and that he trusts that "we shall not fail in our duty".

Nothing less than a unanimous resolution of the council will provide the basis for a settlement. The elements of agreement are already there in the hurried resolutions passed by the council while the confusion of the conflict continued. What is surely needed now is a new initiative setting out a comprehensive plan first for dealing with the constitutional necessity to give the Turkish Cypriots communal security and local autonomy. We know that proposals to those ends were well advanced before the coup. Now the assurances and the guarantees must be strengthened. There must also be urgent provision for dealing with the humanitarian need to let people go safely back to their homes. There must be a new mandate for the United Nations Force. There must be new guarantees ensuring the future independence and sovereignty of the island. There must also be confirmation of the unanimous calls already made for a phased withdrawal of all Greek and Turkish troops from the republic.

Such an initiative should come not from the United Nations General Assembly but from the Security Council where unanimity can add strength to the resolution.

On behalf of the Friends of Cyprus I have urged that the British Government should take the initiative. We in this country have had a long association with Cyprus; we still have bases in the island; we have obligations under the 1960 agreements. We have a unique opportunity to put forward a full plan for future action, a plan which it would be difficult for other powers—including the super powers—to propose but which all could accept.

The dreadful damage which has been done and the even greater dangers which threaten cry out for such a new initiative.

I have had a long association with Cyprus. I first acted as Governor during the Second World War. At that time, relations between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were easy and friendly. There were officials, judges, members of the Executive Council from both communities, and both served in the same military units. Much later, I returned in bad times but when I left in 1960 as the last Governor of Cyprus I paid my respects to both Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kutchuk (the leader of the Turkish Cypriots at that time). We had worked together with trust and confidence for more than a year to establish in harmony an independent sovereign Cyprus.

I am convinced that cooperation and conciliation are possible. There is no need for the beautiful island to be torn apart in hate and bloodshed. The drift to disaster must be stopped. There must be an alternative to violent confrontation.

Glavkos Clerides and Raouf Denktash are setting an example. We are all deeply thankful for their lead. Now we must surely do all we can to see that they are not hindered but encouraged and assisted.

[From the New York Times, Aug. 18, 1974]

THE MAD HONEY OF PONTUS

(By C. L. Sulzberger)

TRABZON, Turkey—When Xenophon's Ten Thousand hacked their way out of the Ciscaucasian Mountains east of here 25 centuries ago, they screamed: "Thalassa, Thalassa" as they sighted the sullen Black Sea and stumbled down to the slate-colored rollers. Shortly afterward they were devastated by the famous "mad" honey distilled by frenzied bees from the azalea of this Pontus region.

The mad honey still exists. It is garnered in villages but not sold in the towns where city folk fear its effects. Yet, judging by events, it would seem to have been lavishly consumed by the successor governments of Pontus—now the Turkish republic in Ankara—and of the Xenophon—the Greek regime in Athens. Their recent behavior shows signs of being inflamed by the same exalted unreason for which the Pontic nectar was renowned.

I came up here to find out whether people feared that nearby Russia, which occupied Trabzon before the Czarist collapse in World War I, might again intrude amid the confusion of the Czarist crisis. Late one night in Trabzon a voice from Ankara, sounding over the dilapidated telephone system like the faint squeal of a worm, informed me things were going from bad to worse with Greece.

But residents of this area were less concerned with the immediacy of a potential Russian threat than the legacy of an ancient Greek quarrel. "We are used to Russia," said the acting governor. "When you're close to the fire you get accustomed to it." More urgent in the public mind—although there seemed a strange tranquility—was Greece.

Trabzon was the capital of a Greek Byzantine state, ruled by the Grand Comnenus, that fell to the Turks eight years later than Constantinople (Istanbul). Greeks lived here for immemorial times. When the Czar's armies withdrew after the Bolshevik Revolution, the Orthodox Metropolitan Chrysanthos sought to re-create an independent Pontus. This endeavor collapsed during the mass population exchange following the Asia Minor war, half a century ago. Chrysanthos had to shepherd out 164,000 Pontic Christians. None are left.

Unfortunately, all these old disputes come to mind when modern crises explode. During the Cyprus talks the present Athens foreign minister compared the loss of Kyrenia—a tiny Greek Cypriote town not even governed by Athens—with that of Constantinople in 1453 and Smyrna (Izmir) in 1923 (largely Greek inhabited but ruled by the Turks for generations save for a brief period after World War I).

The Turks, for their part, sometimes speak of the "generosity" of Kemal Ataturk, who defeated Greece and created the new Turkish Republic, in not having demanded sovereignty over his birthplace, Salonika, and over the Greek islands off Turkey's coast.

Cyprus is a symbol of all this. Ten years ago this month Greek and Turkish Cypriotes were at it hammer and tong; the United Nations was voting cease-fires and Greece had announced it was withdrawing military forces from NATO. Aegean history repeats itself like a broken phonograph disk.

Now, it would seem, the rupture may last long. NATO is broken; the Turks appear unconcerned about the Soviet danger, which was why they joined the alliance originally; the allies don't know what to do. Henry Kissinger is trying to get Greece fully back into NATO. He was planning official visits here and to Athens in October. Now it might prove perhaps an unpropitious time.

I have talked at length with the principal leaders concerned in this dangerous argument—Greek Premier Caramanlis and Defense Minister Averoff; Turkish President Koroturk, Premier Ecevit and Defense Minister Isik. They are intelligent, reasonable men on all subjects but one—Cyprus.

Ankara has a very legitimate claim to protect the Turkish Cypriote minority, which for long was badly treated by Archbishop Makarios and unofficial Greek Cypriote gangs. It also has justifiable concern about the island's strategic importance—lying just off Turkey's coast.

But the Greeks have every right to be furious about Ankara's high-handed ultimatum diplomacy, ignoring every sentiment of the new Athens democracy and endangering its existence, using the excuse of the previous military junta's mistakes to invade and partition Cyprus. This might risk ultimately destroying Premier Caramanlis—from the right, or from the left. It has already torn apart NATO.

Was the substitution of armed might for diplomacy worth these results to Ankara? That, I cannot believe. Meantime the entire Western alliance has suffered a crippling wound. It is time to stop tasting the mad Pontic honey, which seems so to impair the judgment of statesmen.

[From *Commonweal*, Sept. 6, 1974]

CYPRUS—THREE-DIMENSIONAL PROGRAM

(By Richard C. Hottelet)

If the tragedy of Cyprus hammers home one lesson it is this: time alone does not heal.

Cyprus is a part of the age-old struggle between Turk and Greek, burdened with the rancid heritage of a Kulturkampf fought in song and story, in open war and private blood. In a way, ingrained for a longer time, it is more intractable than the conflict between Jew and Arab in the Middle East. Nothing could be more wrong than to treat the Cyprus question as a local affair, resolvable by some quick stroke of pen or sword, or otherwise to be wrapped up and put away for calmer times and cooler tempers.

Ten years ago, when the first effort at solution came unstuck, a United Nations force (UNFICYP) was devised to do what heavy water or graphite do in a nuclear reactor: to separate the radioactive components of the pile and keep them from coming together in a critical mass. The hope was that a reduction in the level of violence, the onset of what could be accepted as normality, would develop from day to day a habit of peaceful interaction between the Greek majority and the Turkish minority inside the framework of a single state, a sovereign member of the United Nations. Some years before, the UN had been enlisted in similar, neater fashion, to man a clear frontier line between Israel and Egypt. But in 1967,

the UN Emergency Force in the Middle East was swept away at Nasser's command. In 1974 UNFICYP found itself elbowed aside by a Turkish army landing on Cyprus. Each time the UN had helped to provide ten years of breathing space but the statesmen who should have used the opportunity to settle the essential dispute found it impossible.

One reason is that—as far as Cyprus is concerned—the problem is three dimensional. The tension between the Greek and Turkish communities on Cyprus is closest to home. It is, however, inseparable from the background of friction between Greek and Turk, which began long before the fall of Byzantium. Above them both is the NATO factor, the strategic considerations which flow from Greece and Turkey's membership in the western alliance. This last touches on such sensitive points as Turkey's control of and Moscow's never extinguished lust for the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. It affects the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean—not so much through the sovereign British bases on Cyprus itself as through bases and other facilities in Greece and Turkey of interest to the United States.

Those who incline to think that the United States coddled the successive military regimes of Greece simply in order to satisfy some geopolitical appetite of the Pentagon may reflect on the events of September 1970. When the radical Palestinian guerrilla groups forced a life or death showdown with King Hussein of Jordan and when an armored force from Syria crossed the border into Jordan to support them, the United States saw the fragile chance of political settlement in the Middle East in danger of being swept away. Washington together with Israel, decided as a last resort openly to intervene on Hussein's side. The Israeli air force was only minutes away but the U.S. airborne contingents which would have gone into Amman—ostensibly to evacuate American citizens—had to be drawn from the United States and Germany. NATO would have no part of the operation. The soldiers from Germany were not allowed to overfly France but had to be flown around Europe to the only land base available for the final push, the Greek island of Rhodes. Whatever might have been the risk of this intervention, the fact that it was possible may in the end have made it unnecessary. Syria withdrew the tanks; Hussein prevailed.

United States commitment in the Greco-Turkish area is older and broader. President Truman, in March 1947, enunciated the doctrine that the U.S. would help Greece and Turkey defend themselves against open or covert Soviet aggression. Moscow had been supporting a civil war in Greece and had been pressing Turkey to turn over not only a base on the Bosphorus but also the eastern provinces of Kars and Ardahan. Britain, drained by World War II, could not continue its traditional role in Greece. Without the Truman Doctrine, Greece and Turkey might well have succumbed. Later, in order to spread and more widely to institutionalize the American responsibility, both countries were brought into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Great Britain, which held Cyprus from 1878 to 1959, when it gave the island independence, is intimately concerned with the local problem. Britain, together with Greece and Turkey, is a guarantor power of the painfully contrived constitution with which Cyprus became a sovereign state. This constitution, providing elaborate legal safeguards for the distinct life of the Turkish community on the predominantly Greek island, was set aside by the President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, at the end of 1963. He found it—with its Turkish vetoes in matters of taxes, defense and foreign affairs, as well as the ethnic proportions prescribed for the army, police and civil service—an insuperable barrier to efficient government. The ethnic Turks saw their existence in danger. Intercommunal fighting flared up beyond the capacity of Britain or NATO to control. UNFICYP, the UN force, was dispatched to keep the lid on.

Turkey had been ready to intervene at once but was dissuaded by what Dean Acheson later called "the most vigorous representations from the government of the United States." Again in June 1964, after new and increased violence, Turkey prepared to send a force to Cyprus—only to be told by President Lyndon Johnson that the US Sixth Fleet would intervene, if necessary, to stop it. This was long before the colonels seized power in Greece. The warning, which bitterly antagonized Turkey, was the price the U.S. was willing to pay to avert the nightmare of a NATO war.

In 1974 that nightmare threatened to become reality. Cyprus had been quiet for years, as regards Greeks and Turks. It was inside the Greek camp that proponents of enosis (union with Greece), led by the guerrilla gangs of EOKA-B in the tradition of the late Gen. Grivas, intensified their violent protest against Markarios' policy of status quo sovereignty. Assuming, probably correctly, that

EOKA-B worked hand in glove with the Greek officers who had run the Cyprus National Guard since 1964, Makarios asked Athens to order them home. The regime in Athens replied by overthrowing Makarios.

Several things combined to turn this Greek quarrel into a Greek-Turkish crisis. Firstly, Athens and Ankara had been on each other's nerves over the exploitation of newly discovered oilfields in the Aegean Sea. Secondly, the man who replaced Makarios, Nicos Sampson, was a red cloth to the Turkish bull—characterized by Ankara as a thug and murderer in earlier violence against the Turkish community. Thirdly, although Sampson immediately disavowed enosis, Turkey assumed that he would give the enosis movement new impetus, especially since a success of that sort would greatly strengthen the Athens regime of Brigadier Ioannides. Fourthly, the Turks' pent up frustration of 1964—which, incidentally, had been aggravated in almost exactly the same way in 1967—could not tolerate a new defeat. The government of Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit was weak. It would not have been able, even had it wanted, to keep the Turkish army from landing on Cyprus.

The U.S. saw the impossibility of restraining the Turks and concentrated, at first, on persuading the Greeks not to indulge in the folly of attacking Turkey. In a few days, the high point of crisis seemed over. Sampson had been replaced on Cyprus by the moderate Glafkos Clerides. In Athens, the colonels were out and constitutional government restored under Constantine Caramanlis. Both changes were welcomed in Ankara. However, it was soon clear that they made no difference to a Turkish government which was determined not to allow Cyprus to return even to the status quo of 1960. The Turks declared that they intended to keep a military presence on the island as protection for their kinsmen and to accept nothing less than federation as the new political structure of Cyprus. The Greeks see federation as a euphemism for partition.

On the island, the Turkish army took little notice of calls for cease fire by the UN Security Council or by the Geneva Conference of the Guarantor Powers. UNFICYP was pushed aside as the Turks enlarged the territory they controlled and roughly expelled the Greek Cypriot population. When the Geneva negotiations did not give Turkey the political solution it sought, a loose bi-communal federation, the Turks moved ruthlessly to capitalize on their strategic advantage. They broke out of the Kyrenia beachhead to cut off the entire northeastern third of the island.

The U.S. and Britain had tried to persuade the Turks not to go too far, arguing that concessions could still be achieved for the Turkish community through negotiation. Ankara would not listen. Anglo-American leverage is limited. NATO needs Turkey almost as much as Turkey needs NATO. Another argument which Ankara disregarded was that inflicting too deep a humiliation on the Greeks would be counter-productive. Greece is prepared to swallow a great deal. Too much would put the new government under patriotic pressure—not from the right, which is bankrupt, but from the left. On Cyprus, Clerides, who is by far the best the Turks will find to deal with, could be swept away by Ankara's intransigence and replaced by men who would wage guerrilla war against the Turkish community and the Turkish army. Since Cyprus is 80 percent Greek and the Turkish army's performance so far has not earned it military laurels, this could open a new and fateful chapter of the Cyprus story. London and Washington are now trying to bring the parties to the negotiating table, where a certain measure of compromise might lead to a *modus vivendi* and avert the worst.

The Soviet Union, meanwhile, follows events closely. Excluded from the Geneva Conference, it would like to see the authority of the UN Security Council—in which Moscow has a loud voice and a definitive veto—imposed on the Cyprus negotiations. Its purpose would be to preserve Cyprus as a sovereign, nonaligned state with NATO forces withdrawn, a bone of contention between Greece and Turkey and a perennial source of domestic discord in them both. So far, Moscow has tried not to offend Turkey yet to hold open doors to the new government in Athens. It has strongly endorsed Archbishop Makarios as the legitimate President of Cyprus, while Britain has tipped its hat to him and Washington has looked the other way, ready to accept him too if he brought stability but very much doubting that he could. Makarios, for his part, is waiting in London for whatever may come.

One response of the world community at the outset of the crisis was to enlarge UNFICYP and agree to make it a buffer around the zone of Turkish control on Cyprus. The new function has now been overtaken by events, together with the original mandate of 1964. If a Cyprus settlement is not found, UNFICYP would

find itself the international guarantor of the Turkish *fait accompli*, or caught in a guerilla war, or simply floundering on the sidelines—each clearly unacceptable. Experience has made one thing abundantly clear: UN peace forces do not solve problems; *vide* Kashmir and the Middle East. They only buy time for settlement. If governments do not use that time it can become an explosive rather than a healing force.

[From the New York Times, Oct. 9, 1974]

FOREIGN AFFAIRS—THE CYPRUS TEST

(By C. L. Sulzberger)

Athens.—If Henry Kissinger can first obtain at least some concessions from Turkey, Greece is prepared to regard the Secretary of State as a valid mediator in the unhappy Cyprus affair, despite contradictory statements by politicians contesting this country's first free election in years. But something tangible must be secured; also Washington should make public its private acknowledgment that, even if recent policy was not "mistaken," it contained "omissions."

This, in a nutshell, may be considered the basic position of Athens with respect to both the U.S.A. and, ultimately, NATO. If Washington takes a diplomatic initiative, relations between this country and the United States as well as those between this country and NATO should improve appreciably after the November balloting creates a normal parliamentary government.

The Greeks are a proud, emotional people and ardently embrace positions unusual for other nations. Their Government is fully aware of NATO's flabby Mediterranean posture and how this weakens Greece. It also fears that after Tito's death Moscow may press Yugoslavia back into the Soviet fold and seek to revive the former idea of a South Slav federation, including claims on Greek Macedonia.

But it is argued that, despite these disturbing prospects, if forced to choose between security and honor, honor comes first. Such certainly was the case in 1940 when Greece spurned an Italian ultimatum and in 1941 when it spurned a German ultimatum.

This is romance, not *realpolitik*; yet it lies at the heart of Greece's contemporary thinking. And it will remain there after the voting because Premier Caramanlis, today's national strongman, will almost certainly retain that position next month and one knows his opinions on the above matters.

Like most of his countrymen, he considers it an American responsibility to get Greek-Turkish talks on Cyprus moving by successfully pressing for some preliminary Ankara gesture; but he differs from many others in believing this procedure could ultimately produce a satisfactory settlement.

Today Greece feels let down by the American Government and immensely bitter. One leader comments: "Aristotle wrote that bitterness between brothers is the most acute; because the Greeks were so pro-American, they feel particularly hurt. Britain had a treaty responsibility to intervene in Cyprus as a guarantor and based troops there. But the people trusted America above all. Therefore you are the scapegoat."

Nevertheless, the problem of Greek relationships with the United States and the grand alliance is not irremediable. Although Mr. Caramanlis ordered withdrawal from NATO's military commands, Greece has proceeded with exceptional deliberation in implementing this decision.

Meanwhile, U.S. naval vessels quietly continue to use Greek facilities, above all vital Suda Bay in Crete. The background of friendship remains. If Washington moves visibly to alleviate Greece's psychological distress, old bonds may be restored.

America has privately explained that "omissions" in handling the Cyprus crisis occurred because our Government was overwhelmed at the time by Watergate's final denouement. Yet, such implied apologies have not been publicized and the Greek people, not just their statesmen, are enraged. They need to know. Washington must openly clarify its position and take the initiative in persuading Turkey to help prospects for valid settlement by concrete gestures of compromise.

As for NATO, there is specific disgruntlement in addition to pique at alliance inability to put the brakes on Turkey when—unlike its first Cyprus landing after the dying Athens junta staged a coup there—Turkey invaded a second time, unprovoked, in the middle of Geneva peace talks.

During the consequent crisis, Greece requested NATO's Secretary General Luns to summon the alliance council. But Mr. Luns, according to Athens, was on holiday and refused to interrupt his vacation.

It is now believed there are "signs of change" in United States policy but these remain to be made public. If that is done—and if Mr. Kissinger pursues an initiative with the Turks—the American and NATO alliances might regain meaning and the storm could blow away.

Yet we are still far from that point. Moreover, those in charge here insist that if an acceptable Cyprus solution is not achieved "in time," there will be a dramatic deterioration. Mr. Caramanlis, a pragmatic leader, not a demagogue, acknowledges limits on his ability to calm his volatile people.

And without an agreed settlement, Cyprus will erupt again. Another explosion could shake the entire Mediterranean, Middle East and Balkan area. The next move, says Athens, is Uncle Sam's; he had better move soon.

[From the N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1974]

LOOKING INTO AN AEGEAN CRYSTAL BALL

(By C. L. Sulzberger)

ATHENS.—The solution of the Cyprus crisis is essentially predicated on three things: continuation of a Caramanlis regime in Greece; maintenance of some kind of cogent government in a confused Turkish political situation; and a successful American diplomatic intervention that produces tangible evidence of a desire for compromise on Turkey's part.

The two communal leaders in Cyprus itself, Glafkos Clerides and Rauf Denktash (representing Greek-speakers and Turkish-speakers) have kept their own bilateral talks going against great odds and achieved some success. And Archbishop Makarios, whose return might touch off trouble, has been persuaded to stay away from the island—at least for a while. Thus the key problems are all external to Cyprus itself.

Premier Caramanlis is likely to gain a majority in next month's elections here (the first in a decade) thus reinforcing his position; otherwise he will lead a coalition. The Turkish outlook is less clear; but the army there always remains the ultimate power force and its leadership must be persuaded. Can Washington achieve that?

Strangely, the Greek situation seems more stable this moment, which is a tribute to the leadership of Premier Caramanlis who took over in emergency circumstances from the despotic junta. He led the nation away from a potential military disaster and has now prepared for restoration of parliamentary government. The likelihood is his firm guidance will avert hysteria over Cyprus.

Although Mr. Caramanlis bitterly resents the second (August) Turkish invasion of that island because it was aimed at his policies, he has kept his cool. (The first Turkish invasion, in July, was aimed at the junta which sponsored a Cypriote coup.) Mr. Caramanlis would probably even ignore the hysterical prejudice against a "federal solution" and accept a reasonable Cyprus federation if the Turks show moderation.

But the Greeks are skeptical enough to doubt the Turks own instincts for reason. They count on American pressure and in this respect Mr. Caramanlis is twisting Washington's arm by threats to undermine the U.S. strategic position. The Premier was an avid student of de Gaulle's diplomatic blackmail techniques.

Right now, the word "Cyprus" symbolizes all Greece's problems: inflation, a shaky economy, uneasiness about potential officer plots, the monarchy-versus-republic question, constitutional reform and widespread public demands for a purge of junta leaders and their nastiest tools.

If Cyprus can be pacified, under a new accord acceptable to Athens and Ankara (as well as their Cypriote clients), much of the pressure here will be relieved. The Greeks now seem to favor total demilitarization of an independent Cyprus, removing not only all Greek and Turkish troops but also British bases. The Soviet bloc and the Arabs both favor this approach. Since London is trying to save defense farthings everywhere, this idea should prove a winner.

Mr. Caramanlis has his own team working on economic problems. Solving them, of course, depends on what happens in the whole Western world; but he seems to reckon that with discipline and restraint, the Greek picture can be substantially improved within two or three years.

The gravest internal concern is the twinned problem of restoring discipline in the armed forces while at the same time satisfying popular demands for a purge.

The army was carefully politicized during the colonels' seven-year rule and most of the officers retired to make way for junta appointees are too old or no longer qualified for commands.

The new Government has prudently attacked the question piecemeal, removing, retiring or sequestering key military opponents without risking the flare-up of a sizable revolt. Many junta appointees who violently opposed King Constantine's return now seem to favor it—hoping he might save them from a purge. This is silly; if the King is voted back by referendum (which is impossible) he will first be deprived of any real power.

My own guess, when regarding the clouded Greek looking-glass, is that Mr. Caramanlis will come back even stronger, that a republic will be established with strong presidential authority, that he will be elected to that office, and that there will be a limited purge of principal junta officials, a purge conducted under regular legal procedures at a time when public passions have subsided.

[From The New York Times, Aug. 19, 1974]

NEXT STEPS ON CYPRUS

Greece's rejection of American mediation in the Cyprus disaster and the unwillingness of either Athens or the Greek Cypriote Government to enter new negotiations with Turkey are entirely understandable. But these refusals cannot justify diplomatic time-marking either by the United Nations or by the United States, which bears heavy responsibility for the Cyprus tragedy.

An effort must be launched without delay to bind up the wounds, both physical and psychological, and to prepare a climate for new negotiations at the earliest feasible moment. For a beginning, Washington might take the lead, either at the United Nations or through the International Committee of the Red Cross, in raising funds for the vast job of relief and resettlement of refugees that will be required. The Red Cross estimates that 100,000 Greek Cypriotes and many thousands of Turkish Cypriotes have been displaced by the military action.

Beyond relief, resettlement and aid for economic recovery, however, Washington must exert its best efforts to persuade Turkey—as a means of bringing Greece and the Greek Cypriotes back to the negotiating table—to withdraw from some of the Cyprus areas its troops have overrun. In the first forthright statement to come out of official Washington, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger said yesterday that Turkey's advance on Cyprus "has gone beyond what any of its friends or sympathizers is prepared to accept."

If Secretary of State Kissinger agrees with Mr. Schlesinger, he should be able to use the political capital he built up with Premier Ecevit during the Turkish aggression to persuade Ankara to order the territorial and troop withdrawals that could make meaningful negotiation possible. Mr. Ecevit was as full of praise for what he called Mr. Kissinger's "objective" conduct during the last week as the Greek Government was outraged by it.

Turkey has long had legitimate complaints about the treatment of the 120,000 Turkish Cypriotes and a good case to make for granting them a greater measure of local autonomy. And Turkey had every reason to regard the putsch of July 15 against President Makarios, ordered by the squalid military dictatorship in Athens, as the prelude for an attempt to force enosis—the union of Cyprus with Greece—probably with Washington's approval.

Had Turkey halted its forces after the modest initial intervention of July 20, aimed at protecting Turkish Cypriotes and preventing enosis, it would have been in a strong bargaining position with the support of nearly all the NATO allies. The coup on Cyprus had backfired with a blast that blew the Greek junta out of power and brought in a civilian government headed by Constantine Caramanlis, who had enjoyed excellent relations with Turkey.

But the temptation for Ankara to achieve by force its long-sought partition of Cyprus while a new Athens Government was still feeling its way proved too strong. As Mr. Schlesinger said yesterday, "the spillover of Turkish forces has gone beyond anything contemplated and has caused great distress."

What might help most in this situation is a quiet approach to Ankara by President Ford, acknowledging the case for greater autonomy for the Turkish Cypriotes but emphasizing the importance of renewing negotiations and suggesting that Turkey should be willing to give up some of the territory it now occupies on Cyprus in order to get them under way.

[From The Times, London, Sept. 2, 1974]

SOVIET COOPERATION COULD STRENGTHEN UN HAND IN THE AEGEAN

(By Nichos E. Devletoglu)

The author is Professor of Political Economy at the University of Athens

A GREEK VIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL MANEUVERING OVER CYPRUS

The charges made here by Professor Devletoglu have been vigorously denied, and there is no evidence of American intervention against Greece. Indeed, 14 Greek transport aircraft flew troops to Nicosia on July 21. We are publishing Professor Devletoglu's article because he does reflect important Greek opinion. In a situation such as Cyprus beliefs, even those without foundation, can be as powerful as proven facts. Professor Devletoglu is known for his conservative views, but he is now welcoming cooperation with the Soviet Union, including the presence of Warsaw Pact troops in a peace-keeping force.

In the aftermath of the disastrous past few weeks in Cyprus, it is with an added sense of shock that I find myself compelled to comment on the un-American activities of the American Secretary of State in that area. Already, it is becoming clear that the tragedy of Cyprus is pointing toward Henry Kissinger's Waterloo in Europe.

The view in Athens is that the Sixth Fleet of the United States, which Greece has been harbouring largely at her own expense for some time now, had received explicit instructions from Washington to obstruct any Greek attempts to send reinforcements to Cyprus during the Turkish invasion of the island. It is also believed that the Turkish military onslaught against the independence of the miniature republic of Cyprus on July 20 was surreptitiously supported by Washington, following the latter's failure to gain control of Cyprus by means of the coup it has organized five days earlier against Archbishop Makarios through the now defunct Greek junta.

These facts have been personally confirmed to me by reliable and authoritative sources both in Washington and in Athens.

Greeks are convinced that under Dr. Kissinger's high auspices and personal instructions, the Turkish Army assaulted and illegally occupied 40 per cent of Cyprus and more than 70 per cent of the island's resources creating by now some 250,000 refugees—nearly 50 per cent of the island's Greek population. These innocent people have now left their land panic-stricken. As it happens, too, their homeland was endowed with most of the island's water, and covered extensive cereal-growing and citrus plantations. Official sources in Cyprus further confirmed to me that in the Lefka region, the Greek people have thus lost some 60 per cent of their mineral resources (such as copper) as well as the lime quarries of Kythrea. In Kyrenia and Famagusta they have further lost their flourishing tourist centres, and in the Nicosia/Famagusta industrial area they have lost some of the largest and most advanced factories in Cyprus.

According to the latest estimates Cyprus is forfeiting over £2m worth of production a day. Exports are already down by some 60 per cent compared with last year, and prospects for the immediate future will be still bleaker if, in addition, perishable resources such as the citrus plantations in the north continue to be left without water. I was also given to understand that as a result of the fighting about 20 per cent of the island's main national forests have been burned down. And, in fact, the devastation has been so widespread that merely to replant these forests would cost about £3m. What is more, the cost of repairing buildings, such public works as roads, irrigation and water supply networks, and effectively financing loans to individuals in both personal and commercial distress must be well over £100m.

If only by virtue of its perverse nature, which has recklessly challenged the rule of law in the community of nations, the Turkish attitude has by now fermented an explosive international problem. Only this week Mr. Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, defied world opinion threatening to establish an "independent Turkish Republic of Cyprus", if, as he put it, Greece were to raise the Cyprus problem in the United Nations General Assembly. This alone explains why even though the Russian call for a broader international conference on Cyprus—involving possibly the permanent members of the Security Council, the war-waging party and Greece—may carry a certain propaganda element, it is nevertheless a move in the right direction. Turkey, as expected, has politely rejected this plan. It has been said, too, especially by the British, that it is difficult, if

not impossible, to visualize "grandiose" conferences and multi-national initiatives making much impact. It has even been said that Russia, groping for so long in pursuit of an initiative of its own, is now merely being cleverly obstructive. Neither contention is true.

It was personally indicated to me in Geneva just over two weeks ago, that Russia was only being discreet and passively helpful in the hope that so deep-cutting a human problem might soon be resolved in an honourable manner within the Western alliance. But nothing of the kind has happened. Nor, of course, is Greece—already in the process of disengaging itself from Nato—ever likely to be returning to anything approximating last month's Turkish "victory" rally in Geneva.

Much as expected, too, Russia has been drawn inextricably into what amounts to a timely and basically moral proposal—already accepted in principle by Greece, but for the moment rejected by Turkey and naturally proving anathema to the deeper Kissingerian design of forcibly establishing an American base in Cyprus. Despite this opposition, however, the Russian plan is bound to mature into some ultimately acceptable form and thus possibly create in the end an *operational United Nations force by including Warsaw Pact troops*. If, indeed, it should gather the momentum it deserves (and mounting EEC interest spear-headed by France increases this likelihood), resolutions of the United Nations would not merely produce paper tigers for aggressors to ignore. Quite on the contrary, as in this case, where the international community were to rule that Turkey had to be called to order in a particular manner (militarily and otherwise), it would naturally be in the position of putting into effect its decision physically dislodging, if necessary, the Turkish army from where it should not be. For far too long the United Nations has been little more than a kind of Greek chorus explaining the world's human dramas rather than positively affecting them. By contrast, a joint Nato Alliance-Warsaw Pact international force along the proposed Greco-Russian lines could be paving the way toward the establishment of a decisively humanitarian role for the United Nations.

It is in this context that the dramatic new relationship between France, Greece and the Soviet Union will perhaps bring peace to Cyprus and much deserved normality to both the Turkish and Greek communities in the island. The suggestion of a wider Conference which this sudden entente has produced can clearly enhance the authority of the international community—not only by means of establishing a workable new constitution in order to uphold the independence of the Republic of Cyprus but also by enforcing the observance of such a constitution. Turkey chose to invade a sovereign state, and America chose not to stop that invasion. Neither was unaware of Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations which reads (naturally less idly than both of these countries might have expected) as follows. "All members shall refrain from the threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."

This, too, is why the restoration and maintenance of a fully independent and united Republic of Cyprus should now become the immediate goal of all future action within the community of nations. Together with a clear and equitable definition of the requirements and strategy for a permanent settlement under a new constitution, the proposed conference or some variant of it will probably produce in the end a *global* effort free to build upon the embryonic attempts already undertaken on a *local* level between the two communities.

With the massive and commanding authority of such an international body at work, widespread "liberation" initiatives based on guerrilla warfare in Cyprus will simply have to stop dead in their tracks, and those legitimate and long-term aspirations of the Turkish minority to play a decisive role in shaping a new Cyprus will undoubtedly materialize.

[Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 20, 1974]

CYPRUS AND U.S. POLICY

It can hardly be said that the American policy of "hands off" on Cyprus has proved effective. Greece lies humiliated and a wave of anti-Americanism is sweeping the country. The new government in Athens has angrily pulled its troops from NATO. The headstrong Turks, initially advancing with Washington's merely mild disapproval, are still pressing their military advantage on the island. And now United States Ambassador to Cyprus Rodger Davies has been assassinated during a demonstration by Greek Cypriots in a dreadful act of vengeance against the United States.

Washington clearly saw some benefits to be gained from Turkey's unrestrained resort to force.

Archbishop Makarios, who dallied with the Communists, has been removed from the scene, Cyprus has come more firmly under the aegis of Turkey, which is more important to the NATO alliance than Greece, and Turkey's redress of the military balance on Cyprus has laid the basis for a better political solution there.

But the price of letting events take their course has been high. As the situation worsens, Washington is getting tougher in its diplomatic stance. It has sent conciliatory messages to Athens, and Defense Secretary Schlesinger has warned the Turks against using their superiority to drive the Greeks "into a corner," indicating also the U.S. will reassess its provision of military and economic aid to Turkey.

Whether there is bite behind the growl remains to be seen. While it is doubtful that a cut-off of aid to Turkey at an earlier stage would have done any good, we nonetheless believe that strong sanctions are in order.

The urgent imperative is to get all parties back to Geneva to start negotiating. Greece, with its wounded pride, refuses to return in a weak bargaining position, and because the U.S. has lost its credit in Athens it is only in a position to pressure the Turks, who now have Cyprus at their mercy.

Washington should exert its influence to induce Ankara to give up some of the territory seized on Cyprus as a gesture to the Greeks. Presumably the Turks are pressing forward with a view to yielding the new land grabs as a concession in Geneva and still keeping their earlier gains. It must be impressed on them that they cannot cling to everything because this would only plunge Cyprus into a tragic guerrilla war.

By its gentle diplomacy as Turkish forces slashed across the top third of Cyprus, the United States has gained political leverage in Ankara. It is to be hoped that leverage will now be fully exploited.

[From The Times (London), Aug. 19, 1974]

MEANS WHICH DEFEAT THE END

There is a growing discrepancy between Turkey's stated aims in Cyprus and the methods used to attain them. The former are or were admitted by a wide consensus of international opinion to be not unreasonable. Since 1963 the Turkish Cypriots had not enjoyed the rights promised to them under the basic articles of the Constitution which Turkey, with Greece and Britain, had guaranteed. Western diplomats who succeeded in dissuading Turkey from intervening in 1963 and in the various crises which followed were willing to admit that her grievances against the regime of Archbishop Makarios were at least partly justified. Consequently when Turkey did take the plunge of intervention last month after the final provocation of the Ioannides-Sampson coup, it would have been unreasonable to expect her to withdraw without seeing those earlier grievances put to rights. For whatever reason the Turkish troops went in on July 20, it was not for the pleasure of seeing Archbishop Makarios restored to unfettered power over Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike.

Legalistically their aim to restore "constitutional order" in Cyprus could have been interpreted as meaning that they wanted the letter of the 1960 Constitution to be re-enforced—with a Turkish vice-president, and Turkish representation at all levels in the state from the government downwards, but still in the context of a unitary state. But many impartial observers of the events of 1963 shared the Turkish view that that formula had proved unworkable, and that Turkish Cypriots needed some more tangible form of security. In practice they had taken this for ten years by barricading themselves inside a number of territorial enclaves, but at the price of accepting restrictions on their movements and forgoing any share in the general conduct of their country's affairs.

The events of last month appeared to offer a chance to negotiate a new and better constitution, in which these enclaves would be preserved (and probably enlarged) not as military ghettos but as the territory of the Turkish state or canton within a bi-national federation. By the beginning of last week Mr. Clerides, representing the Greek Cypriots at the Geneva talks, was apparently willing to accept this principle, although of course he could not comply with the Turkish government's demand that he accept their proposal in all its territorial exorbitance without even taking thirty-six hours to consult his colleagues.

The Turkish government still assert that this is their aim. They still disclaim any desire to partition Cyprus, still less to annex it. (In this they are probably sincere, for annexation would saddle them with the problem of governing a hostile Greek Cypriot population, while partition would enable Greece to establish a military base in Turkey's rear.) They still say that they want Cyprus to remain united (though not unitary) and independent. They still see themselves, and wish others to see them, as liberators and not conquerors.

That cannot change the fact that what they have actually done is to send three army divisions to Cyprus and occupy more than one third of its territory, clearly against the wishes of the majority of the population. Even for the Turkish Cypriots their action has been at best a mixed blessing. No doubt it has brought joy to many of the 66,000 who live north of the "Attila Line". But what of the 44,000 who live south of it? Their sufferings since July 20 have been abundantly publicized by Turkish propaganda, and are not likely to cease now—unless the Turks allow themselves to be provoked into occupying the whole island, which is precisely what they say they do not want to do.

It is clear that the "independence" of Cyprus, if it is to mean anything, is not compatible with the permanent occupation of one third of the island by Turkish troops. Nor can the Turkish Cypriots find true security under the permanent protection of Turkish bayonets. Turkey's aim must be to obtain conditions which will enable her to withdraw her troops, and which will enable the Turkish Cypriots to live in security after they have left. Those conditions can only be obtained by negotiation; negotiation between Turks and Greeks, but more especially between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. They will be much more difficult to obtain now than they would have been a week ago. But the effort still has to be made, and it is in the interest of both Turkish and Greek Cypriots to make it.

The Greeks will be strongly tempted to take an "Arab" attitude, and refuse to negotiate on the basis of a fait accompli. The Turks may be equally tempted to take an "Israeli" attitude—that is, one so inflexible as to make any negotiation an almost impossible humiliation for their opponents. But the history of that other Middle Eastern conflict hardly suggests that either side would have anything to gain by following its example.

[London Times, Sept. 11, 1974]

PRISONERS AND REFUGEES IN CYPRUS

A small glimmer of light has appeared in the Cyprus crisis with the re-establishment of some sort of working relationship between Mr Clerides and Mr Denktash. Their meeting last Friday was a limited success and today they are meeting again, two days ahead of schedule, with a good prospect of reaching agreement at least on the release of sick and wounded prisoners and of those under the age of eighteen. Much of the credit for this must go to the UN special representative, Mr Luis Weckmann.

Even so, the chances of making much further progress in these "humanitarian" discussions remain uncertain, because the humanitarian aspect of the problem is not really separable from the political one. If it could be assumed that prisoners of war once released would simply return to their former homes, agreement on that might be reached quite easily. But Mr Denktash argues that the Turkish Cypriot prisoners will not want to go back to their homes in the south of Cyprus, since there they would once again be at the mercy of the hostile Greek Cypriot majority. Under the Geneva Convention they must have the right to go to the place of their choice and this, he says, will normally be the area occupied by the Turkish army.

For Mr Clerides, however, it is clearly intolerable that these Turkish Cypriots should be encouraged to go and settle in that area so long as the Greek Cypriot refugees whose homes are there are not allowed to return. Since Greek-owned shops and cafés in that area are already reopening under Turkish management, his attitude is understandable.

The same problem arises over the Turkish refugees in the British Sovereign Base Area at Episkopi. They entered the base of their own free will and are therefore refugees, not prisoners. The Turkish government has offered to transfer them to the Turkish mainland, obviously intending to transfer them from there to the Turkish-occupied area of Cyprus. Normally speaking the response to this offer would be something for the refugees themselves, as free men and women, to decide. Yet if they want to accept the offer, and if Britain allows them to do so,

they too will soon be taking over Greek Cypriot property and pre-empting a political solution to the conflict. (Mr Denktash, by giving notice that Greek Cypriot property will be taken over and Greek smallholdings leased to Turkish Cypriots, has hardly helped to unravel the political and humanitarian aspects.)

The truly humanitarian solution would surely be for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots to return to their original homes under UN protection (and for this protection to be given also to the Greek Cypriot population which has remained in the Turkish-occupied zone, about whose safety Mr Clerides is understandably anxious). Only when all those displaced have been given the chance to go home in safety can voluntary migration be fairly allowed. Political negotiations, in whatever forum they are resumed, are now almost certain to end in agreement on the principle of an autonomous Turkish Cypriot zone. But the Turks can hardly expect a negotiated settlement so long as they appear to be imposing their own solution unilaterally and by force.

[From The Times, (London), Sept. 25, 1974]

THE NEED TO LET CYPRIOTS GO HOME

The exchange of prisoners of war in Cyprus, agreed on last Friday by Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash, appears to be going ahead smoothly, though it will be ten or twelve days before all five thousand of them are freed. It was possible to negotiate this exchange only by presenting it as a "humanitarian" problem. But it is far from being without political significance.

The majority of the prisoners have their homes in the areas where they were being held: Greek Cypriots mainly in the area occupied by the Turkish army, and Turkish Cypriots almost exclusively in the southern zone where the writ of the Greek Cypriot administration still runs. They are therefore being offered a choice: to return to their homes, thus remaining under "enemy" rule, or to go to the areas controlled by their kith and kin, thus becoming in some sense refugees. The majority, it appears, are opting for the latter alternative. An important step is thus taken towards that "voluntary" redistribution of the population which alone can make sense of the Turkish demand for a federation composed of two geographically defined autonomous zones.

The word "voluntary" needs to be put in inverted commas because in reality the choices have been largely pre-empted by acts of violence and force. This is obvious enough in the case of the Greek Cypriots. They would certainly want to return to their homes if that did not mean being isolated in an area occupied by foreign troops, without even the protection of United Nations forces. For the Turkish Cypriots there is at least the possibility of UN protection if they return to their homes in the south. But UN protection was found tragically wanting for a number of their compatriots during the terrible days of July and August. Understandably many of them now feel that, UN or no UN, they can never again live in safety in the midst of the Greek Cypriot population. And even those who might be willing to take the risk are clearly under strong pressure from the leaders of their own community to fall in with the Turkish plan.

If Mr Clerides accepted such a one-sided "voluntary" solution to the prisoner-of-war problem it was no doubt because the number of people involved was relatively small. It will clearly be much more difficult for him to let the same principle apply to the refugee problem. This is in effect what the Turks are asking. They want to turn the Turkish Cypriot refugees in the British base at Episkopi into a "humanitarian" problem (by describing them as "hostages"), while insisting that the Greek Cypriot refugees who fled from the Turkish occupation constitute a political problem. Thus in their view the Turkish Cypriot refugees should be allowed to go straight away, not to their homes (where they are free to go anyway) but to the Turkish-occupied zone, before the Greek Cypriot refugees are allowed to return to their homes which are in that zone.

That will hardly do. Refugees are, of course, both a political and a humanitarian problem. Their humanitarian need is, as Lord Caradon so succinctly put it in his article yesterday, to "go safely back to their homes", and it is the task of politicians on both sides, as well as benevolent third parties, to make that possible. It will not be possible so long as Turkey persists in her aim of incorporating the homes of the Greek Cypriot refugees into a new Turkish Cypriot economy closely integrated into that of mainland Turkey. It will only be possible when the one-sided protection of Turkish troops is replaced by the two-way protection of a much stronger United Nations force, with the political backing of a Security Council Resolution.

[From Human Events, Sept. 14, 1974]

HOW KISSINGER DROPPED BALL IN CYPRUS CRISIS

In a recent article Human Events gave Secretary of State Henry Kissinger high marks for his handling of the Arab-Israeli negotiations—while noting that his performance had left a lot to be desired in his various confrontations with the tough-minded negotiators of Moscow, Peking and Hanoi. But the international reputation he won for himself as a diplomatic broker through his handling of the Arab-Israeli negotiations has been seriously tarnished by his total inability to bring his diplomatic talents to bear in the Cyprus crisis.

It is now obvious that the Cyprus crisis has resulted in a disastrous diplomatic, political and military defeat for the United States and NATO, affecting their entire position in the Mediterranean and in Europe. Greece is out of NATO—and the American naval units and other units of the American Armed Forces now stationed in Greece will shortly be forced out of that country.

The Soviets have been able to present themselves to the Greek people as the defenders of Greece against the machinations of the American-Turkish imperialists. And, against the background of this propaganda, Andreas Papandreou, a Soviet sympathizer of many years standing, has emerged as one of the most prominent and most charismatic figures on the Greek political scene. According to some estimates, the Greek Socialist party, whose formation Papandreou recently announced, may already have the backing of more than a third of the Greek electorate.

NATO's entire southern flank has become a shambles—and there is reason to fear that the crisis will aggravate and accelerate the Soviet machinations aimed at the total subjugation of the Balkan peninsula.

Kissinger has excused his failure to act effectively in the Cyprus crisis with a plaintive assertion that the United States cannot be expected to solve all the world's problems. Certainly the United States did not encourage the coup which overthrew the government of Archbishop Makarios in Cyprus. But before the coup took place, was there anything the United States could have done that could have avoided the consequences of the supine, maladroit and disastrous policy Kissinger has thus far pursued?

There is reason for believing that we could have done much better—had our policy been based on adequate intelligence and foresight and an understanding of the forces at work in the area, but so inept has been our policy that it almost suggests a total failure of intelligence and a total failure of comprehension on Kissinger's part.

Had we had adequate intelligence—and it is difficult to believe that on this one point we did not have adequate intelligence—we could and should have moved to head off the Greek army coup which overthrew the Makarios regime.

Had we had adequate intelligence, we should have realized that the Greek coup was bound to trigger a Turkish invasion of Cyprus—and that once they had landed on Cyprus, the Turks would continue to push until they had effected a de facto partition of the island on terms highly favorable to the Turkish minority.

Had we had any kind of foresight, we should have understood that the Turkish invasion of Cyprus was bound to trigger the downfall of the Greek military junta—and the return of parliamentary government, replete with a large left-wing movement led by Andreas Papandreou.

Had we had foresight, we would not have been surprised by Prime Minister Karamanlis decision to withdraw from NATO but we would have understood that under the circumstances any pro-Western politician who wished to survive had to take this action in order to save the country from an immediate takeover by the Papandreou forces.

Had we had foresight, we would have anticipated the perfidious expansionist role which the Soviet Union has played in the Cyprus crisis and we would not have been surprised by the recent *Izvestia* article which charged: "In order to achieve these aims the imperialist circles do not scorn any means. They inspired and organized a military revolt against the government of the country, which was legally elected by the people. When the revolt failed, they moved to open military intervention."

The Makarios government was guilty of failing to respect many of the rights guaranteed to the Turkish minority under the terms of the Cyprus settlement. Turkey and the Turkish minority had legitimate grievances.

There was much to be said, in view of the irreconcilability of the two parties, in favor of an enforced partition of the island into a Turkish sector and a Greek sector, followed by a federation of the two sectors. But we should have made up our minds

in advance that whatever measures we might advocate, a Turkish invasion of Cyprus was something we could no more tolerate than the Greek coup which overthrew the Makarios government. We could not tolerate it for the simple reason that once Turkish forces went into Cyprus the basic events that have since transpired would become utterly inevitable.

What could we have done then?

Makarios knew that a coup was in preparation and we must have known that a coup was in preparation, too. Armed with this information, we might have let the Greek junta know that any such military intervention in Cyprus by agents of the Greek government could not be tolerated and that it was bound to provoke a Turkish reaction which would result in disaster for Greece and for NATO.

On the Turkish side, we might have enhanced our influence by moving to assure the Turkish government that we understood and sympathized with the grievances of the Turkish minority on Cyprus and that we were prepared to use our influence to correct this situation.

And we might have thrown our weight behind an enforced partition of the island into a Turkish sector and a Greek sector for the purpose of avoiding the kind of murderous communal conflict which is today going on in the island.

If despite such warnings, the Greek military junta persisted in carrying through with the coup against Makarios, there would then have been only one way to pre-empt the Turkish invasion of Cyprus—and that would have been to pre-empt the invasion by announcing that we considered his overthrow and the installation of the extremist anti-Turkish Sampson government an imminent danger to the peace of the area, and by moving ourselves to depose Sampson and reinstall, if not Makarios, at least a leader acceptable to the Turks as well as to the Greeks.

Further than this, we might have moved to dissuade the Turkish government from deploying its military forces for action against Cyprus by patiently exploring with them the many dangers that confront the free world in the Balkans and in the Mediterranean and the even greater dangers that were bound to result from an actual invasion of Cyprus by Turkish forces.

The Turks could have been presented with a carefully prepared intelligence memorandum covering the many evidences of Soviet expansionist intentions in the Balkans. Apart from the hard evidence of a Soviet plan to move into Yugoslavia in the event of Marshal Tito's death, there have been two other parallel disturbing developments over the past six months. At the Bulgarian Communist party Congress in March, Todor Zhivkov, the Bulgarian prime minister, surprised many of his own followers by speaking about the possible eventual incorporation of Bulgaria into the Soviet Union.

Shortly after this incident, Marshal Yakubovsky, the Soviet commander of the Warsaw Pact forces in Europe, visited Rumania for discussions with Rumanian leaders. As the *Christian Science Monitor* reported, the Rumanians let it be known that Yakubovsky had asked for a land corridor for the Red Army through Rumania to Bulgaria to which the Rumanians had at this juncture replied that the Soviet Union had no need for such a land corridor because it had a direct sea route from the Soviet Union to Bulgaria.

It could also have been patiently explained to the Turks that a Turkish invasion of Cyprus was bound to result in Greek withdrawal from NATO with all this implies for the security of Turkey itself, and that it was also bound to result in the return of Andreas Papandreu to Greece and in the emergence of a powerful movement under his leadership, committed to a pro-Soviet position.

Indeed, so violent are the passions that have been aroused in Greece by the invasion of Cyprus and so cleverly are the Russians exploiting the militant anti-American sentiment that has emerged in the wake of this invasion, that the possibility of a Communist Greece in the near future certainly cannot be ruled out.

And a Soviet Greece and an even more Sovietized Bulgaria would soon make any kind of independence, even the very limited independence which today exists, quite untenable for either Yugoslavia or Rumania.

Kissinger's handling of the Cyprus crisis was beyond simple bungling and lack foresight. If there was any possibility at all of keeping Greece in NATO and the American naval bases in Greece, this possibility became completely forfeit when Kissinger decided to tilt toward Turkey. Kissinger, of course, has denied that he did tilt. But how else were the Greeks to interpret his statement when, after Turkey had broken the initial cease-fire and was aggressively moving its army forward. Kissinger said that he was prepared to suspend military shipments to both Turkey and Greece? And how were they to interpret his attitude when he virtually repudiated Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's warning that the Turks had exceeded the limits of the permissible?

Things have now developed to the point in Cyprus where it would require almost a miracle of diplomacy to pull our chestnuts out of the fire. On the basis of his performance to date in the Cyprus crisis, there is, unfortunately, little reason for hoping that Henry Kissinger is capable of such a miracle.

[From *National Review*, October 11, 1974]

OUT OF THE BARREL OF A GUN

(By James Burnham)

THE PROTRACTED CONFLICT

Turkey's military force on Cyprus is overwhelmingly superior to any other military force on the island. The population of Turkey is four times that of Greece and their comparative total military strengths are in about the same ratio. Neither the United States nor any other nation, Western or Communist, proposes direct military intervention in Cyprus, Turkey, or Greece. These are the controlling realities from which any estimate of the Cyprus situation must start.

There are other than military realities. Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus do not occupy a sealed off planet. They must take into account not merely the local military balance but their own diverse needs, desires, hopes, and fears in relation to the nations around them, and to their international commitments.

This necessity permits some hope that the troubles provoked by the anti-Makarios coup might be, not solved—since even the terms of a permanent solution are almost impossible to formulate—but tranquilized. The diplomacy of the major West European governments, as of the United States, is working actively and on the whole tactfully to that purpose. Even a temporary cooling off would give a chance to repair the damage to NATO and to the relations between the Western nations and the three embroiled states.

LIMITS OF DIPLOMACY

Since Greece (along with the Greek Cypriots) has lost this round, and lost it in a humiliating manner, it is Greece that requires and is getting the most attention. Everyone sings the praise of the new Greek government, but with Washington in the Greek doghouse for the moment, it is Bonn that announces a big credit to Athens, France that offers jet fighters, and the European Economic Community instead of the U.S. Export-Import Bank that discusses an \$800-million development program with Karamanlis. Meanwhile Washington keeps quiet, the old ambassador slips out of Athens, and the U.S. ships, sailors, and airmen based in Greece try to stay invisible.

Though the local power balance, then, is not the only operative factor, it would be an error to suppose that diplomatic therapy, trade deals, and UN palaver can do more than moderate its influence. Since the Turks won this round, the political result is going to reflect their victory, and will not be pleasing to the Greeks or the Greek Cypriots, who lost.

During the 700 years since the Turks reached the eastern Mediterranean littoral, there have been many precedents in their history for their present-day Cyprus problem. In fact, there are two rather close analogies in the history of the modern Republic of Turkey that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk created out of the ruins of the Ottoman Empire.

In the preliminary settlement after World War I, Greece was assigned rule over a sizable region of western Anatolia in which many of the inhabitants were ethnic Greeks. A Greek army went in and based itself on the major Aegean port, Smyrna. But in 1922 Kemal won a crushing victory over the Greek army. In 1923 the Treaty of Lausanne recognized Turkish sovereignty over all Anatolia. The problem of relations between the Greek and Turkish ethnic communities was solved by a massive exchange of populations: more than a million Greeks of western Anatolia were shipped to Greek national territory, and hundreds of thousands of Turks living in Greek Thrace and Macedonia were shipped to Anatolia. Smyrna was renamed Izmir.

There are closer parallels with the Hatay affair in the 1930s. Hatay is a district just south of Anatolia along the Mediterranean coast. Its principal city was the port of Alexandretta. The World War I settlement had included Hatay in France's Syrian mandate. Like all the region, it has been part of the Ottoman Empire. Its population when France took it over included about the same proportion of Turks as in Cyprus today.

Kemal set his course to regain Hatay for the Republic. Turkish settlers were sent in. Successive census takings reclassified more and more inhabitants as Turks. (The blood of the peoples of the eastern Mediterranean is much intermingled. The Turks themselves enjoy stressing their Hittite component, thus pushing their presence back to 1500 B.C.) Pressures on the French, who were rather casual about their mandate, led in 1936 to a change of Hatay's status to nominal independence, under which regime the Turks rapidly expanded their numbers and power. In 1939 Hatay was made a Turkish province. Alexandretta was renamed Iskanderun.

IS IT LIKELY?

Let us return to Cyprus. The Turkish army controls the northern 40 per cent of the island, in which are located the best of its land and other resources. In that zone three months ago there were 165,000 Greeks and 70,000 Turks. Today about 25,000 Greeks are left; 149,000 have fled south or are dead. Is it likely that (1) the Turks will let the zone revert to Greek-dominated rule? (2) the Turks will let the refugee Greeks return, or even half of them, and thereby reduce the Turks back into a minority, confronting a Greek majority that would become the sea in which Greek Cypriot guerrillas from sanctuaries south of the zone could swim? Even if all or most of the 60,000 Turkish Cypriots living south of the zone shift inside, it seems probable that the Turks will insist that the Greeks remain henceforth a minority.

Meanwhile it is reported that Turkish settlers are crossing from the mainland, and that Greek Cypriots are leaving for Greece. Is it inconceivable that a replay of the Hatay scenario of 1936 is taking place, and that few years from now a federated or partitioned Cyprus will wake up one morning as—once more—a Turkish province?

Smyrna-become-Izmir is today the base of the U.S. 6th Tactical Air Force. Alexandretta-become-Iskenderun is a major supply base for the U.S. Sixth Fleet. Is it excluded that a few years from now a squadron of the Sixth Fleet will be operating from the harbor—the Turks are already upgrading it—of Kyrenia become whatever the new name will be?

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WRECKAGE OF AN ISLAND

Andreas Petsalides is sorely perplexed. He knows that the Turkish conquest of Northern Cyprus has devastated the economy which he has tended for the past six years as Minister of Finance.

But until the big political questions have been answered, he cannot know either the shape or the scale of his problem. Will Cyprus have one economy or two? How many of the 200,000 Greek refugees will be able to return home? Will their jobs and businesses still be there for them?

Petsalides, an economist who studied at the London School of Economics and Harvard, can only hope for the best and plan for the worst. Sipping sweet black coffee in his office within earshot of the Nicosia Green Line, we surveyed the wreckage of Greek Cypriot prosperity.

The Turks, Petsalides said, had taken 40 percent of the island but something nearer 70 percent of its productive resources. The North had most of the water, cereal-growing land, and citrus plantations. In the Lefka area, the Greeks had lost 60 percent of their mineral deposits—copper and copper pyrites—as well as the stone and lime quarries of Kythrea.

In Kyrenia and Famagusta, they had lost their most lucrative tourist centres. In the Nicosia industrial zone and Famagusta, they had lost some of the biggest factories. The Minister estimated that Cyprus was forfeiting £2 millions worth of production a day because of the occupation and the disruption. Severe unemployment was inevitable for a community that had not seen more than 1.2 percent out of work for seven years.

The standard of living would drop. "If the situation remains unchanged," Petsalides predicted, "if there is no foreign assistance, no settlement, and no change in the present arrangements, average income could be cut by half. It is already clear that it will be down by half this year, even with a peaceful first six months. If the situation continues, it will get worse and worse."

Greek Cypriots earned the equivalent of £600 a head last year, but the division between peasant and business economies meant that the townspeople lived rather more affluently than the statistics suggest.

In 1973 Cyprus had a small payments deficit of about £6 millions, its first for many years. Petsalides is reconciled to a huge shortfall in 1974. Cyprus does have a monetary cushion, but one that will wear thin before long. The Bank of Cyprus has enough foreign currency to pay for seven months' worth of imports on the old scale. Imports will probably go down, but not necessarily in dramatic proportions.

Petsalides discerned two opposing tendencies. Spending power would be reduced, so that there would be less demand for foreign consumer goods. But Cyprus would also need to import to replace lost production at home.

Even if there is some kind of political settlement, it may be too late for Cyprus's more perishable resources. If, for instance, the citrus plantations around Morphou, Karavas, and Lapithos are left without water, the trees may be permanently destroyed. It takes between 10 and 15 years to bring a tree to full fruit.

Where then can Petsalides begin? First, the Government is tackling the immediate problem of refugees—food, water, sanitation—as best it can and with what help it can muster.

It is trying to find out how many there are, what they need, and how many have homes to return to. Then Ministers will need money to provide work and revive economic activity. Petsalides will be seeking up to £60 millions in foreign aid till the end of this year alone.
